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Introduction

3Chapter 1
General overview and structure
“Economics defines investment as the act of incurring an immediate cost in the
expectation of future rewards. Firms that construct plants and install equipment,
merchants who lay in a stock of goods for sale, and persons who spend time
on vocational education are all investors in this sense. ... Viewed from this
perspective, investment decisions are ubiquitous” (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 3).
The theory of investment was pioneered by Jorgenson (1963) and Tobin (1969), who proposed
two alternative approaches. Since then, investment decisions have been widely analyzed in
the theoretical and empirical literature. An important aspect in the context of investment
decisions is risk, for “there is hardly any situation where economic decisions are made with
perfect certainty” (Chavas, 2004, p. 1). Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) developed
the expected utility theory which became the standard approach to model decision-making
under uncertainty.1 Despite its widespread use and its general acceptance, the expected
utility approach has been subject to criticism, and so-called non-expected utility models have
been suggested.2 A second factor influencing investment decisions is market frictions. In
the last decades, much research has been devoted to the analysis of market frictions because
many real world phenomena cannot be explained under the assumption of perfect markets.3
Information economics has shown that asymmetric information has profound effects on
1Concerning the meaning of the terms “risk” and “uncertainty”, there is no clear consensus in the literature.
Knight (1921) proposed a distinction between risk and uncertainty that depends on the ability to make
probability estimates, i.e., risk is measurable but uncertainty is not. This terminology is, however, not used
consistently in the literature. We follow Chavas (2004) and use the two terms interchangeably.
2For a comprehensive survey on non-expected utility theory, see Starmer (2000).
3See, e.g., Calcagnini and Saltari (2010), who provide a collection of recent contributions on the effects of
market imperfections on economic decision-making.
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decision-making and equilibrium outcomes in financial and other markets (Stiglitz, 2002).
Additionally, investment decisions may be affected by many other market imperfections,
e.g., various labor market frictions.
This dissertation contributes to the existing literature by presenting two applications of the
economics of investment in the presence of risk and market frictions. The first is in the area
of financial economics (Part II) and the second is in the area of international trade and
labor economics (Part III). In the following, the structure and content of this dissertation
are described.
Part II is devoted to asymmetric information and portfolio risk in credit markets.
Particular focus lies on equilibrium credit rationing, i.e., market equilibria with excess
demand for credit.4 In Chapters 2 and 3, we motivate our analysis and review the literature
on credit rationing, respectively. Chapter 4 presents our contribution which introduces
non-diversifiable risk to the seminal Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) adverse selection model. We
would now like to point out in what way investment, risk, and market frictions matter in our
model. Firms decide whether to undertake an investment project which needs to be financed
externally. Households also face an investment decision: they have to decide on their savings
for future consumption. Moreover, risk plays a pivotal role in our analysis. As investment
projects are risky and may fail, risk-neutral firms only apply for credit if the expected
profit is non-negative. Due to correlated project payoffs, the single-name credit risks do
not cancel out, and there is non-diversifiable risk. The risky return on lending is passed
through to the suppliers of capital, i.e., households’ return on saving is risky as well. To
model households’ consumption-savings decision under uncertainty, we use expected utility
maximization and generalize the analysis to non-expected utility maximization. Market
frictions are also relevant in our model: the credit market is characterized by asymmetric
information. As lenders are unable to observe the risk of a firm’s project, the loan rate is
the same for each of two borrower types. There is cross-subsidization of high-risk borrowers
by low-risk borrowers.
In our static partial equilibrium model, we analyze the credit market equilibrium and
determine the amount and types of investment projects financed. It is shown that credit
rationing is possible. We also address the role of lenders’ risk aversion and the welfare
implications of the equilibrium. In particular, we investigate whether there is too little or
4A more detailed definition is given in Section 3.2.
5too much investment in equilibrium, relative to a first-best or a second-best optimum. To
illustrate our theoretical results, some numerical examples are provided. In sum, we show
that deviating from the common assumption of independent project payoffs leads to several
interesting implications for equilibrium and welfare.
Part III deals with the employment effects of offshoring in the presence of labor mar-
ket frictions. Offshoring means the relocation of production processes from the home
country to a foreign country. In the case of foreign direct investment, production processes
are offshored within multinational enterprises, whereas in the case of offshore outsourcing,
production processes are offshored to unaffiliated suppliers.5 Chapter 5 motivates our work,
which addresses the question of whether offshoring to low-wage countries (the “South”)
is detrimental to employment in high-wage countries (the “North”) with labor market
frictions. In Chapter 6, we define the main concepts and state some general facts and
consequences of offshoring. Chapter 7 reviews the literature on offshoring and its labor
market effects in detail, since, to the best of our knowledge, a comprehensive literature
survey that considers all the different strands of literature related to our model does not
yet exist. We cover different trade models, various approaches to offshoring, and models on
the labor market effects of trade and offshoring. Of main interest are models analyzing the
aggregate employment effects of offshoring in the presence of labor market frictions. As the
literature on this issue is still rather limited, the other contributions reviewed may act as
a starting point for future research. The detailed survey gives an overview of the sizeable
literature on offshoring and its labor market effects, thereby highlighting how our model
contributes to the existing literature.
Chapter 8 presents our model, which is Krugman’s (1979a) North-South trade model aug-
mented to include offshoring and unemployment in the North. It is our second application
of the economics of investment in the presence of risk and market frictions, which raises the
question of how these aspects play into our analysis. Concerning investment, a Northern
firm can move production to the South within a multinational enterprise. This foreign direct
investment is associated with a fixed cost, but the production cost is lower in the South
than in the North. Additionally, our model incorporates union wage setting in the North as
a source of labor market frictions leading to unemployment. Risk aspects play a subordinate
role in our baseline model without productivity uncertainty.6 In the variant of the model
5We revert to defining terms in Section 6.1, since the terms are used differently in the literature.
6As we focus on equilibria with unemployment, there is employment risk in our model, i.e., each worker
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with heterogeneous firms, however, risk plays a more important role. There is uncertainty
about productivity in the South, and a firm only knows its expected profit as a multinational
enterprise when it decides to pay the fixed cost of offshoring. A firm incurring the fixed
cost of offshoring only relocates production to the South if its operating cost is lower there,
i.e., if its productivity in the South is sufficiently high. This means that there is twofold
uncertainty: a firm paying the fixed cost does not know the location of production and its
productivity if it produces in the South.
Our static general equilibrium model endogenously determines the equilibrium number of
firms that offshore production to the South and the production cost in both countries. We
find that a reduction in the fixed cost of offshoring usually decreases employment in the
North, while the opposite may happen at a low initial level of offshoring. The welfare effects
of increased offshoring and a commitment problem of labor unions are also addressed. The
variant of the model with heterogeneous firms possibly displays multiple equilibria and
provides a more optimistic view of the employment effects of offshoring. In contrast to the
existing literature, we extend a standard North-South trade model with two large economies.
In doing so, we obtain interesting results concerning the employment effects of offshoring to
low-wage countries, gains from trade, shrinking union power, and multiple equilibria.
The conclusion in Chapter 9 summarizes the main results of this dissertation and outlines
some future research directions.
faces a positive probability of unemployment. The industry union has the objective to maximize expected
utility of workers and bargains over the wage rate with Northern producers. It is indeterminate which workers
are unemployed because the model only determines the equilibrium amount of offshoring.
7Part II
Asymmetric Information and
Portfolio Risk in Credit Markets

9Chapter 2
Motivation
During the recent financial crisis, a temporary reduction in the availability of credit was
observable. This fact can be illustrated by the Ifo Credit Constraint Indicator for German
industry and trade, depicted in Figure 2.1 for the period between March 2005 and June
2011.1 The figure shows that the share of firms indicating that credit access is restrictive
increased considerably during the financial crisis beginning in 2008. In addition, it indicates
the fact that restrictive credit policy is not limited to the period of the financial crisis, i.e.,
it is not necessarily a temporary phenomenon. While direct evidence for credit rationing is
hard to come by, this data for Germany suggests that it might be an empirically relevant
phenomenon.
Moreover, the financial crisis highlights the importance of information asymmetries and the
portfolio risk of banks. A lesson to be learned from the crisis is that non-diversifiable risk
and correlations should be more carefully considered. Our aim is not to explain the financial
crisis, but to emphasize three aspects which are of interest for the analysis of credit market
equilibria: credit rationing, asymmetric information, and portfolio risk. In the following, we
briefly summarize existing theoretical work on credit market equilibria in order to point out
how our model contributes to the literature.
In the last 30 years, theoretical research on credit markets has made significant progress.
The consideration of asymmetric information represents a fundamental change. Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) and the ensuing literature showed that the credit market equilibrium
1The Ifo Institute for Economic Research (2011, p. 2) provides the following information: “The credit con-
straint indicator is based on ca. 4,000 responses of firms in industry and trade from the sectors manufacturing,
construction, wholesaling and retailing. The firms are asked to respond to the following question: ‘How would
you assess the current willingness of banks to extend credit to businesses’? The answers to choose from are
‘accommodating’, ‘normal’ and ‘restrictive’. The credit constraint is calculated from the percentages of the
responses to the last of the three categories”.
10 2 Motivation
20%
30%
40%
50%
0%
10%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
share of firms indicating that credit access is restrictive
Figure 2.1: Credit Constraint Indicator for German industry and trade.
Source: Adapted from Ifo Institute for Economic Research (2011).
under asymmetric information may differ considerably from the full information outcome.
In their seminal2 contribution, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) established, among other things,
that credit rationing may arise in equilibrium due to asymmetric information. However,
Coco (1997) and Arnold and Riley (2009) independently proved that credit rationing at a
single equilibrium loan rate cannot occur under the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) assumptions.
Additionally, many other models have been developed that modify the Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) model and discuss the phenomenon of credit rationing. It has also been analyzed
whether there is too little investment in a credit market equilibrium, relative to a socially
efficient level. This is an important aspect, since credit rationing per se does not have to be
inefficient.
A common feature of the credit market models with asymmetric information is the neglect
of the portfolio risk of banks. The models build on the assumption that the payoffs of
different risky projects are independent, and single-name credit risks cancel out due to
perfect diversification.
Our analysis is motivated by the rather obvious fact that returns on risky investment
projects tend to be far from independent. Direct evidence is difficult to find, but there are
empirical studies suggesting that individual firms’ profits are positively correlated at business
cycle frequency.3 We are interested in whether the assumption of correlated project returns
2According to Google Scholar, the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) paper was cited 7,576 times (Sept. 6, 2011).
3In Section 4.1, we come back to this point and mention exemplary studies supporting this fact.
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has a major impact on the results of credit market models with asymmetric information. For
this purpose, we focus on the prominent Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) adverse selection model.
We study the consequences of correlated project payoffs and, thus, of portfolio risk in the
two-type version of this model. Our analysis addresses the following questions: Is credit
rationing at a single equilibrium loan rate possible? Does a systematic relationship between
lenders’ degree of risk aversion and the credit market equilibrium exist? Is there too little or
too much investment in equilibrium, relative to the first-best or the second-best optimum?
The remainder of Part II is organized as follows. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on
credit rationing. It illustrates the different approaches used to explain this phenomenon and
highlights the important role of the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model. Chapter 4 presents our
model with aggregate risk.
12 2 Motivation
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Chapter 3
Literature review on credit
rationing
3.1 Early work on credit rationing
Credit rationing is a phenomenon analyzed extensively in the financial economics literature.1
The importance of credit rationing and the “fringe of unsatisfied borrowers” have already
been emphasized by Keynes (1930).2 In the early 1950s the so-called availability doctrine
came into prominence and assigned an important role to credit rationing arguments. The
doctrine, whose leading proponents are Rosa (1951), Kareken (1957), and Scott (1957), is a
reaction to the then accepted view of the monetary mechanism. It suggests that monetary
policy may operate to some extent through an alternative transmission channel, namely a
rationing channel rather than an interest rate channel. Consequently, the funds available to
banks are limited and credit is rationed.3 Even though the availability doctrine was widely
criticized, it raised interest in developing theoretical models of credit rationing. There have
been several attempts to explain equilibrium credit rationing4 in full information models, for
example Hodgman (1960), Jaffee and Modigliani (1969), Cukierman (1978), and Fried and
1A summary of the development of the literature on credit market equilibria is given in Hillier and Ibrahimo
(1993) and Freixas and Rochet (2008, Chapter 5). The structure of our literature review is guided by Hillier
and Ibrahimo (1993).
2For Keynes’ (1930) remarks on this issue, see Vol. 1, pp. 212-13, and Vol. 2, pp. 364-67.
3For a comprehensive discussion on the availability doctrine, see Jaffee (1971) and Clemenz (1986).
4While this literature was mainly concerned with equilibrium credit rationing, some models analyzed dis-
equilibrium credit rationing. According to Baltensperger (1978), the term “equilibrium credit rationing” refers
to a permanent excess demand for credit, whereas “disequilibrium credit rationing” refers to a temporary excess
demand. These terms are, however, not used consistently in the literature. For example, Freixas and Rochet
(2008) additionally use the term “disequilibrium credit rationing” in the context of models on institutional
restrictions in which credit rationing is a permanent phenomenon.
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Howitt (1980).5 These models are not fully satisfactory because they do not really explain
equilibrium credit rationing. They rather assume it or introduce ad hoc rigidities, e.g.,
interest rate regulations (cf. Clemenz, 1986, p. 3). Yet since the late 1970s, there has been
considerable progress in providing convincing theoretical explanations for this phenomenon:
various credit market models incorporate asymmetric information and show how this market
friction may cause credit rationing. Before going into more detail about these models, credit
rationing is defined in greater detail.6
3.2 Definitions of credit rationing
More precise definitions are crucial to the understanding of the different types of credit
rationing addressed in the models with information asymmetries. We present some common
definitions and only remark that the different models use slightly modified definitions applying
to their specific framework.7
Freixas and Rochet (2008, p. 172) give a comprehensive definition which follows Baltensperger
(1978): “Equilibrium credit rationing occurs whenever some borrower’s demand for credit is
turned down, even if this borrower is willing to pay all the price and non-price elements of the
loan contract”. The interest rate charged by the bank is a price element, whereas collateral
requirements or the loan size are examples for non-price elements. Hence, if a borrower with
insufficient collateral is denied credit, he is not credit rationed according to this definition.
Keeton (1979) contrasts two types of credit rationing: “Type I” rationing occurs when all
borrowers within a given group receive smaller loans than those demanded at the interest
rate charged. Rationing of “type II” arises when borrowers within a group are randomly
rationed, i.e., some borrowers of that group do not receive any funds at all, while others are
fully funded. According to Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990, p. 849), type II rationing is the “purest
form of credit rationing”; they establish the term “pure credit rationing” for situations in
which “some individuals obtain loans, while apparently identical individuals, who are willing
5Hodgman (1960) derives a hump-shaped credit supply curve for each borrower, while Jaffee and Modigliani
(1969) build on the assumption that banks cannot use price discrimination due to regulation. Cukierman
(1978) focuses on horizontal integration of banks, i.e., banks provide other services besides credit. Fried and
Howitt (1980) model credit rationing stemming from implicit contracts in credit markets. For more details,
see Clemenz (1986, Chapter 1) and Hillier and Ibrahimo (1993).
6A brief and rather general definition was given in Chapter 1.
7As our model builds on the seminal contribution of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), their definition of credit
rationing is spelt out below.
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to borrow at precisely the same rate, do not”.8 Another phenomenon which can emerge
in equilibrium is “red-lining”, “where exclusion from the loan market is not random but
is systematically determined by an array of imperfect indicators of entrepreneurial quality”
(De Meza and Webb, 2000, p. 217). This means some identifiable groups of borrowers may
be excluded from the loan market. Several authors use the term “credit rationing” in this
context (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), while others do not classify this as such (e.g., Freixas
and Rochet, 2008).
This section illustrated the different forms of credit rationing analyzed in theoretical models
and pointed out that varying definitions exist in the literature.
3.3 Asymmetric information and credit rationing
We now come back to credit market models with asymmetric information. The models in-
corporate different forms of asymmetric information, which may lead to the problems of
adverse selection, moral hazard, or costly state verification. These three problems of asym-
metric information were first identified in other markets. In their ground-breaking papers,
Arrow (1963, 1968) and Akerlof (1970) showed how moral hazard arises because of hidden
action in insurance markets and how adverse selection results from hidden information in the
market for used cars, respectively. Townsend (1979) pioneered the analysis of costly state
verification in insurance markets. Since then, it has been widely recognized that asymmetric
information can have far-reaching effects on market outcomes, and the different approaches
have been applied to credit market models.
In credit market models with ex ante asymmetric information, information is asymmetrically
distributed between the lender and the borrower before project returns are realized. Adverse
selection models consider the inability of lenders to distinguish between different types of
borrowers, i.e., there is hidden information. Whereas in (ex ante) moral hazard models,
lenders cannot influence the firms’ choice between different projects or the firms’ effort after a
loan has been granted, i.e., there is hidden action. Jaffee and Russell (1976), Keeton (1979),
and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) were the first to show that ex ante asymmetric information
may cause credit rationing. While Jaffee and Russell (1976) explain type I rationing in the
8In Section 4.3, we provide a definition of a pure rationing equilibrium for the two-type version of the
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model with aggregate risk.
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context of adverse selection and moral hazard, Keeton (1979) presents a model on moral
hazard explaining type II rationing. The seminal contribution of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
is discussed in detail below. In credit market models with ex post asymmetric information,
project returns are no longer assumed to be costlessly observable for the lender. These
models of costly state verification, which apply the ideas of Townsend (1979), are also called
ex post moral hazard models, since borrowers have an incentive to misreport the project
return. Williamson (1986, 1987) was the first to explain credit rationing in such a model.9
As pointed out by Hillier and Ibrahimo (1993, p. 284), all these models illustrate how in-
formation asymmetries “may create a non-monotonic relationship between bank profitability
per dollar loaned and the interest rate, and how this may lead to credit rationing”.10
After this general overview of credit market models with asymmetric information, we
present the seminal contribution of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) (henceforth SW), in which
several partial equilibrium models of credit rationing with ex ante asymmetric information
are analyzed. SW use the term credit rationing “for circumstances in which either a) among
loan applicants who appear to be identical some receive a loan and others do not, and the
rejected applicants would not receive a loan even if they offered to pay a higher interest rate;
or b) there are identifiable groups of individuals in the population who, with a given supply
of credit, are unable to obtain loans at any interest rate, even though with a larger supply of
credit, they would” (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, pp. 394-95). Part a) of the definition refers to
type II rationing and part b) to red-lining. In the following, we focus on the results of SW
concerning type II rationing and briefly mention their moral hazard model before turning to
their prominent adverse selection model.11
In the moral hazard model, each firm has a hidden choice between a safe and a risky project.
Raising the interest rate may induce the firm to undertake the risky project, i.e., the interest
rate may act as an incentive mechanism. SW show that there may be an interest rate above
which the bank’s expected return declines due to the moral hazard effect. In this case, an
equilibrium with (type II) credit rationing may arise.12
9Adopting the model of Gale and Hellwig (1985), Williamson (1986, 1987) establishes that the standard
debt contract is optimal in his setup and that financial intermediaries arise endogenously in the presence of
monitoring cost.
10This non-monotonicity implies a certain shape of the credit supply curve which may lead to credit rationing
(see the description of the Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, model below). In contrast, regulations or other assumptions
directly influence the credit supply curve in the early models with full information.
11Due to the assumption of indivisible projects, SW analyze rationing of type II rather than type I. For the
results of the models on redlining and other aspects, see Sections III and IV of the SW paper.
12Another noteworthy contribution on moral hazard and credit rationing is Bester and Hellwig (1987).
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However, more prominent is the adverse selection model of SW,13 in which each borrower
is endowed with a project and the payoffs of different projects differ by mean-preserving
spreads.14 By assumption, the lender cannot distinguish between different types of borrowers,
and the amount of collateral and loan size are identical for all borrowers. In this setup, the
interest rate a borrower is willing to pay may act as a screening device. For high interest
rates, borrowers with riskier project still demand credit but those with less risky projects do
not. An increase in the interest rate has the following effects: the average riskiness of the
loan portfolio increases (i.e., the adverse selection effect), and the remaining borrowers pay a
higher rate if they are able to repay. SW establish that there may be an interest rate above
which the adverse selection effect dominates so that the bank’s expected repayment declines.
In the case of a globally hump-shaped return function, the credit supply curve is backward-
bending, and an equilibrium with (type II) credit rationing may arise.15 Besides, SW argue
that a return function with multiple humps may give rise to a two-price equilibrium, which is
characterized by excess demand and random rationing at the lower interest rate and market
clearing at the higher rate.16 Yet, they do not derive the conditions for such a return function.
The analysis of SW has some interesting implications: The “Law of Supply and De-
mand” is repealed, and, as a consequence, standard comparative statics analysis is no longer
possible. Supply and demand are shown to be interdependent. Additionally, red-lining of
some classes of borrowers may be observed. The two-price equilibrium disproves the “Law
of the Single Price”, and the level of investment under asymmetric information might be
inefficient.17 The ground-breaking adverse selection model of SW prompted a number of
papers with different objectives. Among other things, these contributions criticize and
change the assumptions, question the relevance of credit rationing, and push the analysis a
step further. We cluster the models according to their focus and their main deviation from
the SW model.18
13Whenever we refer to the SW model, we mean their adverse selection model.
14This means the different projects have the same expected return but differ in their riskiness (see Rothschild
and Stiglitz, 1970).
15Coco (1997) and Arnold and Riley (2009) independently showed that this putative credit rationing result
(at a single equilibrium loan rate) is inconsistent with the SW assumptions. Later in this section, their finding
is presented in detail.
16For a more detailed description of a two-price equilibrium, see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), p. 398. In
Section 4.3, we provide a definition of the two-price equilibrium for the two-type version of the SW model
with aggregate risk.
17Cf. Hillier and Ibrahimo (1993, pp. 284-88), who give a detailed description of these implications.
18Many of the papers reviewed below are also covered in Hillier and Ibrahimo (1993), pp. 288-99.
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It has been widely criticized that SW assume the use of standard debt contracts as well
as identical loan size and collateral requirement for all borrowers. SW rule out any sorting
mechanism and focus solely on the role of the interest rate the bank charges. Several papers
address this issue and consider different contracts which induce self-selection of borrowers.
If banks offer different contracts which specify the loan rate and collateral requirement
simultaneously, collateral may be used as a sorting device. Contributions adopting this
approach include Wette (1983), Chan and Kanatas (1985), and Bester (1985).19 In his
noteworthy contribution, Bester (1985) shows that, if an equilibrium exists, there is no
equilibrium credit rationing in a variant of the SW model with different contracts.20
Low-risk firms choose the contract with a higher amount of collateral and a lower loan rate,
while high-risk firms choose the other contract. The separating equilibrium21 reveals the
asymmetric information, and there is no reason for credit rationing. This result contrasts
with the pooling equilibrium stemming from the debt contract with a fixed amount of
collateral in the SW model.22 In a related paper, Besanko and Thakor (1987b) characterize
admissible debt contracts by a set of credit instruments, namely interest rate, collateral,
loan size, and credit granting probability. It is shown that there is no credit rationing in
equilibrium, since the lender uses a sufficiently large set of credit instruments in order to
sort the borrowers. In addition, Besanko and Thakor (1987a) analyze the role of market
structure (i.e., monopolistic or competitive credit markets) for credit allocation and for
lenders’ use of collateral as a sorting device.23 Instead of focusing on collateral, Milde and
Riley (1988) use loan size as a sorting device. In their model, banks use higher loan size at
higher interest rates to induce self-selection of borrowers. This mechanism is ruled out in
the SW model by the assumption that all firms have the same need for capital.
Another point of criticism is that SW do not take account of the complexity of the lender-
borrower relationship. In their static setup, strategies of lenders are limited. As a response
to this critique, Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) extend their model to allow for multi-period
19Wette (1983) shows that increases in collateral may also cause adverse selection effects when the interest
rate is fixed. Chan and Kanatas (1985) establish that in a model with asymmetric valuations of the payoffs
the less risky borrowers provide more collateral.
20Bester (1987) establishes a similar result for the case of risk-averse borrowers. He shows that credit
rationing occurs only if some borrowers cannot provide enough collateral, i.e., if perfect sorting is not viable.
21This type of equilibrium was first analyzed in insurance markets in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In this
context, different contracts also specify a quantity and a price.
22In their response, Stiglitz and Weiss (1986) develop a model in which, among other changes, the level of
collateralization is positively related to the riskiness of the borrowers. This view is supported by empirical
evidence of Berger and Udell (1990). SW argue that credit rationing is still possible in such a setup.
23For a survey on the use of collateral in credit markets, see Coco (2000). The empirical work he reviews is
inconsistent with the use of collateral as a signal of project types.
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relationships between the bank and borrowers. Equilibrium credit rationing is still possible
in this model, in which defaulters are denied credit in future periods. Additionally, Diamond
(1989) analyzes how borrowers’ reputation is formed and how the incentive effects of
reputation evolve over time. Reputation may not provide better incentives at the beginning
of a lending relationship, but over time, reputation will lead the borrower to choose less
risky projects. The multi-period model of Bester (1994) considers the role of collateral for
debt renegotiation given ex post asymmetric information. Initial contracts are more likely
to be renegotiated in the presence of collateral requirements, since collateralization reduces
the incentives for strategic default. Petersen and Rajan (1995) establish that competition in
credit markets is an important factor for the value of lending relationships.
Furthermore, there is no explicit game-theoretic foundation for competitive equilibria in
the SW model. Since it is problematic to achieve competitive equilibria under two-sided
price competition (Stahl, 1988, and Yanelle, 1989, 1997), Arnold (2011) provides a detailed
game-theoretic foundation for the SW model. Building on the work of Stahl (1988) and
Yanelle (1989, 1997), competition in the deposit and credit market is described as a
two-stage game. With double Bertrand competition, the order of the game is important:
the credit subgame has to precede the deposit subgame in order to obtain the competitive
equilibria as subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.24 In an earlier contribution, Hellwig (1987)
is concerned with different game-theoretic formalizations of competition in markets with
adverse selection. It is illustrated that the prediction of how a competitive market works
varies with the different formalizations. Hellwig (1987) elucidates the conditions for the
existence of a competitive equilibrium, for credit rationing, and for the emergence of different
credit contracts.25
While SW focus on the credit market equilibrium, a group of papers analyzes the equity
market equilibrium in the presence of asymmetric information and the interaction between
equity and debt financing. Cho (1986) argues that the use of equity instead of debt could
avoid the inefficient allocation of capital in the SW model, since equity contracts are
not associated with adverse selection effects. In contrast, Myers and Majluf (1984) and
Greenwald et al. (1984) establish that rationing is also possible in equity markets. For
this purpose, the authors change some assumptions, in particular asymmetric information
24Arnold (2011) shows that the SW assumptions may give rise to a two-price equilibrium but not to a credit
rationing equilibrium (see also Arnold and Riley, 2009). We come back to this point later.
25General thoughts on game-theoretic aspects of credit market models can be found in Clemenz (1986,
pp. 155-63).
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concerns expected returns and not project risk (cf. Hellmann and Stiglitz, 2000). De Meza
and Webb (1987) take this a logical step further and model the competition between the
different forms of financing, equity or debt. They derive the equilibrium mode of finance
and find that it is debt in their own model but equity in the SW model. This difference
as well as the over- and underinvestment result mentioned below are due to changes in the
model assumptions: In the SW model, the expected returns are equal across projects, and
the payoffs differ by mean-preserving spreads. Concerning the information asymmetry, SW
assume that lenders are uninformed about the risk of a borrower’s project. In contrast,
De Meza and Webb (1987) assume that the projects have the same return if successful but
differ in the success probability; i.e., the riskiest project has the lowest expected return. In
their setup, the lender is uninformed about the expected return of a borrower’s project. These
changes have far-reaching consequences. As the different projects are ranked by first-order
stochastic dominance, an increase in the interest rate improves the composition of the loan
portfolio in the De Meza and Webb (1987) model. Thus, there is no adverse selection, and
credit rationing never occurs in equilibrium. Moreover, De Meza and Webb (1987) are the
first to explicitly address the welfare properties of the market equilibrium by comparing
the equilibrium level of investment with the optimum investment under full information.
They show that the equilibrium in their own model is characterized by overinvestment,
while there is underinvestment in the SW model irrespective of whether rationing occurs or
not.26 Hence, in both models the market equilibrium is not first-best efficient.27 Asymmetric
information concerns the expected project return in the De Meza and Webb (1987) model
and project risk in the SW model. In a setup with both forms of information asymmetries,
Hellmann and Stiglitz (2000) analyze the interaction between equity and debt finance. They
find that there may be credit and/or equity rationing in equilibrium. The adverse selection
which results in rationing outcomes may be caused by competition between the equity and
credit market.
As pointed out by De Meza and Webb (1987), asymmetric information may cause inefficient
levels of investment, and, thus, there may be a case for government interventions. In
general, under- and overinvestment can be mitigated by an interest rate subsidy and an
26With the aim to clarify the different results of these two models, Bernhardt (2000) analyzes a setup in
which lenders and borrowers are symmetrically uninformed. He argues that the over- and underinvestment
result depends on the kind of uncertainty about production technology, i.e., how the stochastic component
enters payoffs.
27In Section 4.8.1, we prove the underinvestment result for the SW model with uncorrelated payoffs, thereby
showing that the first-best and second-best optima coincide.
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interest rate tax, respectively.28 In this context, we mention the contribution of Mankiw
(1986). Using a hidden-type model, he shows that credit allocation is inefficient and can
be improved by interventions. Moreover, he highlights that the government should act
as lender of last resort due to the possibility of financial fragility. Policy implications are
discussed in several other papers, but the recommendations drawn from this class of models
should be treated with caution for the following reasons: All of these models are rather
simple, and their implications are sensitive to changes in the underlying assumptions.29 As
these contributions use only partial equilibrium models, they do not consider the effects of
government interventions on the economy as a whole.
This last aspect leads us to another group of papers which is concerned with macroeconomic
consequences of asymmetric information in capital markets. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1987)
give a rather general overview of possible consequences for the macroeconomy. Additionally,
business cycle theorists incorporate the results from research on imperfect capital markets
into general equilibrium models. Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990) use a model with ex
post and ex ante asymmetric information, respectively.30 Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993)
also analyze the influence of capital market imperfections on the business cycle and take
into account the fact that asymmetric information may lead to a collapse of the equity
market. Suarez and Sussman (2004) use a dynamic extension of the moral hazard model
in SW in order to analyze endogenous cycles. In their simple model, the business cycle is
generated solely by financial imperfections. These different contributions illustrate the idea
that financial factors (i.e., the way of financing projects, the access to financial markets,
and contractual arrangements) play a crucial role for business cycles and the macroeconomy
in general.31 A line of research which is more concerned with long-run macroeconomic
development is the finance and growth literature.32 The central idea is that the functioning
of financial markets and the financial structure may have a substantial influence on economic
growth and the overall development of the economy. For instance, Bencivenga and Smith
28Note that the emergence of credit rationing per se does not imply a socially inefficient level of investment
or a role for government interventions. De Meza and Webb (1992) show that credit rationing need not be
inefficient, since it may also prevail in capital markets with symmetric information.
29For example, De Meza and Webb (2000) show that credit rationing may be associated with overinvestment
in a model of simultaneous adverse selection and (ex ante) moral hazard. In contrast, credit rationing is
associated with underinvestment in the SW model.
30In a simple neoclassical model of business cycles, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) analyze the relationship
between borrowers’ net worth, agency costs of financing investments, and business fluctuations. They show
how shocks are propagated via capital market imperfections. Bernanke and Gertler (1990) examine financial
fragility in a general equilibrium model, in which agency costs play a major role.
31For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see Reichlin (2004).
32Among others, Levine (2005) provides a survey of the theoretical and empirical work in this field.
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(1993) address the profound consequences of credit rationing in an endogenous growth
model with adverse selection in the credit market. They show that, among other things,
government investment subsidies can be growth-reducing.
We already mentioned some contributions that provide arguments against the relevance of
equilibrium credit rationing, e.g., Bester (1985), who points out the role of collateral as a
sorting device. In addition, Riley (1987, p. 226) concludes “that the extent of rationing
implied by the SW model is not likely to be very important empirically”. He builds on
the assumption that banks can group borrowers into different risk classes and highlights
that credit rationing can occur only in one marginal class. More recent contributions
that question the relevance of credit rationing focus on the option to wait. Lensink and
Sterken (2001, 2002) modify the SW model such that a firm has the possibility to delay
its project. They assume that waiting projects never default, i.e., the uncertainty involved
in an investment is resolved in the future. Since firms with riskier projects have a greater
return from waiting, they are the first to delay their projects as the interest rate rises.
Consequently, banks have no reason to ration credit. De Meza and Webb (2006) build on
this model, but the option to wait has a different implication in their setup. By delaying a
project, a firm accumulates financial assets and reduces the size of the loan needed. Given
the assumption that banks condition the interest rate on the loan size, less risky firms delay
their projects, and there is no random rationing. The authors mention scaling down the
project or decreasing consumption as other options to reduce the size of the loan needed,
in turn, avoiding credit rationing. Besides the adverse selection model, De Meza and Webb
(2006) study a model with moral hazard, in which equilibrium credit rationing only occurs
if a delay deteriorates the indivisible project sufficiently.
The theoretical models mentioned so far emphasize the problems of asymmetric information
that may arise in capital markets and the far-reaching consequences they might have. As
pointed out by Stiglitz (2002, p. 461), the main insight gained by research on asymmetric
information is that “even a small amount of information imperfection could have a profound
effect on the nature of the equilibrium”. The information-based models are an important
contribution to economic theory, and this is particularly true for the literature on credit
rationing. Credit market models with asymmetric information considerably improved our
understanding of this phenomenon, but the literature review illustrates that the relevance
of equilibrium credit rationing is disputed. Several models explain how equilibrium credit
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rationing may be caused by asymmetric information, while other models question this
result. The equilibrium outcomes of the different models depend heavily on the underlying
assumptions.
Since there is no consensus on the relevance of credit rationing in the theoretical
literature, empirical evidence on credit rationing would be valuable. The scarceness of
microeconomic data on contract details of commercial bank loans, however, limits empirical
testing of the theories of credit rationing.33 Due to this fact, some empirical investigations
focus on macroeconomic variables as proxies for credit rationing. For example, the stickiness
of commercial loan rates, measured by the speed with which the commercial loan rate
adjusts to changes in open market rates, is used as evidence for credit rationing. Using this
approach, Jaffee (1971) and Slovin and Sushka (1983) find different degrees of loan stickiness
and come to opposing conclusions concerning the empirical relevance of credit rationing.34
As there are many other reasons for sticky loan rates, this method is rather controversial. In
a more recent contribution, Gu et al. (2008) use a new technique and analyze the US credit
market at the aggregate level. They detect that credit is not rationed for very high or very
low levels of inflation but for intermediate levels. Unfortunately, there is little direct testing
of the empirical relevance of credit rationing. A notable exception is the study of Berger
and Udell (1992), which uses individual loan data for more than a million commercial loans
in the US from 1977 to 1988. Berger and Udell (1992) find evidence for the stickiness of
loan rates but show that most of the stickiness does not stem from credit rationing. Their
findings suggest that “information-based equilibrium credit rationing ... [is no] important
macroeconomic phenomenon” (Berger and Udell, 1992, p. 1076). However, this evidence
only applies to a specific micro data set and cannot be generalized. Up to now, the empirical
relevance of credit rationing is still obscure. There is surely a need for better microeconomic
data and further research.
This overview shows that there is a sizeable theoretical literature on the phenomenon
of credit rationing and, in particular, illustrates the important role of the SW model. A
33Petrick (2005) gives an overview of the various methods for measuring credit rationing, which all turn out
to be quite data demanding.
34Other studies using macroeconomic data are by King (1986) and Sofianos et al. (1990). King (1986) obtains
mixed results concerning the empirical relevance of credit rationing, while Sofianos et al. (1990) find evidence
for the credit rationing hypothesis using time series for uncommitted loans. Since alternative interpretations
may apply, these results should be treated with caution (cf. Berger and Udell, 1992).
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widely cited result of SW is that pure credit rationing may only arise if the bank’s return
function is globally hump-shaped. As pointed out independently by Coco (1997) and Arnold
and Riley (2009), however, pure credit rationing at a single equilibrium loan rate cannot
occur in the SW model, since the return function cannot be globally hump-shaped under
the SW assumptions. It is shown that the return on lending is maximum at the highest
possible loan rate (i.e., the loan rate at which the riskiest borrowers drop out of the market).
Consequently, non-monotonicity of the return function cannot result in a pure rationing
equilibrium, but it may give rise to a two-price equilibrium in the SW model.35 In a
two-price equilibrium, only the less risky borrowers are rationed, since the riskier borrowers
who do not get credit at the lower interest rate still demand credit at the higher rate. Even
though there is rationing in a two-price equilibrium, the term “credit rationing equilibrium”
is used only for credit rationing at a single equilibrium interest rate.
The papers of Coco (1997) and Arnold and Riley (2009) demonstrate that the theory
of equilibrium credit rationing under asymmetric information, which was established pri-
marily in the 1980s, is still in need of clarification and encourage further research in this field.
All models presented in this literature survey assume that the payoffs of different projects
are independent. In the next chapter, we present our model introducing non-diversifiable
risk in the SW model. It is shown that correlation of project payoffs has a major effect on
the results of the model; among other things, a pure rationing equilibrium may arise.
35Arnold (2011) suggests a modification of the model for which the return function may be globally hump-
shaped and pure credit rationing may arise: it has to be assumed that projects which are riskier in terms of
second-order stochastic dominance also have a lower expected return.
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Chapter 4
A credit market model with
asymmetric information and
portfolio risk
This chapter is based on joint work with Lutz Arnold and Johannes Reeder. It presents an
extended version of Arnold et al. (2010) which also contains elements of Reeder and Trepl
(2009).
4.1 Introduction
Models of adverse selection or moral hazard in the credit market show why lenders tend to
finance investment projects which are too risky from their point of view. The reason why
lenders dislike risky projects is that, when standard credit contracts are used, they generate
lower expected repayment. Due to the common assumption of independence of the payoffs
on different projects and the law of large numbers for large economies (Uhlig, 1996), the
repayments on a well-diversified credit portfolio are safe, however (an implication that tends
to irritate scholars with a background in portfolio theory): uncorrelated single-name credit
risks cancel out and do not create any portfolio risk for the lender. A notable case in point
is the seminal SW adverse selection model, in which an increase in the interest rate raises
the average riskiness of the pool of active borrowers, but nonetheless the return on lending
remains safe.
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We introduce non-diversifiable risk to the SW model (with two borrower types), so that an
increase in the average riskiness of the borrower pool causes higher portfolio risk, which has
to be borne by lenders. This has several interesting implications for equilibrium and welfare.
Most importantly, it opens up the possibility of equilibrium credit rationing. As mentioned
in Chapters 2 and 3, Coco (1997) and Arnold and Riley (2009) independently showed that
there cannot be pure rationing at a single interest rate in the SW model. The reason is that
it would be profitable to serve rationed risky borrowers at their maximum acceptable interest
rate. This strategy of “picking risky borrowers” might be unattractive to risk-averse lenders
when the project payoffs are correlated, since it gives rise to a highly risky credit portfolio.
Thus, a profitable deviation from the strategies that lead to rationing may not exist, restoring
the possibility of equilibrium credit rationing.
A two-price equilibrium entails higher average project risks and, hence, higher portfolio risk
than a rationing equilibrium, at a given level of investment. This is because market clearing
at the higher interest rate implies that all risky projects are financed. As a consequence,
whether a two-price equilibrium or a rationing equilibrium arises depends systematically on
lenders’ degree of relative risk aversion. To address this issue, we use the constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) version of the Ordinal Certainty Equivalent (OCE) utility function
proposed by Selden (1978), which allows to disentangle changes in risk aversion from changes
in the preference for consumption smoothing over time. We show that starting from a two-
price equilibrium, a rationing equilibrium arises when (everything else equal) the degree of
relative risk aversion grows sufficiently large. Thus, stronger risk aversion tends to make the
emergence of a rationing equilibrium more likely.
A two-price equilibrium is, in a specific sense, more inefficient than a rationing equilibrium:
consider a parameter change that leads to a switch from a rationing equilibrium to a two-price
equilibrium. The level of investment is continuous in model parameters, so it changes only
slightly. However, the riskiness of the pool of active borrowers deteriorates discontinuously,
since all risky firms get finance in a two-price equilibrium. As a consequence, borrowers have
to pay higher risk premia, so aggregate profit and total welfare jump downward. One way
to avoid this inefficiency of a two-price equilibrium is to impose a usury law that prohibits
interest rates above the equilibrium rate with pure rationing. Analogous results are derived
by Coco (1997, Section 3) in a model with independent returns in which projects differ by
both riskiness and mean return.1
1See also Coco and De Meza (2009).
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Following De Meza and Webb (1987), next we address the question of whether there is too
little or too much investment in equilibrium, relative to a first-best or a second-best optimum.
Contrary to the common result that equilibrium is generally characterized by underinvest-
ment,2 we find that equilibrium overinvestment may arise in a two-price equilibrium or in
a rationing equilibrium, viz., when firms are endowed with a large amount of collateral and
little weight is put on their expected utility in the optimum solution. Under these condi-
tions, optimum saving is low, and may thus fall short of equilibrium investment, because
households’ consumption can be satisfied by reallocating the firms’ collateral to them.3
As stated in Chapter 2, the motivation for the analysis is the observation that returns on risky
investment projects are correlated, so that someone has to bear the additional risk when firms
carry out riskier investment projects. While direct evidence of correlation between individual
firms’ returns on investment is hard to come by, there are numerous country studies showing
that economy-wide and industry factors explain much of the variance in firm earnings (e.g.,
Brealey, 1971, for the US), that firm-level profitability is strongly affected by aggregate
demand shocks (e.g., Machin and Van Reenen, 1993, for the UK), and that macroeconomic
shocks have a profound impact on business failures (e.g., Gaffeo and Santoro, 2009, for
Italy). Generally, the fact that aggregate corporate profits are strongly procyclical means
that individual firms’ profits are positively correlated at business cycle frequency. These
observations suggest that there is significant correlation between the returns on individual
firms’ risky endeavors. One might object that, even so, independence would be a convenient
assumption if it reduced complexity without having a major impact on the results. However,
the summary of the results above shows that the introduction of non-diversifiable risk leads to
much richer model implications, as different types of non-market clearing equilibria emerge
depending on lenders’ risk attitudes, with interesting welfare implications. Azariadis and
Smith (1998), among others, investigate a business cycle model with credit rationing. While
they use “the most extreme (and simplest) version” (Azariadis and Smith, 1998, footnote 6,
p. 521) of a model that gives rise to differential repayment probabilities in order to focus on
business cycle dynamics, the emphasis of our static model, following SW, is on the causes
2The standard underinvestment result for the SW model with uncorrelated payoffs is proved in Appendix
4.8.1. Note that in other credit market models with uncorrelated payoffs, credit rationing may be associated
with overinvestment; for instance, in the De Meza and Webb (2000) model with simultaneous adverse selection
and (ex ante) moral hazard (cf. footnote 29 in Chapter 3).
3This relates to variants of the SW model concerned with optimal risk sharing, such as Bester (1987) (see
also the survey in Coco, 2000). These models usually assume risk-averse borrowers and independent project
risks (i.e., no risk for lenders) and highlight the welfare loss due to the use of collateral as a sorting device:
since a borrower’s marginal utility is higher when his project fails, he should not put up any collateral in a
first-best optimum.
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and determinants of repayment probabilities. Asea and Blomberg (1998), among others, use
data on lending standards to estimate a model with regime switching between lax and tight.
The above citation of business cycle facts is just meant to back up the rather obvious fact
that project risks tend to be far from independent and should not be taken to suggest that
we attempt to make a contribution to aggregate dynamics.
We proceed as follows. Section 4.2 presents the model with CRRA preferences. In Section 4.3,
we demonstrate that pure credit rationing can arise. Section 4.4 introduces OCE preferences
and analyzes the impact of the degree of risk aversion on the type of equilibrium. Section 4.5
highlights the inefficiency of a two-price equilibrium. In Section 4.6, we address the question
of equilibrium underinvestment. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Model setup
There are two time periods t = 1, 2. There is one homogeneous (perishable) good, which
can be used for consumption or investment. There is a continuum of measure M (> 0) of
identical risk-averse consumers, each endowed with y (> 0) units of the homogeneous good
in the first period and nothing in the second period. So to consume in period 2, they have to
save in period 1. The consumers’ preferences are represented by the CRRA utility function
E[u(c1, c2)] =
c1−θ1
1− θ + δE
(
c1−θ2
1− θ
)
, 0 < δ, θ < 1, (4.1)
where ct is period-t consumption of the homogeneous good (t = 1, 2). θ measures the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and the degree of relative risk
aversion. The assumption that 1/θ is greater than one ensures that capital supply is upward-
sloping, so that the analysis is comparable to the existing literature.4 In the model with OCE
preferences, we will maintain the assumption that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
exceeds unity but allow for arbitrary positive degrees of relative risk aversion.
There are a continuum of measure NS (> 0) of safe firms and a continuum of measure NR
(> 0) of risky firms, each endowed with collateral C (> 0) and the ability to turn B (> C)
units of the homogeneous good invested in the first period into a random second-period
output of the homogeneous good. Safe firms’ projects succeed with probability pS and risky
41/θ > 1 implies that the substitution effect outweighs the income effect in the consumption-savings
decision.
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firms’ projects with probability pR (0 < pR < pS < 1).5 In case of success, they yield RS or
RR, respectively. If a project fails, the payoff is zero. The projects are equally profitable on
average: pSRS = pRRR (≡ R¯ > B). Standard debt is the only financial instrument.6 Firms’
collateral C cannot be traded in the capital market.7 Firm owners are risk-neutral and apply
for capital if the expected return on their investment (taking care of the possibility that they
lose their collateral) is non-negative. There is asymmetric information: lenders are unable to
observe whether a firm owns a safe or a risky project.8
The novel assumption is that the projects’ payoffs are not independent. There are three states
of nature s ∈ {R,S, F}. In state R, which occurs with probability pR, all projects succeed;
in state S, which occurs with probability pS − pR, only the safe projects succeed; in state F
(i.e., with probability 1− pS), all projects fail. Thus, the returns of any two risky projects as
well as of any two safe projects are perfectly correlated: if one risky project succeeds, all risky
projects succeed; if one safe project succeeds, all safe projects succeed; and the risky projects
never succeed unless the safe projects do.9 As a consequence of non-diversifiable risk, and
contrary to the SW model, the single-name risks do not cancel out, so lenders face positive
portfolio risk. For instance, in state F , all borrowers are unable to repay, so lenders merely
receive the posted collateral. We checked the robustness of our results by making different
assumptions about the dependence of project returns. Among other things, we analyzed the
model under the alternative assumptions that there is positive but imperfect correlation and
that the returns on safe projects are mutually independent.10 The sets of parameters for
which, e.g., rationing or overinvestment occur change, but the essence of our results remains
unaffected.
5Note that “safe” means relatively safe, since pS < 1.
6Standard debt is the optimal mode of finance in related models, e.g., when lenders can observe whether a
project has succeeded or not but not its payoff in case of success (see Besanko and Thakor, 1987b).
7We maintain this assumption, even though it is not innocuous in the welfare analysis (cf. footnote 31),
for the sake of comparability with the literature.
8Lenders only know the distribution of types in the economy. In our model, ex ante asymmetric information
appears in the guise of hidden information, since firms have either a risky or a safe project. Moreover, we
assume that payoffs are observable ex post.
9This means that, besides perfect intra-type correlation, we also consider inter-type correlation in that the
risky projects can only succeed if the safe projects do.
10Reeder and Trepl (2009) use the assumption that the returns on safe projects are mutually independent.
In comparison to the above mentioned correlation structure, this alternative assumption does not change the
analysis for high interest rates at which only risky firms demand credit. For low interest rates, however, it
implies lower aggregate risk and, thus, higher capital supply. In Reeder and Trepl (2009, Section 4.1), we also
propose a way to model imperfect correlation. In brief, we introduce a random variable q˜ with support [0, 1]
to capture the degree of dependency and assume that households take the consumption-savings decision after
q˜ has been realized. Thus, q˜ can be interpreted as an aggregate shock which determines capital risk. The
cases of independent payoffs and perfect correlation between risky firms are the two extreme realizations of
q˜, i.e., q = 0 and q = 1. It is shown that the main results do not rely on the extreme assumption of perfect
correlation between risky firms, and analogous arguments apply for the above mentioned correlation structure.
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We assume that the revenue from lending is passed through completely to the suppliers of
capital.11 One interpretation is that loans are made and deposits are taken by intermediaries
without operating cost and without equity.12 Alternatively, one may think of collateralized
corporate bonds held by funds (so that the different types of firms are represented propor-
tionally in each household’s portfolio). A more complete model would introduce banks with
positive equity, which serves as a buffer against losses on loans, so that deposits are safe and
bank owners carry the non-diversifiable risk that does not remain in the firm sector. The
main point, which the present model captures in the simplest possible fashion, is that the
realization of investment projects creates non-diversifiable risks that someone has to bear and
that these risks have a profound impact on the nature and efficiency of equilibrium in the
credit market.13
4.3 Restoring credit rationing
This section demonstrates that, unlike in the SW model (cf. Coco, 1997, and Arnold and
Riley, 2009), credit rationing may occur in the presence of portfolio risk.
Let r denote the interest rate (because of asymmetric information, lenders cannot set type-
specific interest rates), λ ≡ NS/(NS +NR) the proportion of safe borrowers, and p ≡ λpS +
(1−λ)pR the average success probability among all firms. Firms of risk type i ∈ {S,R} apply
for capital if the expected profit pii(r) = pi[Ri− (1 + r)B] + (1−pi)(−C) is non-negative, i.e.,
if r ≤ ri, where
ri ≡ 1
B
(
R¯− C
pi
+ C
)
− 1, i ∈ {S,R}
(ri > 0 for i ∈ {S,R}).14
11Due to this assumption, we use the terms “lenders” and “households” interchangeably in our model.
12Since we abstract from the cost of intermediation, the raison d’eˆtre of banks is not analyzed. Additionally,
we abstract from equity which would raise questions about the banks’ risk attitude and behavior in the market.
13It will be seen that for well-collateralized credit, firm owners bear significantly more risk than suppliers
of credit (see footnotes 14 and 21).
14The variances of safe firms’ profit and their repayment to lenders are pS(1− pS)[RS − (1 + r)B+C]2 and
pS(1−pS)[(1+r)B−C]2, respectively. At r = rS , the ratio of the variances is [C/(R¯−C)]2 and exceeds unity
if C > R¯/2, i.e., if collateral does not fall short of half of the expected project payoff. Similarly, the ratio of
the variances of risky firms’ profit and repayment at r = rS(
pS−pR
pR
R¯+ C
R¯− C
)2
exceeds unity under the weaker condition C > [1 − pS/(2pR)]R¯. This confirms the assertion that for well-
collateralized credit, firm owners bear the bulk of the risk created by their investments at an equilibrium with
interest rate rS , even though the return on lending is not safe either. If expected profit is a modest percentage
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The demand for capital is
D(r) =

(NS +NR)B; r ≤ rS
NRB; rS < r ≤ rR
0; rR < r
. (4.2)
The average success probability in the pool of credit applicants is p for r ≤ rS and pR for
rS < r ≤ rR.15 Denote the (random) return on lending at rate r as i(r). This function
will be determined below. Since the revenue from lending is passed through completely, the
consumers solve
max
s
:
(y − s)1−θ
1− θ + δE
(
{[1 + i(r)]s}1−θ
1− θ
)
by choosing an appropriate level of savings s. Let
Rˆ(r) ≡ E
{
[1 + i(r)]1−θ
}
. (4.3)
Optimal saving is
s =
y
1 + δ−
1
θ Rˆ(r)−
1
θ
≡ s∗(r) (4.4)
(0 < s∗(r) < y), and the indirect utility function is
u(y − s∗(r)) + δE {u([1 + i(r)]s∗(r))} = y
1−θ
1− θ
[
1 + δ
1
θ Rˆ(r)
1
θ
]θ ≡ v(r). (4.5)
From (4.4), the total supply of capital by a measure M of consumers facing the stochastic
return profile i(r) (yet to be determined) is
S(r,M) = s∗(r)M. (4.6)
For the sake of brevity, we focus attention on model specifications such that
NRB < S(rS ,M) < (NS +NR)B. (4.7)
That is, the supply of capital at interest rate rS is sufficient to carry out the risky projects
but not all projects. This assumption rules out single-price market clearing equilibria (with
of expected project payoff and, hence, of expected repayment, a comparison in terms of coefficients of variation
reinforces this conclusion.
15This illustrates the fact that there is adverse selection for r > rS , i.e., only the risky firms demand credit.
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or without adverse selection) and, thus, allows us to focus on the two most interesting types
of equilibria: pure credit rationing equilibrium and two-price equilibrium. A pure rationing
equilibrium prevails when there is positive excess demand for capital but there is no interest
rate that implies a more favorable return distribution for the consumers. Let X denote the
quantity of capital channeled from lenders to borrowers.16
Definition 4.1: (r1, X) is a pure rationing equilibrium (PRE) if
↪→ X = S(r1,M) < D(r1),
↪→ there is no r such that v(r) > v(r1).
A two-price equilibrium entails that credit is given at two different interest rates r1 and r2
(> r1), with positive excess demand at the lower rate r1 and equality of supply and residual
demand at the higher rate r2. To qualify as an equilibrium, the two interest rates have to
provide consumers with the same level of indirect utility. Moreover, interest rates at which
there is positive residual demand (i.e., r < r2) must be no more favorable to consumers than
r1 and r2. Let M1 (> 0) and M2 = M −M1 (> 0) denote the measures of consumers giving
credit and X1 and X2 the quantities of capital channeled from lenders to borrowers at r1 and
r2, respectively. Denote the residual demand at r2 as D˜2.17
Definition 4.2: (r1, r2,M1,M2, X1, X2) with r2 > r1 is a two-price equilibrium (TPE) if
↪→ v(r1) = v(r2),
↪→ X1 = S(r1,M1) < D(r1),
↪→ X2 = S(r2,M2) = D˜2,
↪→ there is no r < r2 such that v(r) > v(r2).
In the original SW model, pure credit rationing cannot arise in equilibrium; if there is excess
demand at rS but not at rR, as stipulated in (4.7), the equilibrium is a TPE (see Coco, 1997,
Arnold and Riley, 2009, and Appendix 4.8.1). Our first main result states that, given the
presence of aggregate risk and risk-averse suppliers of capital, a PRE can arise. A PRE exists
whenever there is not a TPE (except in the measure-zero event v(rR) = v(rS)):
16As already mentioned in Chapter 3, borrowers are randomly rationed in the SW model due to the as-
sumption of indivisible projects (type II credit rationing).
17In a two-price equilibrium, there is random rationing at the lower interest rate r1. Since all risky firms
get credit either at r1 or at r2, only safe firms are rationed.
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Figure 4.1: Return function.
Proposition 4.1: Let (4.7) hold. (a) If v(rR) < v(rS), there is a PRE and not a TPE.
(b) If v(rR) > v(rS), there is a TPE and not a PRE. (c) If v(rR) = v(rS), there are a TPE
and a PRE.
Proof: The crucial observation is that S(r,M) (for given M) and v(r) move in the same
direction as r changes. This follows immediately from (4.4)-(4.6): r affects S(r,M) and v(r)
only via Rˆ(r), and both functions increase when Rˆ(r) rises. From (4.3),
Rˆ′(r) = (1− θ)E
{
[1 + i(r)]−θi′(r)
}
(4.8)
whenever i′(r) exists. Let is(r) denote the return on lending in state s:18
iR(r)
iS(r)
iF (r)
 =

r
λr + (1− λ) (CB − 1)
C
B − 1
 , r ≤ rS , (4.9)
and  iR(r)
iS/F (r)
 =
 r
C
B − 1
 , rS < r ≤ rR (4.10)
(see Figure 4.1). Both for r < rS and for rS < r < rR, we have i′s(r) ≥ 0 in all states
and strict inequality for some state s.19 It follows from (4.8) that Rˆ′(r) > 0 and, therefore,
18A subscript s/s′ on a function or variable indicates that it applies in states s and s′.
19The expected return is E[i(r)] = pr+ (1− p)(C/B− 1) for r ≤ rS and E[i(r)] = pRr+ (1− pR)(C/B− 1)
for rS < r ≤ rR (the same formulas apply for the safe return on lending in the case of independent project
payoffs, see Appendix 4.8.1). Evaluating E[i(r)] at rS and rR and using p < pS and R¯ > C yields E[i(rS)] =
pR¯/(pSB) + (1− p/pS)C/B − 1 < R¯/B − 1 = E[i(rR)]. Hence, E[i(r)] attains its global maximum at rR (see
also Coco, 1997, and Arnold and Riley, 2009). Intuitively, there are both risky and safe firms active at rS , and
the risky firms make strictly positive expected profits. At rR, only risky firms are active, and their expected
profits are zero.
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Figure 4.2: Pure rationing equilibrium (PRE).
(s∗)′(r) > 0, ∂S(r,M)/∂r > 0, and v′(r) > 0 for r < rS and for rS < r < rR. For r > rS , let
∆(r) denote the difference between Rˆ(r) and Rˆ(rS):
∆(r) ≡ Rˆ(r)− Rˆ(rS), r > rS . (4.11)
Using (4.3), (4.9), and (4.10), one obtains
∆(r) = −(pS − pR)
{[
λ(1 + rS) + (1− λ)C
B
]1−θ
−
(
C
B
)1−θ}
+pR
[
(1 + r)1−θ − (1 + rS)1−θ
]
. (4.12)
Consider ∆(rS + ε) with ε > 0 and ε→ 0. As the last term in square brackets goes to zero,
while the term in braces does not (since rS > 0 > C/B−1), we have limε>0,ε→0 ∆(rS+ε) < 0.
That is, Rˆ(r) and, hence, s∗(r), S(r,M), and v(r) jump downward at rS . Thus, both S(r,M)
(for given M) and v(r) attain their respective global maxima on the interval [0, rR] either at
rS or at rR. The two constellations consistent with (4.7) are illustrated in Figures 4.2 and
4.3 (evidently, parameter combinations giving rise to either case exist, as will be illustrated
by means of example below).
(a) In Figure 4.2, S(r,M) and v(r) attain their (unique) respective maxima at rS . (rS ,
S(rS ,M)) is a PRE. Since v(rS) > v(r1) and rS < r2 whenever v(r1) = v(r2) for two interest
rates r1 and r2, a TPE does not exist.
(b) In Figure 4.3, S(r,M) and v(r) attain their (unique) respective maxima at rR. In this
case, a PRE does not exist. For whenever there is positive excess demand at r (< rR), the
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Figure 4.3: Two-price equilibrium (TPE).
second condition in the definition of a PRE is violated: v(rR) > v(r). Let r1 = rS . There
exists an interest rate r2 > r1 such that v(r2) = v(r1). Let X1 and X2 be determined by
X1 =
NS +NR
NS
[S(r1,M)−NRB] = S(r1,M)−X2 (4.13)
and M1 = X1/s∗(r1) (> 0) and M2 = X2/s∗(r2) (> 0). From (4.5), v(r2) = v(r1) implies
Rˆ(r2) = Rˆ(r1). From (4.4), it follows that s∗(r2) = s∗(r1). Using (4.6) and (4.13), it follows
from the definitions of M1 and M2 that M1 +M2 = M . The residual demand at r2 is
D˜2 =
[
1− X1
(NS +NR)B
]
NRB. (4.14)
It is straightforward to check that (r1, r2,M1,M2, X1, X2), thus defined, is a TPE: by con-
struction, v(r1) = v(r2); from (4.6) and M1 = X1/s∗(r1), X1 = S(r1,M1); from M1 < M ,
∂S(r,M)/∂M > 0, r1 = rS , and (4.7), S(r1,M1) < D(r1); from (4.6) and M2 = X2/s∗(r2),
X2 = S(r2,M2); from (4.13) and (4.14) together with (4.6) and M2 = X2/s∗(r2), S(r2,M2) =
D˜2 (= −(NR/NS)S(r1,M) + (NS + NR)(NR/NS)B); by construction, v(r) ≤ v(r2) for all
r < r2.
(c) The proofs that (rS , S(rS ,M)) is a PRE in case (a) and (r1, r2,M1,M2, X1, X2) is a TPE
in case (b) also go through when v(rS) = v(rR). ||
The multiplicity of equilibria in case (c) is not by itself remarkable, as v(rS) = v(rR) is a
measure-zero event.20 We will come back to this case, however, when we compare welfare
20One could avoid this multiplicity by making the inequality in the second condition of Definition 4.1 weak.
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levels in the two types of equilibria. For now, the important point is that aggregate risk
makes the emergence of a PRE possible.21
As a numerical example, let the model parameters be given by:
y M θ δ B pS pR R¯ C NS NR
10 3,000 0.5 0.95 100 0.9 0.8 110 80 100 100
Safe and risky firms apply for credit up to interest rates rS = 13.33% and rR = 17.5%,
respectively. At rS , each consumer supplies s(rS) = 4.9369 units of capital, so the total
supply of capital is 14,810.6541 (= S(rS ,M)). Since it is higher than 10,000 (= NRB) and
lower than 20,000 (= (NS +NR)B), condition (4.7) is satisfied. As ∆(rR) = 0.0066 > 0, the
equilibrium is a TPE. The consumers’ indirect utility is v(rS) = 8.8883. A measure 96.2131
of randomly selected firms receive a loan at 13.33% interest, and the 51.8935 risky firms
rationed at this interest receive a loan at 15.71% interest.22
4.4 Risk aversion and rationing
In a PRE, since rationing is necessarily random, the proportion of realized projects which are
risky is equal to the proportion of risky firms in the total population of firms (i.e., 1−λ). The
presence of rationing means that some risky firms do not get funds. In a TPE, by contrast,
all risky projects are carried out, which makes the return profile less attractive from the
risk-averse lenders’ point of view. This suggests that a PRE is more likely to emerge as the
lenders’ degree of relative risk aversion rises. The present section gives a precise statement
of this proposition.
Within the framework used so far we encounter the familiar problem that both relative
risk aversion and the preference for intertemporal consumption smoothing are parameterized
by the same parameter θ.23 So in order to appropriately address the question of which
type of equilibrium emerges under what degree of risk aversion, we generalize the analysis
by following Selden’s (1978) OCE approach.24 Let cˆ2 be the certainty equivalent (CE) of
21Since rS is the single equilibrium interest rate in a PRE, the considerations of who bears how much risk
in footnote 14 apply. In a TPE, the same considerations apply for safe firms and for risky firms which get
credit at rS . For risky firms that receive credit at r2, the ratio of the variances of profit and repayment is
([(1−λ)(pS − pR)C− pSR¯]/{[pR +λ(pS − pR)]C})2 and exceeds unity if C > {pS/[(1− 2λ)(pS − pR)− pR]}R¯.
22Numerical examples for a PRE are provided in Sections 4.4 and 4.5.
23In Reeder and Trepl (2009, Section 2.5), it is shown (for the alternative correlation structure) that a
critical θ above which a PRE arises does not necessarily exist in the expected utility framework.
24Selden’s (1978) work prompted, among others, the widely cited paper by Epstein and Zin (1989) with an
infinite horizon.
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period-2 consumption corresponding to the period utility function introduced in (4.1):
cˆ1−θ2
1− θ = E
(
c1−θ2
1− θ
)
, θ > 0, θ 6= 1 (4.15)
(we now allow for θ > 1).25 Households’ utility is given by
u(c1, cˆ2) =
c1−η1
1− η + δ
cˆ1−η2
1− η , 0 < η < 1. (4.16)
1/η is the (intertemporal) elasticity of substitution between c1 and cˆ2.26 The model analyzed
above is the special case with η = θ.27
Rˆ(r)1/(1−θ) defined in (4.3) is the CE of 1 + i(r). Using this definition and c2 = [1 + i(r)]s,
the CE defined in (4.15) can be expressed as:
cˆ2 = sRˆ(r)
1
1−θ .
Households solve
max
s
:
(y − s)1−η
1− η + δ
[
sRˆ(r)
1
1−θ
]1−η
1− η .
The solution is
s =
y
1 + δ−
1
η Rˆ(r)−
1
1−θ
1−η
η
≡ s∗(r), (4.17)
and indirect utility is
v(r) ≡ y
1−η
1− η
[
1 + δ
1
η Rˆ(r)
1
1−θ
1−η
η
]η
. (4.18)
Given the novel definitions of s∗(r) and v(r), define capital supply (cf. (4.6)) and the two
types of equilibria as before. Our first task is to generalize Proposition 4.1:
Proposition 4.2: The assertion of Proposition 4.1 also holds true in the OCE framework.
25For the sake of brevity, we omit the case of logarithmic utility (i.e., θ = 1), which has to be treated
separately.
26Note that the optimization problem as a whole is a non-expected utility approach, since the objective
function is generally not linear in probabilities.
27The empirical literature suggests that there is no unanimous relationship between risk aversion and the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In particular, the hypothesis of an inverse relationship as implied by
the expected utility setup is rejected. There is, however, dissent regarding the plausible magnitudes of η and
θ. Attanasio and Weber (1989) estimate values of η < 1 and θ > 1. While this empirical study supports our
analysis, there are other studies with values of η > 1, e.g., Hall (1987) and Epstein and Zin (1991).
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Figure 4.4: Switch from a TPE to a PRE.
Proof: The crucial observation is that, as before, changes in the interest rate move S(r,M)
and v(r) in the same direction, as is evident from (4.17) and (4.18). From (4.3),
d
[
Rˆ(r)
1
1−θ
]
dr
= Rˆ(r)
θ
1−θE
{
[1 + i(r)]−θi′(r)
}
.
Equations (4.9) and (4.10) hold true without modification. So for all r < rS and rS < r < rR,
we have d[Rˆ(r)1/(1−θ)]/dr > 0 and a fortiori (s∗)′(r) > 0 (from (4.17)), ∂S(r,M)/∂r > 0 (from
(4.6)), and v′(r) > 0 (from (4.18)). Since (4.3), (4.9), and (4.10) are unchanged, ∆(r) defined
in (4.11) satisfies (4.12). For θ < 1, the arguments put forward in the proof of Proposition
4.1 prove Rˆ(rS +ε) < Rˆ(rS) for ε positive and small. Hence, Rˆ(rS +ε)1/(1−θ) < Rˆ(rS)1/(1−θ).
From (4.6), (4.17), and (4.18), it follows that S(r,M) and v(r) jump downward as r rises
above rS . For θ > 1, the term in braces in (4.12) is negative, so limε>0,ε→0 ∆(rS + ε) > 0,
i.e., Rˆ(rS + ε) > Rˆ(rS) for ε positive and small. As before, this implies Rˆ(rS + ε)1/(1−θ) <
Rˆ(rS)1/(1−θ), so that, in this case also, S(r,M) and v(r) display downward discontinuities at
rS . This proves that both S(r,M) and v(r) attain their respective maxima either at rS or at
rR. Under the maintained assumption (4.7), the remainder of the proof runs parallel to the
proof of Proposition 4.1. ||
We are now in a position to give a precise statement of the proposition that higher risk
aversion makes the emergence of a PRE more likely:
Proposition 4.3: Starting from a TPE, as the degree of relative risk aversion θ rises and
(4.7) remains satisfied, a PRE emerges.
Proof: The proof consists of two steps. (a) Increases in θ reduce s∗(r). (b) For θ large
enough, s∗(r) and v(r) attain their maxima at rS . Thus, starting from a TPE, as risk
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aversion becomes stronger, the capital supply schedule shifts downward, and at some point
the maximum will occur at rS and a PRE emerges, provided that (4.7) is still valid (see
Figure 4.4).
(a) From (4.17), as noted by Basu and Ghosh (1993, p. 121), a decrease in the CE Rˆ(r)1/(1−θ)
reduces s∗(r). So we have to prove that an increase in θ reduces Rˆ(r)1/(1−θ) or, equivalently,
ln[Rˆ(r)1/(1−θ)]. From (4.3) (suppressing the argument of the functions Rˆ(r) and i(r)),
∂
[
ln
(
Rˆ
1
1−θ
)]
∂θ
=
1
(1− θ)2
1
E [(1 + i)1−θ]
·
(
E
[
(1 + i)1−θ
]
ln {E[ (1 + i)1−θ ]} − E
{
(1 + i)1−θ ln
[
(1 + i)1−θ
]})
.
Since (1 + i)1−θ ln[(1 + i)1−θ] is a strictly convex function of the random variable (1 + i)1−θ,
the derivative is negative by virtue of Jensen’s inequality.
(b) From (4.12),
∆(rR) =
(
C
B
)1−θ−(pS − pR)
(λ1 + rS
C
B
+ 1− λ
)1−θ
− 1

+ pR
(1 + rR
C
B
)1−θ
−
(
1 + rS
C
B
)1−θ .
Since C/B < 1 + rS < 1 + rR, as θ grows large (in particular larger than one), the power
terms inside the braces become arbitrarily small, so ∆(rR) > 0. From (4.11), Rˆ(rR) > Rˆ(rS)
and Rˆ(rR)1/(1−θ) < Rˆ(rS)1/(1−θ). From (4.17), it follows that s∗(r) attains its maximum
at rS . ||
The example considered below shows that there exist model specifications such that a switch
from a TPE to a PRE occurs. More generally, the following condition is sufficient to ensure
that (4.7) remains valid as θ rises:
NRB <
y
1 + δ−
1
η
(
C
B
)− 1−η
η
M. (4.19)
i(rS) ≥ C/B − 1 in all states of nature with strict inequality in some state of nature. Hence,
Rˆ(rS)1/(1−θ) > C/B. From (4.6) and (4.17), S(rS ,M) exceeds the term on the right-hand
side of (4.19) for all θ, so NRB < S(rS ,M). The validity of the second inequality in (4.7)
follows from the fact that it is satisfied in the TPE and S(rS ,M) becomes smaller as θ
increases (step (a) in the proof of Proposition 4.3).
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In the numerical example introduced at the end of the preceding section (which implicitly
assumes θ = η = 0.5), the critical value for θ, above which the equilibrium is a PRE, is
2.5435. If, for instance, θ = 3, we have ∆(rR) = 0.0058. The single equilibrium interest rate
is rS = 13.33%, indirect utility is v(rS) = 8.8516. The supply of capital is 14,684.1058, so
53.1589 (or 26.58%) of the borrowers are rationed.
Another way of analyzing the impact of portfolio risk on the nature of equilibrium is to
compare the model with correlated payoffs to the (identically parameterized) model with
independent payoffs. Since rationing cannot arise in the model with uncorrelated risks, it
follows immediately from Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 that the introduction of correlated risks
(holding everything else equal) potentially causes rationing. Details are in Appendix 4.8.1.
4.5 Inefficiency of a two-price equilibrium
From a welfare point of view, a TPE is particularly unattractive. For even leaving aside
the question of whether total investment is at its optimal level, it is precisely the risky
projects, disliked by the risk-averse lenders, which have a one-hundred percent chance of
being financed. In the present section, we show that, as a consequence, a change in a model
parameter that gives rise to a switch from a TPE to a PRE has a discontinuous positive impact
on welfare. Coco (1997, pp. 12-13) arrives at the same conclusion under the assumption that
riskier projects have lower expected (uncorrelated) returns28 and concludes that a usury law
that prevents lenders from attracting risky borrowers at high interest rates raises welfare.
This conclusion naturally carries over to our setup with non-diversifiable risk and risk-averse
lenders.29
Proposition 4.4: A parameter change that leads to a switch from a TPE to a PRE has a
continuous effect on household utility but leads to a discontinuous increase in aggregate profit.
Proof: The proof consists of two steps. We consider first (a) the knife-edge case v(rS) =
v(rR), in which both a PRE and a TPE exist, and then (b) a small change in a parameter
that leads to a switch from a TPE to a PRE.
(a) Consider the model with OCE preferences and suppose parameters are such that v(rS) =
28He assumes large differences in projects’ risk and only minor differences in expected returns so that less
risky firms drop out of the market first, i.e., there is adverse selection.
29The effects of usury laws in the presence of moral hazard are analyzed in Coco and De Meza (2009).
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Figure 4.5: Welfare effect of a switch from a TPE to a PRE (θ > 1).
v(rR), i.e., ∆(rR) = 0. From part (c) of Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 4.2, (rS , S(rS ,M))
is a PRE, and there is also a TPE with r2 = rR. Households’ indirect utility is v(rS) in both
equilibria. The mass of projects carried out in equilibrium S(rS ,M)/B is also the same in
both equilibria. But while in the PRE the loan rate is rS for all borrowers who get funds,
some borrowers have to pay the interest rate rR in the TPE. This is the price firms have to
pay in order to make households finance riskier projects. Total expected firm profit in the
TPE is
XS
B
(1− λ)piR(rS)
(where use is made of piS(rS) = 0 and piR(r2) = piR(rR) = 0). This compares with aggregate
profit
S(rS ,M)
B
(1− λ)piR(rS)
in a PRE (where use is made of piS(rS) = 0). Since XS < S(rS ,M), expected profit is strictly
less in the TPE.
(b) If θ > 1, a switch from a TPE to a PRE occurs when ∆(rR) changes from nega-
tive to positive, and vice versa for θ < 1. Consider model parameters (B,C, pS , pR, λ) =
(B′, C ′, p′S , p
′
R, λ
′) such that ∆(rR) = 0. Consider a change in a parameter a (∈ {B,C, pS ,
pR, λ}) that has a first-order effect on ∆(rR) (i.e., d∆(rR)/da 6= 0 for (B,C, pS , pR, λ) =
(B′, C ′, p′S , p
′
R, λ
′)). Without loss of generality, let d∆(rR)/da > 0 (if the reverse inequality
holds true, consider parameter −a).
For instance, let a = λ and θ > 1: from (4.12), d∆(r)/dλ > 0 for θ > 1 (see Figure 4.5). For
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θ > 1, when the parameter rises from a′ − ε to a′ + ε (ε positive and small), ∆(rR) turns
from negative to positive and a PRE replaces a TPE, and vice versa for θ < 1. From the
analysis in the preceding section, it is clear that this is the only way a change in a parameter
can bring about a switch from a TPE to a PRE. From (4.3), (4.9), and (4.18), v(rS) is a
continuous function of model parameters. From step (a), aggregate profit jumps upward. ||
As pointed out by Coco (1997), the special inefficiency of a TPE can be avoided by imposing
an upper bound r¯ on the set of admissible interest rates:
Proposition 4.5: If the equilibrium is a TPE, imposing an interest rate ceiling r¯ ∈ (rS , r2)
raises welfare.
Proof: Define a PRE with an interest ceiling as in Definition 4.1 except that we add the
condition r1 ≤ r¯. The condition r ≤ r¯ rules out the existence of a TPE, for v(rS) exceeds v(r)
for any admissible pair of interest rates which yield the same expected utility. (rS , S(rS ,M))
is a PRE with interest ceiling, since v(r) < v(rS) for all r ≤ r¯, r 6= rS . ||
To illustrate the assertions of Propositions 4.4 and 4.5, we modify our running example such
that θ is close to the critical value above which a PRE emerges:
y M η θ δ B pS pR R¯ C NS NR
10 3,000 0.5 2.55 0.95 100 0.9 0.8 110 80 99 101
We also changed the numbers of safe and risky firms slightly, but will return to the original
values in a second. At interest rate rS = 13.33%, each household saves s∗(rS) = 4.9029, so the
supply of capital is 14,708.7000. As demand drops from 20,000 to 10,100 at rS , condition (4.7)
is satisfied. The critical value for θ, above which there is a PRE, is 2.5720, so the equilibrium
is a TPE with r2 = 17.47% (which can also be inferred from ∆(rR) = −0.0002 and θ > 1).
Indirect utility and aggregate profit are v(rS) = v(r2) = 8.8587 and 157.8703, respectively.
Now, let NS = NR = 100, holding all other parameters fixed, so that λ rises from 49.5% to
50%. Since θ is now above the critical value 2.5435 (∆(rR) = 6 · 10−5 is positive), a PRE
emerges. Indirect utility rises only slightly (to v(rS) = 8.8591), but aggregate profit soars by
more than 50% to 245.1701.30 In the former case, with 99 safe and 101 risky firms, consider
30One might object that the rise in welfare is not surprising, since this parameter change (viz., a higher
proportion of safe firms) is good for the economy. To illustrate that the parameter change need not be good
for the economy, we use an example in which pR falls and welfare rises due to a switch from a TPE to a PRE.
The example from Section 4.3 is modified such that NS = 180, NR = 20, and pR = 0.76. The critical value for
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the imposition of an interest rate ceiling r¯ between 13.34% and 17.46%. The equilibrium
becomes a PRE with 13.33% interest. Borrower expected utility is (v(rS) =) 8.8587, as
in the TPE without the interest ceiling. But aggregate firm profit rises from 157.8703 to
((X/B)(1− λ)piR(rS) =) 247.5964.
4.6 Optimum investment
A TPE is “more inefficient” than a PRE, but even a PRE entails inefficient risk sharing. This
is because firms’ collateral is a potential hedge against households’ period-2 consumption risk,
but is not used completely in order to insure consumers in equilibrium, as firms which do not
invest or whose projects succeed keep their collateral.31 This section characterizes the optimal
solution of the model, with efficient risk sharing, and addresses the question of whether the
market brings forth too little or too much investment.
For the sake of simplicity, we return to the expected utility setup. In the main text, we
maintain the assumption that information is asymmetric: when n projects are carried out,
λn turn out to be safe and (1 − λ)n risky. We assume that the firms’ collateral can only
be consumed in the second period. The constrained-efficient solution maximizes household
expected utility for a given level β of each firm owners’ expected utility by a suitable choice of
investment and state-contingent consumption levels. We show that underinvestment occurs,
as one might expect, for high levels of β and for low values of collateral. However, since
decreases in β reduce the need to invest in order to achieve the firm owners’ given level of
expected utility and increases in collateral expand the pool of resources available for period-2
consumption, equilibrium overinvestment can arise for low values of β and large values of
collateral. (The first-best case, in which the planner can distinguish safe from risky projects,
is analyzed in Appendix 4.8.2.)
Suppose all firm owners receive the same levels of consumption in period 2, irrespective of
whether their project is realized or not. Let αs denote the firm owners’ consumption level
in state s ∈ {R,S, F}. Since firm owners are risk-neutral, we can assume without loss of
generality that their expected utility equals expected consumption, so the constraint that
θ, above which a PRE emerges, is 0.5034, so the equilibrium is a TPE. Indirect utility and aggregate profit
are v(rS) = v(r2) = 8.9134 and 66.8871, respectively. Now, let pR = 0.75, holding all other parameters fixed.
A PRE emerges, since θ is now above the critical value of 0.4981. Whereas indirect utility falls only slightly
(to v(rS) = 8.9128), aggregate profit increases by more than 10% to 74.4686.
31That is why the case in which firms’ collateral can be traded would require a separate analysis.
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they receive a given level β (≥ 0) of expected utility becomes
pRαR + (pS − pR)αS + (1− pS)αF = β. (4.20)
In equilibrium, a firm owner’s expected consumption is C+pii(r) if he takes a loan at interest
rate r and carries out his investment project (of type i) and C otherwise. So if, for instance,
β equals the sum of collateral and expected equilibrium profit per firm owner, then the
firm owners are as well-off in the constrained optimum as in the market equilibrium. Let
m ≡ (NS +NR)/M denote the “number” of firms per household and c2s period-2 household
consumption in state s. Then,

c2R
c2S
c2F
 =

m(C − αR) + λRS+(1−λ)RRB s
m(C − αS) + λRSB s
m(C − αF )
 . (4.21)
The level of investment per household s is bounded above by the minimum of mB and y,
i.e., either by the amount of investment opportunities or by disposable income. For the sake
of brevity, we restrict attention on the case in which My is sufficiently large to finance all
investment projects:
mB ≤ y.
The maximum attainable expected utility for firm owners is then β = C + R¯ (achieved with
s = mB and c2s = 0 for s ∈ {R,S, F}).
Definition 4.3: Given β ∈ [0, C + R¯], (c1, s, c2R, c2S , c2F , αR, αS , αF ) is a constrained op-
timum (CO) if it maximizes (4.1) subject to the constraints s ≤ mB, c1 = y − s, (4.20),
(4.21), and non-negativity of each component.
Since (4.1) is continuous and the set of vectors which satisfy the constraints is non-empty and
compact, a CO exists. Due to the fact that households are risk-averse and firm owners are
risk-neutral, household consumption is equalized across all states in which firm owners’ con-
sumption is positive in a CO.32 For future reference, notice that period-2 household consump-
tion is the same when all projects succeed or only the safe projects succeed (i.e., c2R = c2S)
32If households consume different quantities in two states s and s′, say, their marginal rate of substitution
differs from ps/ps′ , which is the firm owners’ marginal rate of substitution. So if the firm owners’ consumption
is positive in both states, there is scope for a mutually beneficial reallocation of resources.
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if
αR − αS = (1− λ)RR
mB
s. (4.22)
Similarly, c2S = c2F if
αS − αF = λRS
mB
s. (4.23)
We have to distinguish three different cases, arising dependent on the choice of investment s.
(a) For
max
{
0,mB
β − C
R¯
}
≤ s ≤ mB β
R¯
, (4.24)
s is sufficiently low and the share of investment returns in total wealth is sufficiently small
so that it is possible to equalize households’ period-2 consumption across all three states.
Solving (4.20), (4.22), and (4.23) for the αs’s and substituting into (4.21) gives:
αR
αS
αF
 =

β + λRS+(1−λ)RR−R¯mB s
β + λRS−R¯mB s
β − R¯mB s

and
c2R/S/F = m(C − β) +
R¯
B
s (4.25)
(firm owners’ and consumers’ state-contingent consumption levels in this and the following
two cases are illustrated in the upper two panels of Figure 4.6). If 0 ≤ s < mB(β−C)/R¯, i.e.,
the first inequality in (4.24) is violated, then the returns on investment are insufficient so as
to satisfy (4.20). When the second inequality in (4.24) is violated, the non-negativity αF ≥ 0
does not hold, i.e., the firm owners’ risk bearing capacity in the state when all projects fail
is exhausted.
(b) Second, consider investment levels
mB
β
R¯
≤ s ≤ mB β
(1− λ)R¯ . (4.26)
In this case, it is possible to equalize household consumption in states R and S but not in F .
33This figure depicts the case 0 < mB(β − C)/R¯, i.e., β > C.
46 4 A credit market model with asymmetric information and portfolio risk
Rα
Rc2
β
Rp
β
( )mB R
β
λ−1
Sc2c
s
mB
R
β
m C
- p
λ β
λ
 
+ 
 1
C
mB
R
β −
Fα
Sα
( )sν
s ∗∗
R/S/Fc2
Fc2
R/S2
s
smB
R
β
( )mB R
β
λ−1
( )mB R
β
λ−1
mB
R
β
mC
S
Figure 4.6: Consumption levels with optimal risk sharing under asymmetric information.33
From (4.20)-(4.22) and αF = 0, we obtain:

αR
αS
αF
 =

1
pS
[
β + (1−λ)pS(RR−RS)mB s
]
1
pS
[
β − (1−λ)R¯mB s
]
0

and  c2R/S
c2F
 =
 m(C − βpS )+ RSB s
mC
 . (4.27)
(c) Finally, for
mB
β
(1− λ)R¯ ≤ s, (4.28)
c2R exceeds c2S and c2F even if R is the only state in which firm owners consume: αR
αS/F
 =
 βpR
0

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and 
c2R
c2S
c2F
 =

m
(
C − βpR
)
+ λRS+(1−λ)RRB s
mC + λRSB s
mC
 . (4.29)
Substituting c1 = y − s and c2s from (4.25), (4.27), and (4.29) into (4.1) gives house-
holds’ expected utility as a function ν(s) of s alone. The level of investment in a CO is
s∗∗ = arg maxs ν(s) s.t.: 0 ≤ s ≤ mB. The function ν(s) is strictly concave (see the lower
panel of Figure 4.6). This follows from the fact that if two (c1, s, c2R, c2S , c2F , αR, αS , αF )
satisfy the constraints in Definition 4.3, then a convex combination also satisfies these con-
straints (because of linearity of the constraints) and yields higher expected utility (because
of strict concavity of the function in (4.1) in (c1, c2R, c2S , c2F )). ν(s) is continuous and it is
differentiable in the interior of the intervals in (4.24), (4.26), and (4.28):
ν′(s) =

δR¯
B
[
m(C − β) + R¯B s
]−θ
− (y − s)−θ; max
{
0,mB β−C
R¯
}
< s < mB β
R¯
δR¯
B
[
m
(
C − βpS
)
+ RSB s
]−θ
− (y − s)−θ; mB β
R¯
< s < mB β
(1−λ)R¯
δpR[λRS+(1−λ)RR]
B
[
m
(
C − βpR
)
+ λRS+(1−λ)RRB s
]−θ
+ δ(pS−pR)λRSB
(
mC + λRSB s
)−θ − (y − s)−θ; mB β
(1−λ)R¯ < s
.
(4.30)
It has kinks at mBβ/R¯ and at mBβ/[(1 − λ)R¯]. There are four possible types of solutions
to s∗∗ = arg maxs ν(s) s.t.: 0 ≤ s ≤ mB. For ν ′(mB) ≥ 0, all projects are realized in the CO:
s∗∗ = mB. For ν ′(0) ≤ 0, it is optimal not to invest at all: s∗∗ = 0. If ν ′(s∗∗) = 0 for some
s∗∗ that satisfies one of the inequalities on the right-hand side of (4.30), then it is optimal
to invest s∗∗. The final possibility is that ν(s) attains its maximum at one of the kinks, i.e.,
at s∗∗ = mBβ/R¯ or mBβ/[(1 − λ)R¯]. By virtue of the theorem of the maximum, s∗∗ is a
continuous function of β and C. In a CO with ν ′(s∗∗) = 0, investment s∗∗ increases when β
rises or C falls. This follows from the strict concavity of ν(s) and the fact that an increase
in β or a decrease in C raises ν ′(s) (see (4.30)). Optimum investment s∗∗ also increases with
β when it occurs at a kink of ν(s).
Depending on the model parameters β, R¯, and λ, some or all of cases (a)-(c) arise for
admissible investment levels 0 ≤ s ≤ mB.34
34In Appendix 4.8.2, it is shown that the state-contingent consumption levels c2s (s ∈ {R,S, F}) are identical
in the second-best and first-best solutions if the investment levels are small enough (i.e., smaller than the
minimum of mBβ/[(1− λ)R¯] and mB(β + λR¯)/R¯). A simple sufficient condition is that β ≥ (1− λ)R¯. That
is, for R¯ ≤ β and (1− λ)R¯ ≤ β < R¯, the second-best and first-best household consumption and utility levels
coincide.
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R¯ ≤ β:
In this case, s ≤ mB ≤ mBβ/R¯. From (4.24), only case (a) can arise. It is optimal to carry
out all projects (i.e., s∗∗ = mB) if (ν ′(mB) ≥ 0, i.e.)
β ≥ R¯+ C −
( y
m
−B
)(δR¯
B
) 1
θ
.
Otherwise optimum investment satisfies the first-order condition ν ′(s∗∗) = 0, i.e.,
s∗∗ =
y −
(
δR¯
B
)− 1
θ
m(C − β)
1 + δ−
1
θ
(
R¯
B
)− 1−θ
θ
. (4.31)
Since β ≥ R¯ and R¯ > C, we have β > C. So, as noted in the discussion of case (a) above,
s∗∗ > 0.
(1− λ)R¯ ≤ β < R¯:
For s small enough, case (a) applies. For s = mB, (4.26) holds with strict inequalities, i.e.,
case (b) applies. From (4.30), it is optimal to finance all projects if
β ≥ R¯+ pS
[
C −
( y
m
−B
)(δR¯
B
) 1
θ
]
.
If the right-hand side of this inequality is non-positive for C = 0, then it is optimal to realize
all projects (i.e., s∗∗ = mB) for C low enough, irrespective of β. If the right-hand side is
positive for C = 0, s∗∗ = mB becomes optimal once β is large enough. If β ≥ C, zero
investment is ruled out on the same grounds as before. If, on the other hand, β < C, s∗∗ = 0
is optimal (i.e., ν ′(0) ≤ 0) if
β ≤ C − y
m
(
δR¯
B
) 1
θ
. (4.32)
β < (1− λ)R¯:
Each of the cases (a)-(c) arises for some s ≤ mB. It is optimal to realize all projects if
ν ′(mB) ≥ 0, where now the last lines on the right-hand side of (4.30) are relevant. As in the
preceding case, s∗∗ > 0 for β ≥ C, while s∗∗ = 0 if (4.32) holds for β < C.
The results are summarized in Figure 4.7 (where s∗∗ < mB for β = 0)35 and in:
35Alternatively, it may be the case that s∗∗ = mB for β = 0 and low levels of C.
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Figure 4.7: Optimum investment with asymmetric information.
Proposition 4.6: For β = 0, s∗∗ > 0 or s∗∗ = 0, depending on whether C < (y/m)(δR¯/B)1/θ
or C ≥ (y/m)(δR¯/B)1/θ, respectively. In the latter case, s∗∗ > 0 for β > C −
(y/m)(δR¯/B)1/θ. s∗∗ is non-decreasing in β. s∗∗ = mB for β ≥ R¯+C−(y/m−B)(δR¯/B)1/θ.
In words, consumers respond to a reduction in their period-2 consumption possibilities
brought about by an increase in the firm owners’ expected utility β with higher investment
s∗∗. Increases in collateral C relax the constraint that firm owners receive a given level of
expected utility, so optimum investment s∗∗ decreases.
Having characterized both the credit market equilibrium and the CO, we can now address
the question of whether there is too little or too much investment in equilibrium.36
Proposition 4.7: In a PRE or a TPE, (a) for C small enough, there is underinvestment
relative to the CO for all β; (b) for C large enough, there is overinvestment for sufficiently
low values of β and underinvestment for sufficiently high values of β.
Proof: (a) Suppose β = C = 0. From (4.28), case (c) applies for all investment levels. As
noted above, β ≥ C implies that the CO entails s∗∗ > 0. From (4.30), s∗∗ satisfies
s∗∗ =
y
1 + δ−
1
θ
{
pR
[
λRS+(1−λ)RR
B
]1−θ
+ (pS − pR)
(
λRS
B
)1−θ}− 1θ .
36Note that variations in β do not affect the credit market equilibrium but variations in C do.
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The term in braces exceeds
pR
(
RS
B
)1−θ
+ (pS − pR)
(
λRS
B
)1−θ
= Rˆ(rS). (4.33)
So, from (4.4), s∗∗ > s∗(rS) for β = C = 0. C = 0 is not admissible in the equilibrium
analysis (in the absence of collateral, firms would have nothing to lose from taking a credit).
But both optimum investment s∗∗ and s∗(rS) are continuous functions of C (for s∗(rS), this
follows from the definition of rS , (4.3), (4.4), and (4.9)). Therefore, there is underinvestment
(i.e., s∗∗ > s∗(rS)) for β = 0 and C sufficiently small. The fact that s∗∗ is non-decreasing in
β and s∗(rS) (< mB) is independent of β implies underinvestment for all β.
(b) The fact that s∗∗ = 0 for β = 0 and C ≥ (y/m)(δR¯/B)1/θ (from Proposition 4.6) and
s∗(rS) > (1 − λ)mB > 0 (from (4.7)) implies that there is overinvestment for β = 0 and C
large enough. Underinvestment occurs as β becomes sufficiently large so that s∗∗ = mB (see
Figure 4.7). ||
From (4.4), for each C (and other model parameters except y), there exists y such that (4.7)
is satisfied. So, from Proposition 4.1, for each C > 0 and β ≥ 0, there exist parameterizations
of the model such that a PRE or a TPE exists. This proves that parameter combinations
exist such that overinvestment arises in a PRE or a TPE.
The standard underinvestment result37 holds true if firms have little collateral and a suffi-
ciently high weight in the planning solution. However, if there is abundant collateral a large
portion of which can be reallocated to the consumers in the CO, then there is equilibrium
overinvestment.38 To illustrate this, let us return to our running example:
y M θ δ B pS pR R¯ C NS NR β
10 3,000 0.5 0.95 100 0.9 0.8 110 80 100 100 81.1737
As mentioned at the end of Section 4.3, there is a TPE with s∗(rS) = 4.9369 and v(rS) =
8.8883. Total expected firm profit (X1/B)(1 − λ)piR(rS) is 234.7463, so expected profit per
37Appendix 4.8.1 proves the standard underinvestment result for the SW model with uncorrelated payoffs.
Following De Meza and Webb (1987), it is assumed that β = C, and the first-best and second-best solutions
coincide. One might ask whether there are parameter constellations such that for β = C there is overinvestment
in the model with correlated risks and underinvestment in the model with uncorrelated risks. We provide
the following example: y = 10, M = 3,000, θ = η = 0.8, δ = 0.95, B = 100, pS = 0.3, pR = 0.2,
R¯ = 150, NS = 150, NR = 50, and C = β = 80. In the model with correlated risks, there is a PRE with
s∗(rS) = 4.9664, while optimum investment is s∗∗ = 4.4197 (in the second-best and first-best case). In contrast,
with uncorrelated risks, there is a TPE with sˇ∗(rS) = 5.0683, and optimum investment is sˇ∗∗ = mB = 6.6667.
38Compared to the first-best case, the market equilibrium may also be characterized by underinvestment or
overinvestment. See Appendix 4.8.2.
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firm owner is 1.1737. This motivates our choice of β, which equals the value of the collateral
plus expected profit per capita. Optimal investment is s∗∗ = 5.0123, which is the solution
to ν ′(s∗∗) = 0 in case (b). There is underinvestment: the “number” of projects financed in
the credit market equilibrium (i.e., 3,000 · 4.9369/100 = 148.1065) falls short of the optimum
“number” (i.e., 3,000 · 5.0143/100 = 150.3701). Indirect utility is (ν(s∗∗) =) 8.8962. The
credit market equilibrium is doubly inefficient: there is too little investment, and too large a
proportion of the investment capital is dedicated to risky projects. Proposition 4.7 suggests
that overinvestment tends to arise when β falls. In fact, when β = 75 (holding everything
else equal), we have s∗∗ = 4.8147 < 4.9369 = s∗(rS) (maximum utility rises to 9.0621).
4.7 Conclusion
Our model deviates from the common assumption in models of the credit market with asym-
metric information that single-name credit risks cancel out and do not create any portfolio
risk. The introduction of portfolio risk in the SW model raises several interesting questions
and yields several interesting results. A credit market equilibrium with pure credit rationing
becomes possible. Comparative statics analysis shows that an increase in risk aversion turns a
two-price equilibrium into a rationing equilibrium. A two-price equilibrium is more inefficient
than a rationing equilibrium, and a usury law that rules out the higher of the two interest
rates raises welfare. Compared to the optimal allocation of resources, the credit market equi-
librium is characterized by either underinvestment or overinvestment, where the latter tends
to occur when collateral is high and firm owners get little consumption. The implications
of the model are thus much richer than the standard SW model’s, in which a non-market
clearing equilibrium is generally a TPE and there is too little investment in equilibrium.
The most promising route for future research seems to be the introduction of bank capital.
In the model considered here, there are no intermediaries with positive equity that could
serve as a buffer against loan losses. Introducing bank capital would help make the model
more complete, as one could distinguish the portions of the banks’ credit risk borne by the
bank owners (the major part or all) and by the depositors (little or none at all), respectively.
Another possible extension of the model would introduce lenders with heterogeneous risk
attitudes, which would raise the question of the optimal allocation of risks across differently
risk-averse agents. Risky collateral would shed further light on optimal risk sharing. These,
and possibly further, issues can only be meaningfully addressed in a model with portfolio
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risk, and we are confident that our results will hold true with a small amount of bank capital,
a small second group of consumers with different risk attitude, or uncertain collateral with
a small variance.
In this chapter, we analyzed how aggregate risk affects the credit market equilibrium
in a model with asymmetric information. In our setup with correlated project payoffs,
lenders’ risk aversion plays a crucial role for the credit market outcome. If risk aversion
increases, fewer investment projects are financed and the average riskiness of the projects
financed possibly falls. While Part II of this dissertation (Chapters 2 to 4) was devoted
to this first application of the economics of investment in the presence of risk and market
frictions, Part III (Chapters 5 to 8) deals with the second application, viz., the employment
effects of offshoring in the presence of labor market frictions.
4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 Uncorrelated payoffs
This appendix compares the model with non-diversifiable risk to the standard SW model, in
which single-name risks cancel out completely. We show that the introduction of correlation
between project payoffs possibly causes the emergence of pure credit rationing and that it
tends to reduce equilibrium investment. We also prove the standard equilibrium underinvest-
ment result for the SW model.
Call the model with non-diversifiable risk described in Sections 4.2 and 4.4 model “C”. Let
“U” be the identically parameterized (SW) model that is obtained by replacing correlated
with uncorrelated payoffs. In model U, the (due to Uhlig’s, 1996, law of large numbers) safe
return on lending is iˇ(r) = pr+(1−p)(C/B−1) for r ≤ rS and iˇ(r) = pRr+(1−pR)(C/B−1)
for rS < r ≤ rR.39 Since consumers do not face any risk, the expected utility and OCE
approaches yield the same results for U. Let Rˇ(r) = [1 + iˇ(r)]1−θ. Optimal saving sˇ∗(r) is
given by
sˇ∗(r) =
y
1 + δ−
1
η Rˇ(r)−
1
1−θ
1−η
η
(4.34)
39As mentioned in footnote 19, the same formulas apply for the expected return of the model with correlated
risk. Evaluating iˇ(r) at rS and rR and using p < pS and R¯ > C yields iˇ(rS) < iˇ(rR). This fact is pointed out
by Coco (1997) and Arnold and Riley (2009).
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(cf. (4.17)). Let
NRB < sˇ
∗(rS)M < (NS +NR)B (4.35)
(cf. (4.7)).
The following proposition states that the introduction of portfolio risk possibly causes the
emergence of credit rationing:
Proposition 4.A.1: (a) There exist parameters such that U does not have a PRE but C
does. (b) The reverse is not true.
Proof: The return function iˇ(r) attains its unique global maximum iˇ(rR) = R¯/B − 1 at rR.
Given (4.35), similar arguments as in the proofs of Proposition 4.1 and 4.2 prove that there
is a TPE and not a PRE. So U does not possess a PRE. (a) Jointly with Proposition 4.2,
this proves the former part of the proposition. (b) The fact that U does not possess a PRE
also contradicts the supposition that C does not have a PRE but U does. ||
Another way to compare models U and C is to ask which one brings forth higher investment.
The following proposition states that the introduction of portfolio risk reduces equilibrium
investment:
Proposition 4.A.2: Equilibrium investment is lower in C than in U.
Proof: From (4.9) and (4.10), E[i(r)] = iˇ(r) for all r ≤ rR. Using Rˇ(r) = [1 + iˇ(r)]1−θ, it
follows that
Rˇ(r) = {1 + E[i(r)]}1−θ .
Jensen’s inequality implies Rˆ(r) < Rˇ(r) if θ < 1 and Rˆ(r) > Rˇ(r) if θ > 1. In either case, from
(4.17) and (4.34), we have s∗(r) < sˇ∗(r) (given η < 1). That is, the presence of risk reduces
optimal saving (cf. Basu and Ghosh, 1993, Proposition 1, pp. 121-22). Since (4.7) holds, the
equilibrium of C is a TPE or a PRE, and equilibrium investment is S(rS ,M) = s∗(rS)M .
Since (4.35) holds, the equilibrium of U is a TPE, and equilibrium investment is sˇ∗(rS)M .
The validity of the assertion follows from s∗(r) < sˇ∗(r). ||
De Meza and Webb (1987, Proposition 5A, pp. 287-88) argue that the equilibrium of the
SW model is characterized by underinvestment (irrespective of whether the credit market
clears or not). They assume that, in the optimum, the proceeds of the investment projects
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accrue to the consumers, but the collateral remains with the firm owners, i.e., using the
notation of Section 4.6, β = C. Since diversification eliminates project-specific risks, safe
and risky projects are equally good under these assumptions, whether there is asymmetric
information or not does not matter, the first-best and second-best optima coincide. The
following proposition generalizes the De Meza and Webb (1987) result:
Proposition 4.A.3: In an equilibrium of U with s∗(r) < mB and r < rR, there is underin-
vestment for β ≥ C.
Proof: Consider the optimal solution for model U. Given independent project risks, the safe
rate of return is R¯/B − 1. Since consumers do not face any risk, we can use the notation of
the model with expected utility (i.e., η = θ). Period-2 consumption c2 is then given by the
right-hand side of (4.25). If optimum investment is mB, the condition s∗(r) < mB of the
proposition implies that there is underinvestment. So we can focus on an interior optimum.
Optimum investment sˇ∗∗ is then given by the right-hand side of (4.31), so
sˇ∗∗ ≥ y
1 + δ−
1
θ
(
R¯
B
)− 1−θ
θ
(4.36)
for β ≥ C. In an equilibrium of U, as shown in the proof of Proposition 4.A.1, we have
iˇ(r) < R¯/B − 1 for r < rR. Hence, Rˇ(r) < (R¯/B)1−θ. From (4.34) with η = θ and (4.36),
sˇ∗∗ > sˇ∗(r). ||
If s∗(r) = mB in equilibrium, underinvestment evidently cannot arise. Optimum investment
is then also equal to mB. The condition r < rR rules out the special case in which the supply
of funds at the projects’ expected rate of return R¯/B − 1 is merely sufficient to finance NR
projects. Equilibrium and optimum again coincide in this case.
4.8.2 First-best optimum
This appendix analyzes the first-best optimum that can be achieved when, contrary to what
has been assumed in Section 4.6, it is possible to distinguish safe and risky projects.
Clearly, for Ms ≤ NSB, the first-best solution entails that only safe projects are realized.
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For Ms > NSB, all NS safe projects as well as Ms/B −NS risky projects are realized. So c2R/S
c2F
 =
 m(C − γS) + RSB s
m(C − γF )

for s ≤ mBλ and

c2R
c2S
c2F
 =

m(C − δR)− λm(RR −RS) + RRB s
m(C − δS) + λmRS
m(C − δF )

for mBλ < s, where the γ’s and δ’s are the firm owners’ consumption levels in the respective
cases and states of nature. The constraint that they receive expected utility β reads:
pSγS + (1− pS)γF = β
for s ≤ mBλ and
pRδR + (pS − pR)δS + (1− pS)δF = β
for mBλ < s. For the sake of brevity, we confine attention to cases where β is not too large:40
β < λR¯. (4.37)
Similarly as in Section 4.6, we obtain four different cases:
(a) First, let
max
{
0,mB
β − C
R¯
}
≤ s ≤ mB β
R¯
.
The second inequality and (4.37) jointly imply s ≤ mBλ. c2 is equalized across all states: γS
γF
 =
 β + 1m RS−R¯B s
β − 1m R¯B s
 ,
and c2s is given by (4.25). Firm owners’ and consumers’ state-contingent consumption levels
in this and the following three cases are illustrated in Figure 4.8.
40This condition is inessential for the determination of optimum investment (cf. footnote 42 below).
41This figure depicts the case 0 < mB(β − C)/R¯, i.e., β > C.
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Figure 4.8: Consumption levels with optimal risk sharing under symmetric information.41
(b) For
mB
β
R¯
< s ≤ mBλ, (4.38)
still only safe projects are realized, but the non-negativity constraint on γF is binding: γS
γF
 =
 βpS
0
 ,
and c2s is given by (4.27).
(c) For
mBλ < s ≤ mBβ + λR¯
R¯
,
some risky projects are carried out:

δR
δS
δF
 =

β
pS
− λ(RR −RS) + 1m RR−RSB s
1
pS
(
β + λR¯− 1m R¯B s
)
0
 ,
and (4.27) gives period-2 consumption.
(d) For
mB
β + λR¯
R¯
< s,
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firm owners consume only in the state when the risky projects succeed:
 δR
δS/F
 =
 βpR
0
 .
Household consumption is given by

c2R
c2S
c2F
 =

m
(
C − βpR
)
− λm(RR −RS) + RRB s
mC + λmRS
mC
 . (4.39)
Consider the expected utility setup. Substituting the state-contingent consumption levels c2s
into (4.1) yields expected utility as a function ν(s) of investment s alone.42 This allows us to
conduct the welfare analysis parallel to the second-best case. One noteworthy implication is
that the state-contingent consumption levels c2s (s ∈ {R,S, F}) are identical in the second-
best and first-best solutions for investment levels s up to the minimum of mBβ/[(1 − λ)R¯]
and mB(β + λR¯)/R¯. So if the second-best and first-best investment levels are small enough,
the second-best and first-best household consumption and utility levels coincide. This is
because the fact that the projects are more risky on average in the second-best solution does
not matter for consumer welfare as long as the firm owners’ risk bearing capacity is sufficient
so as to absorb the additional risk. A simple sufficient condition is that β ≥ (1 − λ)R¯, for
in this case, s ≤ mB ≤ min{mBβ/[(1 − λ)R¯], mB(β + λR¯)/R¯}. For the sake of brevity,
we merely prove that there is equilibrium underinvestment for low levels of collateral and
firm owner expected utility and illustrate the possibility of overinvestment by means of the
running example.
Proposition 4.A.4: In a PRE or TPE, for C and β small enough and s∗(rS) < mBλ, there
is underinvestment.
Proof: Let s˜∗∗ denote optimum investment. We can focus on the case s˜∗∗ < mBλ, since
otherwise the assertion of the proposition trivially holds true. Given β = 0, case (b) applies
42The reason for condition (4.37) being inessential is that the same function ν(s) also gives utility if the
inequality sign in (4.37) is reversed. If β > λR¯, c2s is also given by (4.25) for max{0,mB(β − C)/R¯} ≤ s ≤
mBβ/R¯, by (4.27) for mBβ/R¯ < s ≤ mB(β + λR¯)/R¯, and by (4.39) for mB(β + λR¯)/R¯ < s. As some risky
projects are financed for λmB < s ≤ mBβ/R¯, the γ’s and δ’s do not remain the same.
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(cf. (4.38)). Using (4.27) and β = C = 0, we obtain optimal investment:
s˜∗∗ =
y
1 + δ−
1
θ p
− 1
θ
S
(
RS
B
)− 1−θ
θ
.
From (4.4) and (4.33), it follows that s˜∗∗ > s∗(rS). C = 0 is not admissible in the equilibrium
analysis. But both optimum investment s∗∗ and s∗(rS) are continuous functions of β and C
(this follows from the theorem of the maximum for s˜∗∗ and from the definition of rS , (4.3),
(4.4), and (4.9) for s∗(rS)). As a consequence, s˜∗∗ > s∗(rS) holds true for β and C sufficiently
close to zero. ||
To illustrate the fact that the second-best solution does not necessarily imply a welfare loss
compared to the first-best optimum and the possibility of overinvestment relative to the
first-best outcome, we return to the example at the end of Section 4.6, except that we now
set β = 50, so that (4.37) is satisfied. The CO displays overinvestment: s∗∗ = 4.0145 <
4.9369 = s∗(rS). Indirect utility ν(s∗∗) = 9.7036 exceeds the equilibrium value by 9.17%.
The first-best optimum is characterized by the same amount of investment (and, therefore,
overinvestment) and the same level of indirect utility. This is because s∗∗ = 4.0145 < 6.06 =
min{mBβ/[(1− λ)R¯], mB(β + λR¯)/R¯}.
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Part III
Employment Effects of Offshoring
in the Presence of Labor Market
Frictions

61
Chapter 5
Motivation
The recent decades have seen a rapid increase in international trade and foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI). Helpman (2006, p. 589) highlights that trade and FDI “have been among
the fastest growing economic activities around the world”. This fact is shown in Figure 5.1,
which compares the growth in world FDI outflows, in world goods exports, and in world
GDP between 1975 and 2009. Since the late 1980s, GDP growth has fallen far short of FDI
growth and has also been lower than goods exports growth. Both FDI and goods exports
have increased considerably, but FDI has expanded much faster. Additionally, the figure
presents the growth in FDI outflows from seven developed countries.2 The share of outflows
of these seven countries accounted for more than 60% of the total until 2000 and for more
than 45% in the period 2000-2009. This indicates that the developed countries were the main
driver of FDI growth until 2000 and still play a pivotal role.3 Moreover, the rise in FDI and
final good trade was accompanied by a fast expansion of trade in intermediate inputs and
services.4 As pointed out by Bottini et al. (2007), initially mainly manufacturing inputs were
traded, but more recently trade in services has increased considerably due to improvements
in communication technologies.
These trends in the data are associated with the rapidly expanding business practice of
offshoring. Production processes can be offshored within multinational enterprises (MNEs),
i.e., via FDI, or to unaffiliated suppliers. If not all production processes are conducted in the
same country, offshoring involves trade in intermediate inputs or services.
1All variables are in constant 2000 US dollars and purchasing power parity. Developed countries include
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US.
2We use the G8 countries with the exception of Russia due to data limitations.
3For more information on this issue and the business practice of offshoring, see Crino` (2009).
4Empirical evidence for this trend is provided, for instance, by Hummels et al. (2001), Yeats (2001), and
Amiti and Wei (2005a).
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Figure 5.1: Growth in FDI outflows and goods exports compared to GDP growth. World
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Source: UNCTAD (Foreign Direct Investment Database) and World Bank .
(World Development Indicators).1Adapted from Crino` (2009). .
While, in general, the host countries for offshoring are both industrialized and emerging
economies, we are primarily concerned with production relocation from industrialized
countries to emerging economies. The enormous wage differential constitutes the main
explanation for the steady increase in offshoring of manufacturing and services to emerging
countries (cf., for instance, Amiti and Wei, 2005a). General reasons contributing to this
trend are, among other things, the reduction of trade barriers, decreasing transportation
and communication cost, substantial progress in information technology, and improvements
in institutions of the target country.
The consequences of the proceeding international integration are very complex and
affect the involved economies in various ways. One question became particularly important
for politicians, the media, and the public: is offshoring to low-wage countries detrimental
to employment in high-wage countries? In many industrialized countries, the debate over
offshoring centers on its labor market repercussions, and the fear of low-wage competition
is widespread. Anecdotal evidence for negative employment repercussions is indeed easy to
find, but whether offshoring lowers or raises aggregate employment in the home country is
very controversial. For instance, Greg Mankiw, when he was Head of the President’s Council
of Economic Advisers in the US, commented that offshoring is only “the latest manifestation
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of the gains from trade that economists have talked about at least since Adam Smith” and
“a good thing” (Mankiw and Swagel, 2006, p. 1032). This statement was attacked sharply,
since it is not evident that there are aggregate welfare gains for each country involved. In
addition, aggregate welfare gains do not rule out that some agents may lose from offshoring.
According to the predominant view in the public debate, the employees in the home country
are the “losers” of offshoring.
The fear of negative employment repercussions is present not only in the US but even more in
Western Europe. There are two main reasons why this concern is greater in Western Europe.
First, the US labor market is quite flexible, whereas several Western European labor markets
are characterized by rigidities and the presence of labor unions. In many Western European
countries, the labor unions still play an important role in wage setting due to a coverage of
collective bargaining of around or above 70%.5 In the presence of strong unions, wages tend to
be higher and more rigid, therefore the negative employment effects are expected to be larger.
Second, the opening up of the formerly communist Central and Eastern European countries
(CEECs) during the 1990s and the subsequent eastern enlargement of the European Union
(EU) intensified low-wage competition for Western European countries. The geographic and
cultural vicinity make the CEECs a favorite target for offshoring of Western European firms.6
According to the survey by Kinkel and Maloca (2009), 40% of German manufacturing firms
that were active in offshoring between 2007 and 2009 relocated production to the new EU
member states, 27% to China, 16% to other Asian countries, and 12% to other Eastern
European countries. As there is a substantial wage gap between Western European countries
and the CEECs,7 employees in highly unionized Western European countries fear massive
job losses caused by production relocation to the CEECs.
In general, various factors including country-specific labor market institutions influence
the nature and the magnitude of the employment effect of offshoring in the home country.
Despite the relevance of this issue, the academic literature, both theoretical and empirical,
5Cf. OECD (2004, p. 145). The estimates for the year 2000 are 68% for Germany, above 95% for Austria,
above 90% for France, and above 80% for Italy. While collective bargaining coverage is very high in these
countries, union density is much smaller (25% in Germany, 37% in Austria, 10% in France, and 35% in Italy).
6See Neureiter and Nunnenkamp (2010) for more details on this issue.
7A factor that is likely to contribute, among other things, to this wage gap is the difference in labor
market institutions, with collective bargaining coverage being notably lower in the CEECs. Before 1990, the
CEECs had total coverage. However, union coverage decreased markedly during the 1990s (cf. Baranowska
and Gebel, 2008, pp. 10-11). Estimates for 2002 show that, with the exception of the UK and Slovenia,
collective bargaining coverage is higher in the old EU member states compared to the new member states.
For instance, the coverage is 42% in Hungary, 35% in the Czech Republic and Poland, and around 20% in the
Baltic countries (cf. Van Gyes et al., 2007, p. 14).
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is far from providing detailed insights on the employment repercussions of offshoring in the
presence of labor market frictions. It is not yet clear whether the employees in the home
country are the “losers” of offshoring.
The theoretical literature has examined the relationship between offshoring to low-wage
countries and aggregate unemployment only to a rather limited extent. Yet, there is a
vast literature on the phenomenon of offshoring as well as on other labor market effects of
production relocation. For quite a long time, the theory of trade and offshoring mainly used
full employment models and focused on the wage differential between high- and low-skilled
workers. There was an “apparent disconnect between the public and academic views of the
impact of trade on labor market outcomes” (Davidson and Matusz, 2010, p. 2). Economists
predominantly talked about wages, while the public talked about jobs. Recently, the public
opinion has been taken more seriously,8 and more theoretical research is devoted to labor
market frictions. Trade models with imperfect labor markets allow for analyzing the effects
of offshoring on wage levels, unemployment, aggregate welfare, and its distribution. Some
progress has been made in this respect, but the number of trade models with offshoring
and imperfect labor markets is still very limited. In addition, existing models of production
relocation to a low-wage country and unemployment assume that the high-wage country
is a small open economy, i.e., the production cost in the low-wage country is exogenously
given. As these models abstract from important repercussions on the domestic labor market,
there is a need for future research considering general equilibrium models of offshoring and
unemployment with two large economies.
In the empirical literature, the results regarding the aggregate employment effects of
offshoring are inconclusive and limited.9 The findings should be interpreted with caution and
further research is needed for several reasons: First, the effect of offshoring is difficult to dis-
entangle from that of technological change. Second, most studies are firm-level studies which
deliver an incomplete picture of the effect on economy-wide employment. Third, it has not
yet been established how country-specific labor market institutions influence the strength of
the employment effect. Therefore, it is not possible to deduce general principles from country
studies. Fourth, the measurement of offshoring may crucially influence the results. In sum,
the impact of offshoring on economy-wide employment is very difficult to identify empirically.
8See Section 8.1 for more information on this issue.
9There is, however, a sizeable literature on the effect of offshoring on the wage differential between skill
groups and the relative skilled labor demand.
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These main facts about the academic literature show that further research is needed
to shed more light on the following questions: What is the aggregate employment effect of
offshoring to low-wage countries (the “South”)? How do certain labor market frictions in
the high-wage country (the “North”) influence the magnitude of the employment effect?
Through which channels does offshoring affect employment in the high-wage country? These
are the questions which motivate our analysis. We present Krugman’s (1979a) North-South
trade model augmented to include offshoring to the South and union wage setting in the
North. This framework captures one important characteristic of many Western European
labor markets and allows for analyzing the effects of offshoring on production cost in both
countries and unemployment in the North. Hence, this model also takes into account the host
country effects and endogenously determines the cost differential which motivates offshoring.
As extensions, a second factor of production and firm heterogeneity are considered.
Our study builds upon several streams of literature presented in detail in Chapter 7. In the
next chapter, we first define the main concepts and state some general facts and consequences
of offshoring. This step is essential for a better understanding of the different approaches
used in the literature.
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Chapter 6
Offshoring: Definitions, facts and
consequences
Trade theorists have studied international production processes of firms since the 1960s by
using a variety of terms which refer to the same or related phenomena: “offshore sourcing”,
“(international) outsourcing”, “delocalization”, “intra-product specialization”, “international
fragmentation of production”, “vertical specialization”, “slicing up the value chain”, “kaleido-
scope comparative advantage”, “global production sharing”, “disintegration of production”,
“multi-stage production”, “offshoring”, “trade in tasks”, “FDI”, “multinational activity” and
many more.1 This non-exhaustive list illustrates that it is necessary to define the main terms
which are widely used in the current literature. Since the definitions vary, we also point out
confusing use of terms.
6.1 Definitions of offshoring and related concepts
“Offshoring” and “outsourcing” are two widely used terms. Some people treat them as
synonyms, but this is misleading as they refer to two distinct business decisions: location
(domestic or abroad) and ownership (in-house or external) choice for production processes.2
This two-dimensionality is illustrated in Figure 6.1. If production processes are located
domestically, they can be conducted in-house or by an external supplier, and international
1See Feenstra (1998, pp. 31-32), Hummels et al. (2001, p. 76), and Bottini et al. (2007, p. 3) for information
on the authors using the respective terms.
2The term “production processes” includes both manufacturing and service activities.
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Source: Adapted from Bottini et al. (2007) and Kirkegaard (2008).
trade is not involved. If production processes are relocated abroad,3 they can be carried out
by an affiliate or by an unaffiliated supplier. These two modes of offshoring are associated with
intra-firm trade and arm’s length trade, respectively.4 Following the widespread terminology
in the recent literature, the bold terms in Figure 6.1 represent the terminology we adopt
across the paper: “offshoring” includes both “FDI” and “offshore outsourcing”, whereas
“outsourcing” includes “domestic outsouring” and “offshore outsouring”.5 Thus, the two
concepts overlap as both include “offshore outsourcing”, and the fourth organizational form,
“domestic integration”, is not comprised in either concept.
Unfortunately, this clear terminology is not universally adopted in the literature. Some papers
use the term “international outsourcing” for both modes of “offshoring”, an example being
Amiti and Wei (2005a). Moreover, the business literature restricts the term “offshoring”
to production relocation within MNEs, which we call “FDI”.6 Following the widespread
terminology in the industrial organization and trade literature, we use the term with the
broader meaning.
Concerning the term “outsourcing”, some authors take narrower definitions than the
standard one we follow. For instance, Bhagwati et al. (2004) restrict the term to comprise
3In this context, “abroad” means a country different from where a firm’s headquarter is located.
4As long as headquarter services are needed for final good production, at least trade in these services is
involved.
5See, for example, Helpman (2006) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). These and many other
authors use the terms “offshoring” and “outsourcing” as we do. The terminology for the four organizational
forms varies slightly between different sources. “FDI” is, for instance, also called “vertical FDI” and “pro-
duction transfer within MNEs”. Terms used instead of “offshore outsourcing” are, for instance, “international
outsourcing” and “arm’s length contract”.
6An example that adopts this approach is Kirkegaard (2008).
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only offshore outsourcing of services. Additionally, Markusen (2005) interestingly points out
that there exists a long-standing literature which labels the business practice of outsourcing
with the inverse term “internalization”.
A term which should be briefly mentioned in the context of offshoring is “inshoring”.
According to Trefler (2005) and Bottini et al. (2007), “inshoring” refers to the same process,
i.e., the cross-border relocation of production, but from the point of view of the target
country. Some authors label it “insourcing” instead.7 However, “insourcing” is a rather
confusing term, since it has also been used for trade-unrelated issues, namely for domestic
internal production and domestic outsourcing from the point of view of the receiving firm.
Having distinguished offshoring from outsourcing, we now classify offshoring on the
basis of the type of relocated activity. “Material offshoring” refers to the relocation of
manufacturing activities, such as assembly or intermediate input production, while “service
offshoring” describes the relocation of service activities, e.g., call-centers, after-sale services,
or accounting.8
As a next step, we take a closer look at the activities of MNEs by discussing the traditional
division of FDI into horizontal and vertical FDI. The term “horizontal FDI” is generally used
for “subsidiaries that serve the local market in the host country” (Helpman, 2006, p. 596).
Thus, this kind of FDI is driven by market-seeking motives. “Vertical FDI”, in contrast,
refers to “subsidiaries that add value to products that are not destined (necessarily) for the
host country market” (Helpman, 2006, p. 596).9 Cost-saving motives underlie this sourcing
strategy.10
As we define the term “offshoring” very broadly, it encompasses both forms of FDI. In
contrast, Kirkegaard (2005, p. 4) states that “not all FDI is offshoring”, since his narrower
definition excludes horizontal FDI. This perception is adopted, for example, by Bottini et al.
(2007) and Crino` (2009). Another issue to add is that, in practice, the above mentioned
traditional categories of FDI lose importance because of the growing complexity of MNEs’
sourcing and integration strategies (cf. Lipsey, 2002, and Helpman, 2006).
7For instance, Amiti and Wei (2005a) use this term for international outsourcing in the opposite direction.
8These definitions are widely used. See, for instance, Bottini et al. (2007) and Crino` (2009).
9As pointed out by Bottini et al. (2007), the value added may take the form of specific intermediate goods,
final goods, or services.
10Cost-saving motives refer to the saving of production cost and not to the saving of trade cost for a final
good, which may be associated with horizontal FDI.
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To refer to the phenomenon of offshoring, the term “international fragmentation” is
used especially by one stream of literature. As pointed out by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008, p. 1980), the focus of this literature lies on the modeling of the “breakdown of
technology for producing some good into discrete parts that can be separated in space”.
Other frequently used terms focusing on global production systems are “slicing up the value
chain”, “global value chain”, and the like.11
Due to technological development ever smaller slices of the value chain are tradable. This
fact is addressed by the new concept of “trade in tasks”. As a crucial novelty, Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008, p. 1978) “conceptualize production in terms of the many tasks that
must be performed by each factor of production”.
Lastly, it should be briefly mentioned that some studies use very general terms like “global-
ization” or “economic integration”. Subsuming various aspects, these terms refer to the
phenomenon of offshoring as well as trade liberalization for final goods and other aspects.
To sum up, the terminology used in the literature is sometimes confusing. Therefore, we
stick to our definitions throughout the literature survey in order to clarify the issues. In the
following, some general facts and consequences of offshoring are stated.
6.2 Facts and consequences of offshoring
The motivations for offshoring may vary considerably depending on the sector, the mode of
offshoring, the type of relocated activity, and the target country. To give an impression of
the main reasons for offshoring, the OECD (2007) refers to a 2003 survey from the consulting
firm A. T. Kearney. The survey results show that for large firms cost reduction is the
main reason for offshoring, followed by proximity to clients, increase in sales, improvement
of productivity, and access to foreign markets. Trefler (2005) states that an alternative
motivation is the improvement of access to skilled workforces. Additionally, he refers to a
survey from Accenture in 2004 concerning the importance of different factors in choosing an
offshore outsourcing provider for services. In this survey, cost reduction is only the third
most important factor behind service providers’ expertise and service providers’ flexibility.
These different results illustrate the fact that the ranking of motivations depends on the
above mentioned circumstances.
11Hummels et al. (2001) use the very general term “vertical specialization” to refer to the global chain of
value-adding stages.
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In Chapter 5, we have already pointed out some factors which are favorable to offshoring,
namely the reduction of trade barriers, the decrease in transportation and communication
cost, technological change, and improved institutions in the host country. There is, however,
also a long list of factors which are unfavorable to offshoring: low quality of goods and ser-
vices, delay in delivery, management problems, unexpectedly high cost, lack of protection of
intellectual property rights, problems of contract enforcement, restrictions on establishment,
and the like.12 The list of factors which are unfavorable to offshoring also sheds some light
on factors leading to “backshoring”, i.e., moving production back home. Firms may decide
to re-relocate their production processes due to the risk associated with offshoring.13 In
addition, there are various factors which favor offshore outsourcing relative to FDI. One
prime example is the improvement of the contracting environment.14
After this brief outline of the motivations for offshoring and the factors influencing
offshoring decisions, we proceed with the following question: what are the effects of
offshoring on the domestic economy? As pointed out by the OECD (2007), possible positive
effects are, among others, growth in consumers’ income, improved competitiveness and
productivity of enterprises, export growth, control of inflation, and better returns on capital.
In contrast, possible negative effects are falling real wages of certain categories of workers,
deterioration in the terms of trade, possible decline in capacity for innovation, loss of tax
revenues, regional effects, and many others. This very general exposition illustrates that
offshoring influences the domestic economy in various ways. We are particularly interested
in the effects on domestic employment. The public debate focuses on potential negative
employment effects that arise if offshoring firms substitute foreign for domestic labor.
Alternatively, domestic and foreign labor may act as complements in firms’ production
processes. Besides this direct employment effect, offshoring may increase the productivity
of domestic firms, and this productivity effect may in turn lead to job creation. The effect
on domestic wages, which crucially depends on country-specific labor market institutions,
also influences the employment effect. In the presence of labor unions, offshoring may
influence the bargaining power of firms in the wage setting process. Additionally, the above
mentioned positive and negative effects on the domestic economy may have repercussions
12Cf. Markusen (2005, p. 20) and OECD (2007, p. 38) for a more detailed discussion of these issues.
13Kinkel and Maloca (2009) provide survey data on the backshoring activity of German manufacturing
firms. We revert to this study in Section 8.7.
14A summary of the factors which are analyzed in theoretical models is provided by Spencer (2005, p. 1131).
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on the labor market. Hence, the nature and the magnitude of the overall employment effect
of offshoring are not easy to determine. These rather general thoughts on the labor market
effects of production relocation give a first impression of the complexity of this issue. To
reduce complexity, the theoretical studies use different approaches to abstract from some
repercussions and highlight various links between offshoring and employment.
In this chapter, we presented definitions as well as general facts and consequences of
offshoring. This step is conducive to better understanding the academic literature. Several
strands of literature that address the phenomenon of offshoring exist, and the literature on
the labor market effects of offshoring and trade has started to grow in recent years. As the
analyzed scenarios and the results differ considerably between the numerous contributions,
a close look at the respective modeling approaches is needed. Therefore, we review in detail
the state of the art of the literature on offshoring and its labor market effects in the next
chapter. This survey, which is still selective due to the enormous amount of literature, shows
the differences and similarities of the various models as well as promising avenues for further
research. To the best of our knowledge, a survey that brings together all the different bodies
of literature we consider does not exist. Pflu¨ger et al. (2010) also review the literature on
the labor market effects of trade and FDI, though their focus differs. They too consider
some basic models on trade and offshoring, but with respect to the labor market effects
they primarily concentrate on agglomeration models of the “new economic geography” and
empirical evidence on Germany. Other more selective surveys are mentioned when reviewing
the respective branches of literature.
73
Chapter 7
Literature review on offshoring and
its labor market effects
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.1, we consider the development of trade
theory, since the theories on offshoring build on different models of final good trade. Section
7.2 reviews various streams of literature that deal with offshoring. This comprises models
on horizontal FDI, complex integration strategies of MNEs, firms’ sourcing strategies, inter-
national fragmentation, task trade, and technology transfers by offshoring.1 Since the main
purpose is to review the theoretical literature on offshoring, we mention only a few empirical
studies that motivate or support theory. In the subsequent sections, we present models that
analyze the labor market effects of trade and offshoring. Section 7.3 deals with models on
offshoring without labor market frictions, while Section 7.4 is devoted to models of trade
and labor market frictions, which may act as a good starting point for further research on
offshoring. In Section 7.5, we proceed by reviewing existing work on labor market effects
of offshoring in the presence of labor market frictions, with particular focus on studies con-
sidering union wage setting as a source of frictions. Section 7.6 states the main results of
the empirical literature on labor market effects of production relocation. Finally, Section 7.7
summarizes the survey and points out avenues for further research. Thereby, it also illustrates
how our analysis contributes to the literature.
1To stay focused, we abstract from other approaches to offshoring whose focus differs considerably from
ours. For example, we exclude studies on the role of agglomeration economies for FDI decisions (see Pflu¨ger
et al., 2010, pp. 11-14) as well as studies on the role of tax policy in attracting FDI (see Markusen and Maskus,
2001, p. 18).
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7.1 Development of trade theory
Trade theory consists of a portfolio of models that have evolved over time. In the following,
we primarily concentrate on trade models on which the theories of offshoring are based. We
begin with traditional trade theory that focuses on the comparative advantage of countries.
One source of comparative advantage is differences in technologies, an approach originated
by David Ricardo in the nineteenth century. A simple Ricardian model consists of two coun-
tries, two goods, and one factor of production. Due to constant but different unit factor
requirements, the relative cost of producing the two goods is different in the two countries.
Therefore, countries specialize in the production of their comparative advantage good, which
yields a simple structure of trade flows. The other source of comparative advantage used
in traditional trade theory is differences in factor endowments. This approach is attributed
to Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin, two authors whose contributions date back to the first
half of the twentieth century. In the simplest case, the Heckscher-Ohlin model consists of
two countries, two goods, and two factors of production (2×2×2). The key assumptions of
this model are that goods differ in factor intensities, countries differ in factor endowments,
and technologies are the same across countries. These assumptions determine the pattern of
comparative advantage and of trade.2 Additionally, the Heckscher-Ohlin model allows for the
analysis of aggregate welfare and distributional effects. A third model of traditional trade
theory is the Ricardo-Viner model (or the specific factor model), which assumes sector-specific
factors. It is mentioned briefly, since a few contributions on offshoring build on this model. In
general, traditional trade theory assumes that each industry produces a homogeneous good
and, hence, only explains inter-industry trade.
The empirical evidence of large flows of trade within industries led to a further development
of the theory of trade around 1980. It was Paul Krugman who pioneered intra-industry trade
theory, also called the “new trade theory”. His widely cited contribution is Krugman (1980),
which is a special case of Krugman (1979b). The main ingredients of this theory are the
possibility of product differentiation, economies of scale, and monopolistic competition. In
addition, consumer preferences are characterized by love of variety. Due to these features,
each of the otherwise identical firms produces a single variety of a good, and intra-industry
trade arises in this one-factor model. The wage rates in the two symmetric countries are
the same. In contrast to traditional trade theory, welfare gains do not accrue from dif-
2Concerning the implied pattern and magnitude of trade, the Heckscher-Ohlin model is often rejected
empirically (Trefler, 1995).
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fering opportunity cost of production but from increased scale of production and greater
product diversity.3
The theory of so-called North-South trade modified the intra-industry trade model (or
“North-North trade” model) to allow for wage differentials between countries. This theory
explains both the pattern of trade and the wage differential between developed countries
(the “North”) and less developed countries (the “South”). Krugman (1979a) introduced
exogenous differences in technology,4 which are in line with the product cycle hypothesis
described in an influential article by Vernon (1966). According to this stylized hypothesis,
a typical manufactured product is innovated in developed countries and initially produced
there. When the production process becomes more standardized, technology is transferred
to less developed countries characterized by lower wages.5 Krugman (1979a) was the first to
formally model this phenomenon in a trade context. He applies an exogenous rate of new
product innovation in the North and an exogenous rate of technology transfer to the South.
Since Krugman (1979a, p. 259) uses the term “imitation lag”, it becomes apparent that he
thinks of technology transfer via imitation. In this setup, the North exports new goods and
imports old goods. Wages are higher in the North due to technological superiority, i.e., the
ability to produce certain goods the South cannot produce. Our own study presented in
Chapter 8 builds on this model.
The theory of Krugman (1979a) was further developed by Grossman and Helpman (1991a),
who endogenized the rates of innovation and imitation. They embed the North-South
trade model in an endogenous growth framework and model innovation as an increase
in the number of producible varieties. In contrast, Grossman and Helpman (1991b)
regard innovation as quality improvements of the existing varieties. In these North-South
models, imitation by Southern firms is the only channel of technology transfer. Some
contributions on offshoring modify this assumption, for there are in general various ways of
technology transfer.
A further seminal contribution to the trade literature is the model of Helpman and
Krugman (1985), which integrates traditional and intra-industry trade theory. By in-
troducing monopolistic competition, product differentiation, and economies of scale
3This is the case in Krugman (1979b), whereas the welfare gains accrue only from greater product diversity
in the less complex Krugman (1980) model.
4These differences are not the same as in the Ricardian model. It is assumed that all goods are produced
with the same cost function.
5In addition, Vernon (1966) specifies the mode of production in the South, which changes along the product
cycle. This aspect is not addressed by Krugman (1979a) but by Antra`s (2005) (see Section 7.2.2).
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into a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, it accounts for both inter- and intra-industry trade
flows. As stated by Helpman (1999), it is possible to extend this framework in such a
way that it embodies, for example, factor price inequality, differences in technology, and
trade cost. This integrated model is convenient for studies that combine theory and empirics.
All trade models mentioned so far are based on the analysis of a representative firm,
at least within each industry. These models provide valuable insights concerning different
possible patterns of trade and sources of aggregate welfare gains. However, in the 1990s, new
findings on trade within industries emerged which could not be explained by the existing
models. Using new firm-level data, empirical studies showed that, within an industry, only
a fraction of firms export and that firm characteristics, such as productivity and size, differ
considerably between exporters and non-exporters.6 Motivated by these findings, richer
models featuring firm heterogeneity were developed. Melitz (2003), the initiator of this
“new new trade theory”, embeds productivity differences at the firm level into the Krugman
(1980) model on intra-industry trade. Potential firms, which face uncertainty regarding
their productivity, pay a fixed and irreversible cost to enter the domestic industry. Once the
entry cost is paid, each firm draws its productivity from some distribution. As in Krugman
(1980), all firms pay the same wage. In his dynamic industry model with North-North
trade, Melitz (2003) shows that only the most productive firms enter the export market
due to an additional fixed cost of exporting. Less productive firms serve only the domestic
market, while the least productive firms are forced to exit the industry. Trade liberalization
results in inter-firm reallocations towards more productive firms and thereby implies a rise
in aggregate productivity. This is a source of gains from trade which has not been analyzed
in previous trade models. The Melitz (2003) model has become a new workhorse in trade
theory and stimulated a growing literature on the impact of firm heterogeneity on various
trade-related issues including offshoring.
Baldwin and Forslid (2010) study different aspects of trade liberalization using the Melitz
(2003) framework. Interestingly, trade liberalization may lead to an anti-variety effect, i.e.,
a fall in the number of available product varieties,7 but nonetheless it leads to welfare gains.
A modified version of the Melitz (2003) model is presented by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
They dispense with constant elasticity of substitution preferences and use a linear demand
6Cf. Helpman (2006, p. 592), who also mentions some examples of empirical studies.
7This effect stands in contrast to the results of standard intra-industry models like Krugman (1980).
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system which brings forth variable markups. Therefore, market size and trade influence
the toughness of competition in the market. The authors derive predictions concerning the
impact of trade liberalization on productivity and price distributions.
In a noteworthy contribution, Bernard et al. (2007) integrate heterogeneous firms into a trade
model a` la Helpman and Krugman (1985) with imperfect competition and endowment-driven
comparative advantage. This rich model explains three patterns of trade simultaneously:
countries’ exports are higher in comparative advantage industries, there exists two-way trade
within industries, and only a fraction of firms export within each industry. In this setup,
trade liberalization leads to reallocations both within and across industries and countries.
The rise in aggregate productivity may lead to gains for all factors.8
This new class of trade models with heterogeneous productivities provides new insights
into the causes and consequences of trade. In addition to productivity heterogeneity, a
second firm characteristic has recently been analyzed, namely the number of products a
firm manufactures and exports. To stay focused, we cover these multi-product models only
briefly. Empirical studies showed that exporting firms typically export multiple products.
However, in most trade theories, firm boundaries and the number of products per firm are
indeterminate, or single-product firms are assumed. Motivated by these facts, models with
heterogeneous firms producing multiple products evolved. For instance, Eckel and Neary
(2010) show that trade liberalization influences the scale and the scope of multi-product
firms. Among other things, firms may drop marginal high-cost products and focus on their
core competencies.9
By reviewing the main developments of the trade literature,10 we illustrated the dif-
ferences between the various models. Of particular importance is that the assumption of
full employment is a common ground of all these trade models. Since we focus on aggregate
employment effects, we revert to this point later on. To sum up, the trade literature
traditionally focused on industries and countries. In addition, the newer models point out
the role of individual firm characteristics, such as firm productivity and number of products,
and foster a better understanding of the microfoundations of trade.
8This is an anti-Stolper-Samuelson result, for it is not necessarily the case that the abundant factor gains
from trade liberalization, while the scare factor loses.
9Bernard et al. (2007) and Eckel and Neary (2010) provide further information on trade models with
multi-product firms.
10More comprehensive surveys on the development of the trade literature can be found, for instance, in
Markusen (2005), Bernard et al. (2007), and Helpman (2010).
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As the reviewed trade models focus on final goods and exporting as the only means to serve
foreign markets, they do not consider the possibility of production offshoring and the choice
between different sourcing strategies. Yet, splitting the production process across countries
and firms is a widespread business practice. The international organization of production
affects the pattern of trade in final goods as well as in intermediate inputs and services. Due
to this fact, the analysis of offshoring decisions helps to explain the trends in the data. In the
following, we discuss various approaches to offshoring, which build on different trade models
and on other sub-areas of economic theory.
7.2 Different approaches to offshoring
In this section, we review various strands of literature analyzing the phenomenon of offshoring.
The models are grouped by topic rather than chronologically, while the categories are not
mutually exclusive. First, we present the main contributions on horizontal FDI and complex
integration strategies of MNEs. We proceed by discussing the literature on firms’ sourcing
strategies for intermediate inputs. Subsequently, the models of international fragmentation
and task trade are surveyed. Lastly, we review the literature on offshoring as a means of
technology transfer. The selected models cover a broad range of topics, and the modeling
approaches vary considerably. The aim of this overview is to illustrate how different forms of
offshoring are modeled and which questions can be addressed in the different setups.
7.2.1 Horizontal FDI and complex integration strategies
As the topic covered in this section is not the primary focus of this dissertation, only two
main contributions are mentioned. The first is on horizontal FDI, while the second considers
complex integration strategies of MNEs. Up to now, these models have hardly been used
to address the labor market effects of offshoring. Only the first model is incorporated in a
contribution mentioned in Section 7.5.
Helpman et al. (2004) extend the Melitz (2003) model, in which exporting is the only way
to serve foreign markets, to additionally allow for horizontal FDI. Serving the foreign mar-
ket through subsidiary sales is associated with a fixed cost that arises from giving up the
concentration of production, while avoiding trade cost. This proximity-concentration trade-
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off11 is the main determinant of Helpman et al.’s (2004) heterogeneous firm model. The
authors show that the least productive firms are forced to leave the industry, low productive
firms only serve the domestic market, and high-productivity firms also serve foreign markets.
Among the latter, the relatively less productive firms export and the more productive engage
in horizontal FDI. This sorting pattern is in line with their own estimates and other empirical
studies.12 Using a Pareto distribution, they find that the ratio of subsidiary sales to exports
is higher in sectors with greater productivity dispersion.13 The approach of Helpman et al.
(2004) highlights the effects of within-industry heterogeneity on the firm’s decision to serve
foreign markets via FDI or exporting. This model and the trade models mentioned above
focus on final goods and abstract from the sourcing decision for intermediate inputs.
As already mentioned in Section 6.1, MNEs are increasingly engaged in both horizontal and
vertical FDI. Such complex integration strategies are, for instance, analyzed by Grossman
et al. (2006).14 They build on Yeaple (2003) and Melitz (2003) concerning the modeling of the
two types of FDI and the heterogeneous productivity of firms, respectively. In a framework
with two symmetric Northern countries and one Southern country, each Northern firm must
provide headquarter services at home, but relocation of production is possible. These firms
can perform the production of components and assembly of the final good either in the home
country or in the other Northern country or in the South. Grossman et al. (2006) derive the
equilibrium choice of integration strategies for the heterogeneous firms. They analyze how
this choice depends on the fixed cost for foreign affiliates, the trade cost for intermediate and
final goods, and the relative size of the consumer market in the South. The model predicts
an array of integration strategies and highlights a complementarity between the two types
of FDI. It combines cost-saving and market-seeking motives, while abstracting from the out-
sourcing decision.
In the next section, the firms’ choice concerning the sourcing strategies for intermediate in-
puts is analyzed. Both the outsourcing and the offshoring decision are addressed. To clarify
the differences between the modeling approaches, it should be pointed out that all approaches
11Empirical evidence for this kind of tradeoff is given by Brainard (1997). An early example of an FDI
model that focuses on the proximity-concentration tradeoff is Markusen (1984). Markusen (2004) provides a
summary of the literature on horizontal MNEs.
12Girma et al. (2005) conduct an empirical study on the UK and find that the productivity distribution
of MNEs dominates that of exporters, which in turn dominates that of domestic firms. Additionally, Arnold
and Hussinger (2005) analyze the export behavior of German manufacturing firms. They detect a causal link
between high productivity and the presence in foreign markets.
13Greater productivity dispersion is modeled by a lower shape parameter of the Pareto distribution.
14A second model that combines the two types of FDI is the so-called knowledge-capital model (see
Markusen, 2004, for more information).
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to offshoring reviewed in the remainder of Section 7.2 do not consider horizontal FDI, i.e.,
market-seeking motives.
7.2.2 Sourcing strategies of firms
The recent decades have seen new trends in trade and investment patterns, and the
organizational change of firms has been key to this development (cf. Helpman, 2006, p.
589). One important aspect concerning the organizational form is the sourcing strategy for
intermediate inputs. To address the issues of location and ownership choice, trade models
are enriched by concepts of industrial organization theory and contract theory. The concepts
which are integrated include relationship-specific investments, search and matching, and
incomplete contracts. The models of this relatively new branch of literature highlight
different tradeoffs explaining the circumstances under which a firm decides to engage in
outsourcing and/or offshoring of intermediate inputs. Moreover, the implications for the
industry structure are analyzed.
As this is a lively area of research, we do not review all contributions in detail and focus
primarily on the models of incomplete contracts. More detailed surveys of this literature are
provided by Spencer (2005) and Helpman (2006).
All the incomplete contract models mentioned below “build on a common assumption,
namely that some inputs are highly specific to a final product and that their supply is
not fully contractible” (Helpman, 2006, p. 591). This assumption can be used in different
incomplete contract settings in order to analyze various aspects associated with sourcing
strategies.
The first category of models studies organizational choice by focusing on matching
between buyers and suppliers of specialized inputs and the resulting thick market effects.15
Since the consideration of the simultaneous ownership and location decision turns out to
be rather complex, a series of papers by Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003, and 2005)
focuses on the decision between two of the four possible forms (cf. Figure 6.1). In Grossman
and Helpman (2002), the choice of ownership is addressed in a purely domestic context.
Nevertheless we mention this model, as it is further developed in the ensuing papers. The
make-or-buy decision is governed by the tradeoff between the cost of a larger and less
15We do not review Spencer and Qiu (2001) and Qiu and Spencer (2002). These early contributions on
incomplete contracts have a narrow focus on specific organizations and use only a partial equilibrium approach.
See Spencer (2005) for a detailed review of these papers.
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specialized organization under vertical integration and the cost associated with the search
for a partner and incomplete contracting under outsourcing.16 The underlying theory of
the firm is the so-called transaction cost approach,17 which implies that the cost associated
with hold-up problems stemming from incomplete contracting only exists under outsourcing.
Concerning the industry equilibrium, which results from firms’ organizational choices,
Grossman and Helpman (2002) show that some sectors solely consist of vertically integrated
firms, whereas others solely consist of disintegrated firms.
While Grossman and Helpman (2002) analyze the ownership decision in a closed economy,
Grossman and Helpman (2003) study the decision between FDI and offshore outsourcing
of specialized inputs to the South in a related setup. They establish that the prevalence of
offshore outsourcing relative to FDI rises under the following conditions: the productivity
advantage of specialized suppliers increases, the industry size of final good producers rises,
the degree of contract incompleteness falls, or the relative wage of the South decreases.
However, Grossman and Helpman (2003) use exogenous wages and do not consider the
location decision between North and South.
Their third paper on different sourcing strategies is the only one which uses a general
equilibrium model of monopolistic competition and North-South trade. With respect to the
sourcing options considered, it complements the other two papers and addresses the location
choice for outsourcing activities. Grossman and Helpman (2005) do not allow for in-house
production of specialized inputs and assume that final good producers enter only in the
North while input suppliers enter in both countries. Outsourcing involves costly search for
a partner and incomplete contracting. The authors analyze the equilibrium of this trade
model, thereby emphasizing its determinants. The scale of offshore outsourcing relative to
domestic outsourcing depends on the differences across countries in market thickness, cost
of customizing inputs, contracting environment, and search cost.
The second group of papers on organizational choice under incomplete contracts com-
bines the property rights theory of the firm with different trade models. The so-called
contractual input intensity is emphasized as a main determinant of the firm’s sourcing
strategy. In contrast to the traditional factor intensity, this measure concerns the control of
intermediate inputs. Since intermediate inputs that are controlled by affiliated or unaffiliated
16A related paper, which also uses a simple model focusing on matching, is McLaren (2000). In contrast to
Grossman and Helpman (2002), it embeds bidding rather than incomplete contracting under outsourcing.
17More information on the transaction cost approach is provided by Spencer (2005, p. 1110).
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suppliers suffer more from contractual problems than intermediate inputs under direct
control of the final good producer (e.g., headquarter services), the term contractual input
intensity is used for the relative requirement of the two categories of intermediate inputs
(cf. Helpman, 2006, p. 609). Using this modeling approach, the different papers address the
effect of contractual input intensity on trade patterns (Antra`s, 2003), product cycles (Antra`s,
2005), and the impact of within-industry heterogeneity (Antra`s and Helpman, 2004).
Antra`s (2003) further develops the work of Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003) on the
choice of ownership. He uses a two-sector trade model in the spirit of Helpman and Krugman
(1985), changes the modeling of contract incompleteness, and embeds another theory of the
firm, namely the property rights theory.18 This theory, which was developed by Grossman
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), implies that the hold-up problem resulting
from sunk, relationship-specific investments and incomplete contracts is also present within
MNEs.19 Nash bargaining20 over the surplus created by the relationship thus takes place
under integration and outsourcing, but the distribution of the surplus depends on the
ownership structure. On the one hand, integration within MNEs provides property rights
which improve the bargaining position of the final good producer, while on the other hand,
it reduces the supplier’s incentives to supply components. In this model, the supplier, who is
either inside or outside the firm, controls one intermediate input and the other is controlled
by the final good producer. As already mentioned above, a main determinant of the decision
between integration and outsourcing is the relative intensity of these two intermediate
inputs. Antra`s (2003) analyzes the integrated equilibrium of this trade model in order to
show that offshoring within MNEs and, thus, intra-firm trade in inputs prevails in the sector
with a higher relative intensity of the input controlled by the final good producer. The
other sector is characterized by offshore outsourcing and arm’s length trade. To combine
theoretical results with empirical support, Antra`s (2003) assumes that the intermediate
input controlled by the final good producer is capital intensive, while the other input is
labor intensive. In this case, the model predicts the following two patterns of US import
data: Across industries, the higher the capital intensity of an industry, the larger the share
of intra-firm imports in total imports. Across countries, the higher the capital-labor ratio of
the exporting country, the larger the share of intra-firm imports in total imports.
18For detailed information on the property rights theory, see, for instance, Spencer (2005, p. 1114).
19As pointed out by Trefler (2005), the transaction cost approach used by Grossman and Helpman (2002,
2003) assumes that FDI magically removes hold-up problems within the firm. Antra`s (2003) addresses this
issue by applying the property rights approach.
20See Binmore et al. (1986) for detailed information on the Nash bargaining solution.
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A variant of this model is used to describe product cycles in Antra`s (2005). In a dynamic
model of North-South trade, goods continuously standardize along their life cycle. This is
modeled by a continuous fall in their headquarter intensity. In addition to the ownership
choice, a Northern firm has to decide whether to offshore the manufacturing stage of
production. To limit the extent of offshoring, it is assumed that contract incompleteness is
present only for international contracts. As a consequence, the tradeoff between lower cost
in the South and the distortions stemming from incomplete contracting determine the firm’s
organizational choice. Initially, goods are manufactured in the North, and as the goods
become more standardized, the manufacturing stage is offshored to the South. Production
is first offshored within firm boundaries and only later on to independent supplier. Thus,
this incomplete contract model features a product cycle that specifies the different modes of
production transfer in line with Vernon’s (1966) formulation.21
In their prominent model on organizational choice, Antra`s and Helpman (2004) highlight the
impact of within-industry heterogeneity. They embed heterogeneous productivities of the
Melitz (2003) type in a one-factor North-South trade model featuring relationship-specific
investments, contractual input intensity, and property rights. Compared to related work,
they abstract from differences in factor proportions (in contrast to Antra`s, 2003) and use
a static setting (in contrast to Antra`s, 2005). It is assumed that producers of final good
varieties need two customized inputs, namely headquarter services and intermediate inputs.
These firms are located in the North, where they also produce the headquarter services. The
production of the intermediate inputs, which is subject to incomplete contracts, can be both
outsourced and offshored. Nash bargaining between suppliers of intermediate inputs and final
good producers is modeled as in Antra`s (2003). The supply of labor faced by the producers
of final good varieties is perfectly elastic in both countries. Across the differentiated good
sectors, the importance of headquarter services varies. In this setup, each Northern firm
decides between the four possible organizational forms, which involve different fixed cost. By
assumption, the fixed cost is higher for sourcing in the South and, given the location, higher
for integration. Additionally, the variable cost is lower in the South, and integration gives
the final good producer a larger share of the revenue but lowers the supplier’s incentives.
The heterogeneous firms choose a sourcing strategy for the intermediate inputs depending on
21This model differs from the above mentioned contributions of Krugman (1979a) and Grossman and Help-
man (1991a,b) in that the product cycle is driven by voluntary offshoring rather than imitation of Southern
firms. As these earlier articles on product cycles focus on the effects on trade flows and relative wages, imitation
is used as a simple form of production transfer.
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productivity and sectoral characteristics, e.g., headquarter intensity. This model is the first
in which different organizational forms coexist within an industry. In particular, Antra`s and
Helpman (2004) show that all four forms may coexist in a headquarter-intensive sector: with
increasing productivity the firms choose to exit the market, outsource domestically, integrate
domestically, outsource abroad, and engage in FDI. The last form, offshoring within MNEs,
is associated with the highest organizational cost and is most likely if both productivity
and headquarter intensity are high. The authors analyze in detail the determinants for the
relative prevalence of the different organizational forms. Empirical support for the above
mentioned sorting pattern is provided, for instance, by Tomiura (2007).22 The Antra`s and
Helpman (2004) model, which is widely cited in the literature, delivers interesting results.
With regard to our research questions, however, we remark the following: Since the focus
of Antra`s and Helpman (2004) is on the endogenous organizational choice, they restrict the
general equilibrium structure to a minimum. Most importantly, the Northern and Southern
wage rates are fixed and cannot be influenced by organizational choice.23 Hence, this model
is not designed to address general equilibrium effects of organizational choice on employment,
aggregate welfare, or distribution of income.24
To analyze complementarities between outsourcing and offshoring, Grossman et al. (2005)
develop a variant of the Antra`s and Helpman (2004) model, in which the fixed cost for
integration is lower than for outsourcing. One key finding is that, in the case of zero
transportation cost, the smaller the fixed cost for outsourcing in an industry, the higher the
fraction of both outsourcing firms and offshoring firms.
While the above mentioned papers on organizational choice under incomplete con-
tracts have a lot of common ground, we proceed by reviewing related papers that use
different approaches.
Grossman and Helpman (2004) embed the incentive system approach of Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1994) into a model of heterogeneous firms and North-South trade. It is assumed
that the nature of contracts between principals and employees or suppliers is constrained.
22Using firm-level data on all manufacturing industries in Japan, he finds the following ranking: Firms
active in FDI tend to be more productive than firms outsourcing abroad and exporters. The latter two are
in turn more productive than domestic firms. Nunn and Trefler (2008) also support the predictions of Antra`s
and Helpman (2004) by examining US intra-firm and arm’s-length import data.
23As Antra`s and Helpman (2004) introduce a homogeneous good in addition to the differentiated goods and
preferences which are quasilinear in the homogeneous good, the wage rates in the North and the South are
determined by the respective fixed labor productivities in the production of the homogeneous good.
24See also Spencer (2005) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) for a discussion of this class of models.
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In this effort-based model, there is a tradeoff between higher-powered incentives under
outsourcing and greater monitoring under vertical integration. Grossman and Helpman
(2004) mainly analyze the sorting of the heterogeneous firms into different organizational
forms. They find that the least and most productive firms choose offshore outsourcing.
Among the firms with intermediate productivity, the less productive choose FDI and the
more productive domestic integration. Thus, their sorting pattern differs considerably from
Antra`s and Helpman (2004).25
In their noteworthy paper, Feenstra and Hanson (2005) use a simple incomplete contract
model of offshoring and test it with data on firms engaged in export-processing in China.
Their model is based on the property rights approach but is general enough to allow for
implications of the incentive system approach. It encompasses four alternative organizational
forms: the same or different parties can have the ownership of the plant and the control
of the input purchases. The organizational choice depends on model parameters, and the
theoretical predictions are supported by the data. In accordance with the property rights
approach, the most prevalent form is foreign ownership of the plant and control over inputs
by the local management. Moreover, this pattern is particularly common in provinces with
thick export markets and low contracting cost.26
Another model on organizational choice with a somewhat different focus is Marin and
Verdier (2010). It embeds the Aghion and Tirole (1997) theory of delegating authority27 in a
trade model of the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) type in order to investigate the link between
trade and varying levels of decentralization across firms and countries. This model is also
tested empirically with data on the internal organization of Austrian and German firms.
The final contribution we mention in this section is by Nunn (2007), who builds on the work
of Levchenko (2004). Instead of focusing on the inability to write complete contracts, he
analyzes the institutional differences across countries that influence the quality of contract
enforcement and, thereby, the pattern of trade. The impact of the quality of contract en-
forcement is expected to be particularly pronounced for industries that require considerable
relationship-specific investments, i.e., contract-intensive industries. Nunn (2007) confirms
his theoretical insights by a detailed empirical analysis. He finds that countries with
good contract enforcing institutions export relatively more in contract-intensive industries.
25Detailed information on the incentive system approach and the model of Grossman and Helpman (2004)
can be found in Spencer (2005).
26See Spencer (2005) for more information on the modeling approach of Feenstra and Hanson (2005).
27This theory of the firm extends the property rights approach (see Spencer, 2005, for more details).
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Hence, the institutional environment turns out to be an important source of comparative
advantage. Although this study focuses on the effects of contract enforcement for specialized
inputs on final good trade flows, it suggests that the extent of offshoring as well as the
relative prevalence of offshore outsourcing and FDI are also influenced by the quality of
contracting institutions. This aspect is analyzed by Antra`s and Helpman (2006), who
generalize the Antra`s and Helpman (2004) model in order to allow for varying degrees of
contract incompleteness across inputs and countries. One of their main findings is that
better contracting institutions in the South lead to more offshoring, while they may lower or
raise the prevalence of FDI relative to offshore outsourcing.
To sum up, there is a vast body of literature on firms’ sourcing strategies for inter-
mediate inputs. Motivated by new trends in the data, this literature enhances the
understanding of the various factors influencing the location and ownership choice of
individual firms. Moreover, it highlights how these firm-level decisions influence the industry
structure and the trade flows of intermediate and final goods.
As the other approaches to offshoring do not focus on the choice between different modes
of offshoring, it should be emphasized that the models on firms’ sourcing strategies analyze
different factors that favor offshore outsourcing relative to FDI. Concerning this aspect, we
additionally mention an empirical study, which supports and supplements the theoretical
insights of this section. Using survey data on Austrian and German firms that offshore to
Eastern Europe, Marin (2006) finds that lower trade cost, reduced level of corruption, and
improved contracting environment in the host country favor offshore outsourcing relative
to FDI. The opposite result is obtained for low organizational cost of hierarchies and large
hold-up cost.
We can expect to see more work in this lively area of research on organizational choice,
which also serves as a starting point for several related topics.28 Since we are concerned
with the labor market effects of offshoring, we note that the models on firms’ sourcing
strategies are not designed to analyze labor market and welfare effects. Due to the com-
plexity of the models, the general equilibrium structure is often restricted to a minimum. Up
28Two examples are the contributions by Antra`s et al. (2006) and Antra`s et al. (2009). In a model of firms’
hierarchies, Antra`s et al. (2006) examine the effects of the formation of cross-country teams through offshoring.
They show that offshoring results in better matching between Northern managers and Southern workers and
in increasing wage inequality in the South. Antra`s et al. (2009), in contrast, combine the literature on MNE
activity with the macroeconomic literature on capital flows. It is analyzed how costly financial contracting
and weak investor protection influence MNE activity and FDI flows. Their theoretical findings are supported
by firm-level data.
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to now, labor market effects have not yet been analyzed in frameworks that build on this class
of models, but future research might investigate the labor market effects of these complex
sourcing strategies. We proceed by reviewing the literature on international fragmentation of
production processes. Instead of focusing on the determinants of organizational choice, this
literature mainly concentrates on distributional and welfare effects of offshoring.
7.2.3 Literature on international fragmentation
A sizeable literature has developed that uses the term international fragmentation when
referring to the phenomenon of offshoring. This strand of literature usually considers
multinational firms, as the ownership choice for offshored activities is not addressed.
Concerning the modeling of the production process, the following is assumed: the production
process of a good can be split into separate activities, and some exogenous development
allows that these production activities are carried out in different countries. Without going
into depth on these exogenous developments, this literature focuses on the interesting effects
of international fragmentation on factor rewards, production, trade flows, and welfare.
The various contributions use general equilibrium models building on traditional trade
theory in order to address cost-saving motives of offshoring. Many models are based on the
Heckscher-Ohlin framework and emphasize factor-proportion arguments, while others are
inspired by the Ricardian model or the Ricardo-Viner model.29 Noteworthy contributions
that we do not cover in detail are Arndt (1997), Jones (2000), Jones and Kierzkowski (1990,
2001), Deardorff (2001a,b), and Kohler (2004a,b).30 Some of these authors use verbal and
diagrammatic analysis, while others analyze mathematical models. To reduce complexity,
it is predominantly assumed that fragmentation takes place in only one sector and one
direction (cf. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007). Concerning activities moved abroad,
the early models focus primarily on the offshoring of activities that are low-skilled labor
intensive. As pointed out by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), this literature shows
the analogy of fragmentation and technological progress in the same industry. The different
modeling approaches deliver interesting insights, but the effects of fragmentation depend
heavily on modeling details, such as the industry in which fragmentation occurs, the relative
29For more information on this issue, see Kohler (2008, pp. 3-4).
30Brief reviews of these models are provided by Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) and Kohler (2007).
Markusen (2004) presents the development of the theory of multinational firms and lists Helpman (1984) as
an early contribution using a simple factor-proportions explanation for MNE activity. In the Helpman (1984)
model, MNEs only exist if factor endowments differ strongly enough.
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factor intensities of the fragmented activities, and the like. Due to this fact, we review
the literature on international fragmentation rather selectively. Another reason is that the
models on task trade further develop this approach. In the following, we present three
contributions that were motivated by the public debate about offshoring of white-collar
services and skill-intensive activities. This also gives an impression of the related modeling
approach concerning offshoring of activities that are low-skilled labor intensive.
Markusen (2005) studies a variety of model structures in which the relative intensity of
skilled and unskilled labor and sometimes also of a third factor (know-how) play a key
role. The first framework is a 2×2×2 Heckscher-Ohlin model with fragmentation occurring
in one sector. Non-factor price equalization is achieved by assuming that the countries’
endowments lie in different diversification cones.31 Numerical simulations are required to
study the impact of fragmentation. Markusen (2005) assumes that production fragmentation
occurs only in the skill-intensive sector and that the offshored activity is of middle skill
intensity. In this setting, the relative demand for skilled labor and the skill premium tend
to increase in both countries due to offshoring,32 but this direct effect may be reversed by
the terms of trade effect. The other models “vary in terms of the number of factors, the
substitutability of factors in various sectors, and the factor-intensity of the offshored process
and offshoring sector” (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007, p. 4). Running simulations for
the different models, Markusen (2005) examines the effects of offshoring on each factor and
aggregate welfare. The simulations demonstrate various scenarios, including one in which all
factors gain and one in which all factors lose. The paper’s aim is to present several plausible
and empirically relevant alternatives to model the offshoring of white-collar services. As the
theoretical outcome depends on the focus of the selected model, it is hard to draw robust
conclusions.
To examine offshoring of white-collar services, Markusen and Strand (2007) develop a
general equilibrium model similar to the first model in Markusen (2005). However, they
assume that two types of international fragmentation become possible for one of the two
goods: services can be separated from final good production and, additionally, can be split
into headquarter and production activity. Simulations show that the possibility of both
types of fragmentation tends to be beneficial for a small, skilled-labor abundant economy.
31This is the case if the endowments differ enough so that the two countries specialize in different goods in
equilibrium.
32This happens in both countries, since the transferred activities are not skill intensive from the North’s
point of view but from the South’s. In this context, the North is a high-skilled abundant country, while the
South is low-skilled abundant.
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The authors also discuss the factor price consequences and extend the model by dividing
skilled labor into two types.
Deardorff (2005), who examines skilled-labor offshoring, uses a variant of the Heckscher-Ohlin
model enriched with differences in technology. He illustrates that wages of unskilled workers
in the developed North can fall below wages of their counterparts in the developing South as
a consequence of offshoring, but it is also possible that skilled and unskilled workers in the
North gain.
To sum up, models of international fragmentation allow for analyzing the effects of
offshoring on aggregate welfare as well as on labor demand and factor rewards for different
skill groups. Due to the complexity of these models, offshoring is only considered for one
sector rather than the whole economy. Since the various models address different scenarios
of offshoring, their results differ considerably and hinge on modeling details. Hence, it is
not easy to derive general conclusions. The description of Markusen’s (2005) first model
illustrates how cost-saving offshoring can be studied based on a Heckscher-Ohlin framework
with non-factor price equalization. In this model, the interplay between factor endowments
and skill intensity takes center stage.
In contrast to the above mentioned literature on sourcing strategies, the models on interna-
tional fragmentation address labor market effects of offshoring, namely the wage and demand
effects for different skill groups. However, aggregate employment effects are not analyzed,
since these models adopt the standard assumption of full employment. Contributions that
change this assumption are reviewed in Section 7.5. We now proceed by presenting the
related literature on task trade. This literature evolved because a model like the above
mentioned 2×2×2 Heckscher-Ohlin model with international fragmentation is not well-suited
to analyze the fact that ever finer slices of the value chain are traded.
7.2.4 Theory of task trade
As already mentioned in Section 6.1, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) model the pro-
duction process as a continuum of tasks. To clarify their contribution to the literature, we
present related previous work and include the noteworthy contribution of Feenstra and Han-
son (1996a) in this context. Compared to the above mentioned literature, the theory of task
trade is in general more similar in spirit to the international fragmentation literature than to
the literature on firms’ sourcing strategies. Kohler (2004b) is an example of a related interna-
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tional fragmentation model. In his setup, there is a continuum of fragmented activities, each
of which requires capital and labor. In contrast to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008),
fragmentation is possible in only one sector, and the cost of trading fragmented activities is
uniform.
Another strand of literature, which is related to both the fragmentation and the task trade
literature, addresses offshoring in models with tradable intermediate inputs. Our review of
this class of models is restricted to the influential work of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a).33
These authors analyze the contribution of offshoring to the decline in relative wages of un-
skilled workers. It is assumed that the production of a single good requires both capital and a
continuum of intermediate inputs that differ in their relative intensity of skilled and unskilled
labor.34 In an equilibrium without factor price equalization, the South produces a range of
inputs up to some critical ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, while the skill-abundant North
produces the remaining inputs. As all intermediate inputs are traded costlessly in this model,
the range of inputs produced abroad is determined by the countries’ factor endowments. An
increase in the relative capital stock of the South leads to a shift of production activities
to the South and, thus, to a rise in the relative wage of skilled workers in both countries.
The reason is that the range of intermediate inputs produced in the South extends in such
a way that the average skill intensity of inputs produced in each country rises. The theory
is supported by an empirical analysis with respect to the impact of offshoring on relative
wages of unskilled US workers during the 1980s. In comparison to the Feenstra and Hanson
(1996a) approach, the main novelty of the paper by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) is
the introduction of heterogeneous cost for trading inputs.35
Having highlighted the main differences compared to the previous literature, we now present
more details on the seminal work of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). In their model,
some tasks must be performed by low-skilled workers (L-tasks) and others by high-skilled
workers (H-tasks). The production of each of two final goods requires a continuum of L-
tasks and a continuum of H-tasks, but the factor intensities may differ between the two
goods. Additionally, the cost for trading tasks is heterogeneous in order to capture the fact
that different tasks vary in terms of tradability, i.e., suitability for offshoring.36 Cost-saving
33Feenstra and Hanson’s (1996a) model is further developed in the literature, one example being the work
of Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) on multinational firms.
34The modeling approach of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) is similar to the Heckscher-Ohlin model with a
continuum of goods.
35This review of previous work draws on Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008, pp. 1979-80).
36See Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008, footnote 2, p. 1978) for contributions that characterize tasks
that are well-suited for offshoring.
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motives determine the geographic organization of firms, with the extent of offshoring being
continuous.37 Studying the impact of falling offshoring cost on factor prices, Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008) emphasize a productivity effect of increased task trade and show its
analogy to factor-augmenting technological progress. This productivity effect benefits the
factor whose tasks are easier to offshore. For instance, this means that offshoring of L-tasks
is associated with rising wages for domestic low-skilled workers. The authors highlight that,
due to this productivity effect, a fall in the offshoring cost may lead to shared gains for all
domestic factors if the relative price effect or its impact on factor prices is not too large. This
result contrasts with the standard factor-proportions theory, according to which falling cost
of trading final goods leads to a distributional conflict. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)
offer a tractable model of offshoring that can be used to address its impact on prices, resource
allocation, welfare, and other purposes. They extend the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin model
and illustrate the important role of heterogeneous cost for trading tasks.38 According to the
authors, the drawbacks of their theory are restrictive assumptions concerning the specific pro-
duction technology and the transportation cost for partially processed goods. Nevertheless,
the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) model is widely used in the literature. Section 7.5
reviews some contributions on the employment effects of offshoring that build on this model
but refrain from the full employment assumption.
In the following, we present the literature considering offshoring as a means of technology
transfer in a growth context. This literature differs considerably from the aforementioned
models, with the exception of Antra`s (2005).
7.2.5 Technology transfer by offshoring
This section deals with the approach to offshoring taken by the growth literature on product
cycles which builds on the work of Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b). These authors
model imitation as the only channel through which technological knowledge can be diffused
internationally. However, FDI and offshore outsourcing are other important channels of
technology transfer to the South. Both modes of offshoring are considered in the ensuing
literature, and we begin by presenting the literature on FDI.39
37In contrast to the literature on sourcing strategies, there is no distinction between offshore outsourcing
and FDI.
38Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010) develop a related model for task trade between countries with similar
relative factor endowments. In this model, country size may differ between the two countries.
39Antra`s (2005) is related to this literature insofar as he analyzes product cycles and models voluntary
offshoring instead of imitation. Since he focuses on incomplete contracts and changes some crucial assumptions,
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Helpman (1993) is mainly concerned with the enforcement of intellectual property rights
(IPR) in a product variety model of innovation and imitation, but he also considers a
“crude theory of foreign direct investment” (Helpman, 1993, p. 1276). He emphasizes the
important relationship between the extent of FDI and IPR protection, and this issue is
further developed by Lai (1998). To contrast imitation and FDI as means of technology
transfer to the South, Lai (1998) uses a dynamic North-South trade model that builds on the
product cycle model of Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and Helpman (1993). Concerning
the technology transfer via FDI, he assumes that Northern firms may transfer production
to the South via FDI and that Southern firms can only imitate the products of MNEs. In
contrast to other models, there is no fixed cost of offshoring. In each period, a firm’s decision
to offshore production is driven by the tradeoff between lower wages in the South and the
probability that its product will be imitated after multinationalization. The equilibrium
values are such that, at any time, Northern firms are indifferent between offshoring and
continuing production in the North, i.e., the expected present discounted values of profits
are the same. Thus, the instantaneous profit of MNEs is larger than that of Northern
producers. Lai (1998) determines the extent of FDI in the steady state and analyzes the
effect of stronger IPR protection, which is modeled as a fall in the exogenous imitation
rate. He finds that stronger IPR protection in the South increases the rate of innovation,
the rate of technology transfer, and Southern relative wage. It is demonstrated that the
opposite effects arise if technology is transferred to the South via imitation (as in Grossman
and Helpman, 1991a) rather than FDI. Glass and Saggi (2002) analyze the two channels of
technology transfer simultaneously and assume that Southern firms can more easily imitate
the products of MNEs relative to the products of Northern firms. Building on the quality
ladder framework of Grossman and Helpman (1991b), they model stronger IPR protection
by an increase in the cost of imitation. They find that stronger IPR protection lowers FDI
and innovation, a result contrasting with Lai (1998). These models on FDI are reexamined
and extended by, among others, Glass and Wu (2007) and Mondal and Gupta (2008a).
We now turn to a contribution on offshore outsourcing. Glass and Saggi (2001) build on
the quality ladder model of Grossman and Helpman (1991b) but assume that Northern
firms, which assemble the final good using Northern labor, can purchase basic stages of
production from Southern firms. Hence, offshore outsourcing replaces imitation as the
channel of production transfer to the South. In analogy to innovation, offshore outsourcing
his model is included in a different section.
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is associated with a fixed cost and uncertain rewards. This incorporates the fact that “a
firm might never find a feasible adaptation of its production process” (Glass and Saggi,
2001, p. 72). Once a firm is successful in innovation, it chooses the price of its good and
the intensity of adaptation. In their dynamic setup, Glass and Saggi (2001) identify five
forces that potentially explain higher offshore outsourcing along with a lower relative wage
of the North and a higher rate of innovation. These forces include falling cost of adapting
technologies for the South and a larger fraction of production stages that can be offshored.
To sum up, this strand of literature builds on North-South growth models with product
varieties and quality ladders. The focus differs from most of the aforementioned models. On
the one hand, the effects of stronger IPR protection in the South on FDI and growth are
analyzed. On the other hand, the causes for offshore outsourcing and its wage and growth
effects are studied. These dynamic North-South models, which are driven by differences in
technology, deliver interesting insights on the issue of offshoring, but they do not address
employment issues. To the best of our knowledge, labor market frictions have not yet been
considered in such North-South growth models with offshoring.
In Section 7.2, we reviewed different approaches analyzing offshoring in the context of
trade theory. Apparently, the research questions as well as the theoretical frameworks differ
considerably between the various contributions on offshoring. In the next three sections,
we present models that address labor market effects. Section 7.3 deals with labor market
effects of offshoring in frictionless labor markets, while Section 7.4 reviews trade models with
labor market frictions. These models may act as a starting point for future research on the
employment effects of offshoring. Section 7.5 presents existing work related to our research
focus, viz., offshoring models with labor market frictions.
7.3 Labor market effects of offshoring in frictionless labor
markets
As this section deals with full employment frameworks, it should be pointed out that all
models of Section 7.2 use such frameworks. We have already mentioned the labor market
effects that some of these contributions on offshoring address, and, therefore, we only briefly
summarize their results. The models on international fragmentation and task trade (Sections
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7.2.3 and 7.2.4) mainly analyze the effects on labor demand and wages for different skill
groups in the domestic economy. They shed some light on this issue, but no consensus has
yet emerged. The results depend on different factors, including the skill intensity of the
offshored activity and the sectors in which offshoring occurs. In the following, we add a few
other papers concerned with the extensively studied aspect of relative labor demand and
wages.
In their survey on trade and wages, Feenstra and Hanson (2001) emphasize that trade in
intermediate inputs is a potentially important explanation for the rising wage gap between
skilled and unskilled workers in developed countries. Additionally, they state that the wage
and employment effects of trade in intermediate inputs can be much greater than the effects
of trade in final goods. Building on the model of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a), they show
that trade in inputs has the same effects as skill-biased technological change and, thus, raises
the relative demand and wages for the high-skilled.
Sayek and S¸ener (2006) use a dynamic product cycle model with two skill groups in order
to analyze the effects on the domestic skill premium. They assume that production can be
shifted to the South via offshore outsourcing40 or imitation. One key result is that a larger
fraction of outsourced production leads to a rise in the Northern skill premium.
A contribution that studies the welfare and wage effects of service offshore outsourcing is
Bhagwati et al. (2004). Three models building on traditional trade theory suggest that
service offshore outsourcing generally benefits the economy as a whole. However, the
distributional effects are less unanimous: it may be that some workers lose while others gain
or that all workers are better off. The latter is also emphasized, for instance, by Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
To sum up, much research on the labor market effects of offshoring has focused on its
contribution to the increase in the skill premium observed in many industrialized countries.
Several studies suggest that offshoring tends to increase the wage differential, while others
point to the possibility that this need not always be the case.41
Offshoring may also affect the elasticity of labor demand. A contribution addressing
this fact is Senses (2010), whose theoretical underpinning builds on the model of Feenstra
and Hanson (1996a). If the demand for labor used in production is elastic, an increase in
40Offshore outsourcing is modeled in the spirit of Glass and Saggi (2001).
41There is also much empirical work on this issue, which is reviewed in Section 7.6.
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offshoring lowers the share of production workers and, thereby, increases the conditional
labor demand elasticities. This effect on the elasticity of labor demand is consistent with
the Rodrik (1997) hypothesis. Although Senses (2010) is mainly an empirical investigation,
we briefly present this theoretical mechanism because it is also used in other contributions
(e.g., Koskela and Stenbacka, 2009).
Karabay and McLaren (2010) study the impact of offshoring on the volatility of wages and
workers’ welfare. They contrast the effects of trade in final goods with those of offshoring in
a 2×2×2 trade model, in which risk is allocated through long-run employment relationships.
It is shown that the welfare of rich country workers is lowered by trade in final goods but
raised by offshoring. Moreover, trade in final goods reduces wage volatility, while offshoring
leads to increasing wage volatility.
In this section, we surveyed some labor market effects of offshoring analyzed in full
employment models. However, we are particularly interested in the aggregate employment
effects for economies with labor market frictions. Therefore, we proceed by reviewing
contributions that study the labor market effects of trade in models with labor market
frictions. Afterwards, we present models that also consider offshoring in such frameworks.
7.4 Labor market effects of trade under labor market frictions
The first part of this literature review illustrated the fact that full employment models
are widely used to treat the effects of trade in final goods and offshoring. Davidson and
Matusz (2010, p. 15) point out that “by and large the importance of labor market structure
and labor market institutions has not [...] received the attention that it deserves”. Early
exceptions that analyze trade in final goods and unemployment include Brecher (1974) on
minimum wages, Matusz (1986) on implicit contracts, Copeland (1989) on efficiency wages,
Agell and Lundborg (1995) on fair wages, Davidson et al. (1988) on search and matching,
and Grossman (1984) on unionized labor markets. In recent years, however, the interest
in this topic has resurged, and several trade papers with labor market imperfections and
unemployment have been published.
Most of the recent contributions incorporate search unemployment. Davidson and Matusz
(2010) provide a comprehensive summary of their seminal research. In a series of papers
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starting with Davidson et al. (1988), they study various effects of search induced unem-
ployment in trade models.42 In the following, we review two recent contributions on search
unemployment and trade introducing heterogeneous firms of the Melitz (2003) type. Trade
liberalization leads to inter-firm reallocations towards more productive firms in the Melitz
(2003) model (see Section 7.1). Jobs are lost at some firms and new jobs are created at
other firms, but there is no aggregate employment effect. Yet, this changes if labor market
frictions are considered.
Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) analyze the effects of labor market frictions and trade cost
on welfare, trade flows, productivity, and unemployment. Using a static model43 with
two countries and two sectors, they embed search and matching frictions of the Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides type44 and individual wage bargaining45 into both sectors. In addition
to a homogeneous good sector, there is a differentiated good sector with heterogeneous
firms of the Melitz (2003) type, which pay the same wage. This setup implies that trade
liberalization affects the productivity distribution in the differentiated good sector. Labor
market frictions, which can vary across sectors, are the only difference between the two
countries. Changes in these frictions (e.g., higher efficiency of matching or lower cost of
hiring) affect the trading partner. Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) show that labor market
frictions act as a source of comparative advantage and that both countries gain from trade.
Concerning trade liberalization, they find the following: a fall in trade cost may raise or
reduce a country’s aggregate unemployment, depending on whether its relative labor market
frictions in the differentiated good sector are low or high.46
The second contribution presented in the context of search frictions and heterogeneous firms
is by Felbermayr et al. (2011). In contrast to Helpman and Itskhoki (2010), these authors use
a generalized version of the Melitz (2003) trade model with symmetric countries. Concerning
the labor market, they integrate the same type of search and matching frictions as well
as individual bargaining. In their one-sector model, labor market frictions do not affect
average productivity. One key result is that trade liberalization leads to lower unemployment
42Building on this work, Moore and Ranjan (2005) analyze the impact of trade liberalization on unem-
ployment. They find that both trade liberalization and skill-biased technological change lead to rising wage
inequality, but their impact on unemployment may be quite different.
43The static analysis is consistent with the steady state of a dynamic model (Helpman and Itskhoki, 2009).
44A detailed description of this approach is provided by Pissarides (2000).
45It is assumed that the wage is bargained between a worker and his firm because the search and matching
frictions lead to bilateral monopoly power.
46In related models, Helpman et al. (2010a,b) study the impact of trade liberalization on unemployment
and wage inequality within industries. Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) and Helpman et al. (2010a,b) illustrate
that labor market frictions may act as a source of comparative advantage. A detailed review of this approach
is provided by Helpman (2010).
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and higher real wages if, and only if, it improves average productivity. To examine under
which circumstances trade liberalization and average productivity are positively linked,
they calibrate the model towards US data. Interestingly, they find that different trade
liberalization scenarios all reduce unemployment.47 As a robustness check, they consider firm-
level collective bargaining48 instead of individual bargaining, and their main results still hold.
In recent years, search frictions have been widely used to incorporate unemployment
in trade models, but other noteworthy approaches also exist. Egger and Kreickemeier
(2009) include the fair wage approach of Akerlof and Yellen (1990) in a trade model with
heterogeneous firms. Whether workers consider a wage fair depends on the productivity of
the firm they work for. In this setup, trade liberalization leads to increasing within-group
wage inequality and higher unemployment. Hence, their result concerning the effect on
unemployment contrasts with Felbermayr et al. (2011).49
Like Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), Davis and Harrigan (2011) consider the labor market
effects of trade liberalization in a Melitz (2003) type trade model. However, they incorporate
the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). One key result is that trade
liberalization may destroy a large fraction of good jobs which pay above average wage,
although the impact on aggregate employment is very small in their model.
To analyze the link between trade and unemployment, the literature mainly uses setups
that do not consider economic growth and dynamic trade patterns. An exception constitute
dynamic North-South trade models of the product cycle with labor market frictions. Arnold
(2002) studies the impact of imitation on Northern frictional unemployment in a model
based on Helpman (1993). He shows that labor market flexibility, modeled by the outflow
rate of unemployment, crucially affects the growth effects of North-South trade. In contrast,
Mondal and Gupta (2008b) introduce efficiency wages for low-skilled Southern workers into
the Grossman and Helpman (1991a) model. They find that stronger IPR protection either
lowers or raises the level of unemployment in the South, depending on the North-South wage
differential. While the focus of these two contributions differs from the other papers in this
section, the contribution by Grieben and S¸ener (2009) also deals with the labor market effects
47In a closely related model, Janiak (2006) shows that trade liberalization increases equilibrium unemploy-
ment, but he imposes rather restrictive and implausible assumptions.
48Concerning the modeling of firm-level collective bargaining, they apply the efficient bargaining approach,
in which the two parties bargain over both wages and employment. See Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, Chapter
7, Section 3.2) for more information on this approach.
49Another trade paper with unemployment due to fair wages is Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006). It examines
the impact of global and national technological change on relative wages and unemployment levels.
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of trade liberalization. Concerning the modeling of production activity, trade, and growth,
Grieben and S¸ener (2009) deviate from the standard North-South endogenous growth models
in several ways. In addition, they assume that the Northern labor market is characterized
by firm-level collective bargaining as well as a minimum wage. The labor union’s objective
is to maximize the expected wage in excess of the given minimum wage. In this model,
unilateral Northern trade liberalization leads to increasing Northern unemployment and
lower per-capita welfare in both countries, whereas unilateral Southern trade liberalization
leads to the opposite effects. Grieben and S¸ener (2009) consider union wage setting as a
source of labor market frictions in a trade context. In the next section on offshoring, we
treat this source of labor market frictions more extensively.
To sum up, this section illustrates that there is a small but growing literature on final good
trade and unemployment. Among other things, the models analyze the general equilibrium
effects of trade liberalization on unemployment, and further research on offshoring and
unemployment may be inspired by this work. The next section reviews the existing literature
on offshoring and labor market frictions.
7.5 Labor market effects of offshoring under labor market fric-
tions
First, we present contributions that analyze the labor market effects of offshoring in trade
models with either fair wages or search frictions. Afterwards, existing work on offshoring and
unionized labor markets is reviewed in detail. Due to the focus of our own study, we are
especially concerned with the impact of offshoring on aggregate unemployment.
7.5.1 Fair wages and search frictions
Applying the fair wage approach to efficiency wages, Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) study
the impact of offshoring on the domestic skill premium and unemployment of the unskilled
workers in a small open economy. They use a standard model of international fragmentation
with three sectors and two inputs, namely skilled and unskilled labor, and assume that the
two inputs are mobile across sectors. Production can be fragmented only in the sector with
middle skill intensity. Skilled workers are fully employed in equilibrium, but the fairness
constraint is binding for unskilled workers, which leads to unemployment for this group of
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workers. The authors demonstrate how the relative wage and employment effects of inter-
national fragmentation can be explained by the interaction of relative factor endowments,
the skill intensity of the domestically produced component, preferences towards wage equal-
ity, and the level of unemployment benefits. In particular, it is shown that international
fragmentation increases unemployment of unskilled workers if unskilled labor is sufficiently
abundant relative to skilled labor.
Instead of focusing on fair wages, it is more common to introduce search and matching
frictions. In the following, we present four contributions on offshoring that build on job
search models. Sethupathy (2009) investigates the effects of offshoring on firm-level domestic
wages and employment. His two-sector model displays heterogeneous firms with endogenous
markups (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) in the differentiated good sector and a productivity
effect in line with Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). Search frictions and individual
bargaining are present only in the differentiated good sector. The homogeneous good sector
absorbs any residual labor, and offshoring is not possible in this sector. For firms in the
differentiated good sector, this model predicts the following: Since offshoring firms increase
their productivity and profitability, they raise the wages paid to domestic workers. In con-
trast, non-offshoring firms lose profitability and lower their wages. The effect on domestic
employment is ambiguous at offshoring firms and negative at non-offshoring firms. These
theoretical predictions are tested with data on US multinationals (see Section 7.6).
Kohler and Wrona (2010) follow Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) by modeling offshoring
as trade in a continuum of tasks. In contrast to Sethupathy (2009), they focus on aggregate
employment effects of offshoring and rule out reallocation of labor across sectors. They assume
that workers are specific to a single sector, in which offshoring occurs.50 In this single-sector
economy, the labor market is characterized by search frictions and individual bargaining.
Concerning offshoring, Kohler and Wrona (2010) incorporate the simplifying assumption of
a given foreign wage rate that is low enough so that the domestic economy imports tasks.
They find that increased offshoring of tasks does not necessarily lead to net job destruction in
this small open economy. More precisely, enhanced technology of offshoring has the following
consequences: jobs are lost at the extensive margin because ever more tasks are offshored, and
jobs are created at the intensive margin because labor cost saving results in a productivity
effect and higher employment for the entire set of tasks. The authors derive conditions for
50This assumption of factor specificity is associated with a short-run perspective on offshoring. Cf. Kohler
(2008, p. 3).
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domestic net job creation and highlight that steady improvements in the offshoring techno-
logy may have a non-monotonic effect on employment. The main determinants of the shape
of this relationship are the slope and the convexity of the offshoring cost function for the
different tasks. One key finding is that, for certain industry characteristics, improvements in
the offshoring technology cause wage cuts and job losses for low levels of offshoring but wage
gains and job creation above a critical level of offshoring. For alternative industry charac-
teristics, increased offshoring leads to a steady decrease in employment. This employment
reducing effect is also obtained in a related work by Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009).51
Mitra and Ranjan (2010) study the impact of offshoring on both sectoral and economy-wide
unemployment, whereby they highlight the role of intersectoral labor mobility. Their two-
sector model exhibits search frictions and individual bargaining in the labor market. In one
sector, firms use labor to produce two inputs, which are then assembled into a good, and off-
shoring of production is possible for only one of the two inputs.52 The other sector uses only
domestic labor in the production of its good. The two goods are then combined to produce
the final consumption good, which is exported in the case of offshoring in order to pay for the
imports of the input produced abroad. As in Kohler and Wrona (2010), it is assumed that
the wage in the other country is fixed. Due to this small open economy assumption, these
models abstract from repercussions on the domestic labor market that would arise in the case
of two large open economies.53 Analyzing the steady state of this model, Mitra and Ranjan
(2010) find that offshoring leads to a higher wage and lower unemployment in each sector
if intersectoral labor mobility is perfect. This reduction in sectoral unemployment is driven
by the complementarity between the offshored and the domestically produced input which
leads to a positive productivity effect of offshoring.54 Since this productivity effect outweighs
the negative relative price effect in the offshoring sector, both sectors experience lower un-
employment. In the case that offshoring results in a labor movement towards the sector with
lower or equal search cost, economy-wide unemployment decreases unambiguously as well.
These findings refer to the case of perfect intersectoral labor mobility. If instead intersectoral
51Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) also use a job search model to analyze the effects of offshoring, but they
mainly focus on welfare policy, i.e., redistribution and social insurance. In their model with two skill groups,
only the low-skilled workers are subject to unemployment, and offshoring raises unemployment among the
low-skilled.
52With regard to the modeling of offshoring possibilities, the paper by Mitra and Ranjan (2010) is related
to international fragmentation models.
53In the case of two large open economies, offshoring shifts, among other things, the foreign wage rate and
this shift feeds back on domestic production and employment decisions.
54By relying on a positive productivity effect of offshoring, Mitra and Ranjan (2010) follow the seminal
work of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) (but they use a different framework and refrain from the full
employment assumption).
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labor mobility is imperfect, unemployment in the offshoring sector may increase, while un-
employment in the non-offshoring sector definitely falls. As a result, the impact on aggregate
employment is ambiguous. Additionally, the presence of imperfect labor mobility may give
rise to a mixed equilibrium in which only a fraction of firms in the offshoring sector move pro-
duction abroad. For this type of equilibrium, unemployment unambiguously increases in the
offshoring sector.55
In a related job search model, Ranjan (2010) analyzes the labor market effects of offshoring
in the presence of firm-level collective bargaining.56 He adopts the right-to-manage (RTM)
approach:57 wages are bargained between a firm and a labor union in the first stage, and the
firm chooses domestic employment in the second stage. Since the amount of offshoring is also
determined in the second stage, the threat point of the firm can be positive. The goods mar-
ket is characterized by a single good that is produced under diminishing returns of labor. In
contrast to Mitra and Ranjan (2010), Ranjan (2010) models the offshored input and domestic
labor as perfect substitutes. He abstracts from a productivity effect of offshoring due to his
focus on the role of collective bargaining in shaping the labor market effects. Concerning
offshoring, he assumes that the supply curve of the offshored input is upward sloping, i.e.,
some inputs are costlier to offshore.58 As this is a draft paper, the analytical results for the
steady state are very limited up to now, but numerical examples illustrate some interesting
aspects: while the wage is monotonically increasing in the cost of offshoring (due to higher
wage claims’ of workers), the relationship between the cost of offshoring and unemployment
is non-monotonic. If the offshoring cost is initially very high and then begins to fall steadily,
unemployment first decreases before it increases. Two effects countervail: firms hire more
domestic labor due to a lower wage, and they increasingly substitute offshored inputs for
domestic labor. Ranjan (2010) emphasizes the result that offshoring may reduce both the
wage and unemployment.59
55In a contribution preceding the paper by Mitra and Ranjan (2010), Davidson et al. (2008) investigate how
offshoring of high-tech jobs affects the wages of low- and high-skilled workers and overall welfare. In this job
search model, firms endogenously choose different technologies, and workers differ in skill levels. The authors
briefly address unemployment, but their key result is that offshoring leads to a falling skill premium.
56Most job search models assume individual wage bargaining between a worker and his firm. Exceptions that
consider firm-level collective bargaining include Felbermayr et al. (2011), who mention this form of bargaining
only in the appendix of their trade paper, and Ranjan (2010). It is assumed that the workers a firm hires are
represented by a labor union.
57The RTM approach assumes that the two parties bargain over wages, while the firm then unilaterally
determines employment. For details on this approach, see Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, Chapter 7, Section
3.1).
58This is a reduced form version of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
59Additionally, Ranjan (2010) contrasts his findings for collective firm-level bargaining with the results
obtained in his model under the widely used assumption of individual bargaining. He argues that the non-
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In recent years, several small open economy models that consider fair wages or search and
matching frictions in order to address the effect of offshoring on economy-wide unemployment
have appeared. Models that focus on search frictions include wage bargaining to determine
wages. Most contributions assume individual wage bargaining, while Ranjan (2010), for
instance, postulates labor market institutions and studies the case of firm-level collective
bargaining in the presence of search frictions. Concerning the role of labor market institu-
tions, there is another strand of literature that does not take search frictions into account. In
these models, union wage setting is the source of labor market frictions, and it induces un-
employment. The next section is devoted to these contributions on offshoring and unionized
labor markets, whose modeling approach differs considerably from job search models.
7.5.2 Union wage setting
A considerable amount of literature on offshoring and unionized labor markets exists, but
the work on the effects of offshoring on aggregate unemployment is still limited. As our
own analysis focuses on union wage setting as the source of labor market frictions, we also
cover several studies on offshoring and unionized labor markets analyzing aspects other than
aggregate unemployment. These contributions are presented first.
Bughin and Vannini (1995) use an oligopoly model to investigate how a unionized labor
market in the host country alters the choice of an MNE between FDI and exporting.60 In
contrast, Zhao (1998) examines the labor market effects of offshoring and the role of FDI
for the bargaining position of the firms.61 There are two identical countries, each of which is
characterized by a unionized sector and a non-unionized sector that absorbs all workers not
employed in the unionized sector. Collective bargaining at the industry level is simultaneous
and independent between the two countries. Zhao (1998) applies the efficient bargaining
approach, according to which the two parties bargain over both wages and employment.62
In each country, there is a monopoly firm that produces the good of the unionized sector.
It is assumed that these firms can undertake symmetric intra-industry FDI without a fixed
monotonicity of unemployment does not arise in the case of individual bargaining. This result may, however,
be due to either the different level of bargaining or the change in the time structure.
60In a related work, Leahy and Montagna (2000) address the question of how different degrees of wage
setting centralization impact the incentives of an MNE for FDI. In a recent contribution that builds on the
framework of Bughin and Vannini (1995), Rocha-Akis and Scho¨b (2011) include a redistributive welfare state
and examine welfare policy in the presence of unionized labor markets and offshoring.
61Zhao (1998) extends the analysis of Zhao (1995) so as to analyze the effect of FDI on wages and sectoral
employment.
62As already mentioned in footnote 48, see Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, Chapter 7, Section 3.2) for more
information on this approach.
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cost. Since each MNE bargains in the home and the host country, the two MNEs partially
cooperate against the labor union in each country. Zhao (1998) highlights that FDI leads to
strategic interaction and alters a firm’s threat point in the bargain. The cost-saving effect
of FDI is ruled out by the assumption of identical countries. In this model, FDI always
lowers the bargained wage. Additionally, if the union does not care more about wages than
employment, FDI reduces employment in the unionized sector and the competitive wage in
the non-unionized sector. The author states that these effects are weaker under firm-level
collective bargaining.63
In a related framework, Skaksen and Sørensen (2001) derive conditions under which labor
unions appreciate FDI. They use an industrial organization model, in which a single
monopolistic firm decides to be a local firm or an MNE with some production abroad. There
is collective wage bargaining between this firm and the labor union at home. If the firm
decides to engage in FDI in the first stage, it simultaneously bargains over wages with the
foreign labor union. It is implicitly assumed that labor union members not employed by this
firm get a job elsewhere and earn the competitive wage that prevails in this country. In this
setup, FDI lowers the demand elasticity for domestic labor.64 As a consequence, the union
may achieve a higher wage, which outweighs a potential employment loss in this industry.
Local workers tend to gain from FDI if the degree of complementarity between the MNE
activities at home and abroad is high. In contrast, they tend to lose in case of a high degree
of substitution.
There are several other contributions that analyze different aspects concerning offshoring
and unionized labor markets without considering aggregate unemployment. To stay focused,
we just mention some selected papers and do not describe the different frameworks they
build upon. Gaston (2002) studies how offshoring possibilities influence the nature of
collective bargaining in light of the fact that they worsen the bargaining position of unions.
Additionally, Naylor and Santoni (2003) consider an FDI game between two unionized firms
and investigate the impact of union bargaining power on the decision for FDI. In contrast,
Lommerud et al. (2003) address the question of how trade liberalization alters both domestic
wage bargaining and the incentives for FDI. In a related paper, Collie and Vandenbussche
(2005) analyze the optimal domestic trade policy in the presence of FDI and a unionized
63In this model, firm-level collective bargaining means that, in the presence of FDI, there are two independent
and simultaneous wage bargaining games in each country.
64This contrasts with the Rodrik (1997) hypothesis, according to which globalization increases the demand
elasticity and, thus, lowers the workers’ bargaining power.
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labor market. Elberfeld et al. (2005) investigate the impact of FDI on welfare and labor
demand in the home country, while Lommerud et al. (2009) examine the incentives for
offshoring in the presence of strong unions. The last contribution mentioned in this context
is Bognetti and Santoni (2010). This study, which is closely related to Skaksen and Sørensen
(2001), addresses the effect of offshoring to a low-wage country on the union’s welfare.
Since we are particularly interested in the effect of offshoring on unemployment, we
proceed with contributions that analyze this issue. To guide their empirical analysis, Egger
and Egger (2003) consider a simple one-sector model of a small open economy, in which
firms may offshore part of their intermediate input production to a foreign country that is
rich in low-skilled labor. In the case of offshoring, a firm uses low-skilled labor abroad and
only high-skilled labor at home. It is assumed that the domestic market for low-skilled labor
is unionized. In this model, a decline in trade barriers stimulates offshoring and, thereby,
leads to unemployment of domestic low-skilled workers. However, Egger and Egger (2003)
do not model the wage bargaining process explicitly and simply postulate that low-skilled
employment decreases in the domestic wage differential between high- and low-skilled labor.
In contrast, Eckel and Egger (2009) use a trade model with two symmetric countries and
two-way horizontal FDI. They investigate the relationship between firm-level collective
bargaining and the mode to serve the foreign market in a setup with heterogeneous firms.
Each country consists of a homogeneous good sector and a differentiated good sector, and
the homogeneous good, which requires only capital, acts as a nume´raire. The modeling of
the differentiated good sector combines aspects of Helpman et al. (2004) with the RTM
approach to firm-level wage bargaining. In the two identical countries, the sequence of
events is as follows: First, each firm in the differentiated good sector decides to serve the
foreign market as an exporter or an MNE and incurs the fixed capital cost that differs for
these two options. Second, firm-level wage bargaining takes place. An MNE negotiates with
two independent unions at the plant level. Third, the firms determine employment, produce
their respective varieties with labor input, and sell them in both countries. In this model,
the firm’s decision between exporting and FDI depends on the proximity-concentration
tradeoff. Additionally, the presence of unions makes FDI more attractive, since it increases
a firm’s disagreement profit and, thereby, strengthens its bargaining position. Concerning
the labor market effects, Eckel and Egger (2009) find that the unemployment rate tends to
be lower under economic integration than in autarky. This is due to a wage reducing effect
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of FDI, i.e., MNEs pay lower wages than exporters. Real income of the average worker rises
under economic integration, while workers in MNEs may lose. The authors argue that the
reduction in unions’ bargaining power in both countries may have a particularly positive
employment effect in the case of strong unions, while this kind of deregulation is less effective
in the presence of weak unions.
The approaches of Egger and Egger (2003) and Eckel and Egger (2009) differ from ours.
To analyze the effect of offshoring on aggregate unemployment, we consider a high-wage
country with a unionized labor market that may move production to a low-wage country. In
the following, we review contributions that consider this offshoring scenario.
Skaksen (2004) studies the effects of both potential, but non-realized, and realized offshore
outsourcing on domestic wages and aggregate employment.65 He assumes that wage
bargaining takes place prior to the firm’s decision on the level of offshore outsourcing and
domestic employment. Due to this timing structure, he only considers offshore outsourcing,
which is more flexible than establishing an own plant via FDI. In this small open economy
model, a single final good is produced by combining two intermediate activities, one of which
can be perfectly substituted by offshore outsourcing. Labor is the only factor of production,
and the domestic market for labor is unionized. The cost of buying the intermediate activity
abroad is exogenous and assumed to be sufficiently low so that a domestic firm would never
export this activity. Skaksen (2004) analyzes the bargaining game between a representative
firm and a labor union. He finds that potential, but non-realized, offshore outsourcing acts
as a threat in the wage bargaining game and strengthens the firm’s bargaining position.66
Consequently, a marginal fall in the cost of offshore outsourcing results in a lower negotiated
wage rate and higher employment in this case. Aggregate welfare rises and the firm gains,
while the labor union loses. If instead realized offshore outsourcing is analyzed, the results
differ considerably: A marginal fall in the cost of offshore outsourcing raises the wage rate
and reduces employment. The labor union gains, but the firm loses and aggregate welfare
falls. This paper highlights the differential impact of non-realized and realized offshore
outsourcing on the wage bargaining game in the home country.
Using a related small open economy model, Koskela and Stenbacka (2009) also examine
the effects of offshore outsourcing on domestic wages and employment.67 In contrast to
65This model is related to some of the above mentioned models, especially to Skaksen and Sørensen’s (2001).
66This effect would not arise when applying the efficient bargaining approach instead of the RTM approach.
67Koskela and Stenbacka (2009) state that their model can alternatively be interpreted as one of FDI rather
than offshore outsourcing.
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Skaksen (2004), the offshoring decision precedes wage bargaining, and firms choose their
domestic labor demand after the wage bargain.68 The authors point out that such a time
structure is relevant if offshore outsourcing is a long-term decision requiring significant
sunk investments for establishing a network of foreign suppliers. Therefore, they assume
a fixed cost of offshore outsourcing, which is convex in the amount of offshored labor. In
final good production, domestic and offshored labor are modeled as perfect substitutes
with a productivity differential. The wage in the foreign country, which is not endogenous,
is assumed to be sufficiently low. In this setup, offshore outsourcing increases the wage
elasticity of domestic labor demand (see Senses, 2010), which in turn leads to a wage
reducing effect. In addition, offshore outsourcing mitigates the firm’s profit reducing effect
of higher domestic wages. For a sufficiently strong labor union, the first effect dominates and
offshore outsourcing lowers the negotiated wage and aggregate unemployment in the home
country. The opposite effects arise in the case of a weak labor union. Koskela and Stenbacka
(2009) remark that, in the presence of a sufficiently strong union, the fraction of production
that should be optimally offshored increases in the bargaining power of the union. This
paper stresses that the effect of offshore outsourcing on unemployment depends critically
on the relative bargaining power of the labor union.69 The models of Skaksen (2004) and
Koskela and Stenbacka (2009) deliver interesting insights, but the production cost in the
low-wage country is given exogenously due to the small open economy assumption. Thus,
these models abstract from repercussions on the domestic labor market which arise if two
large open economies are involved in offshoring.
To sum up, the modeling approaches and the aspects analyzed differ considerably between
the contributions on offshoring and unionized labor markets. For instance, some models
consider two identical countries with labor unions and two-way FDI, while others study
offshoring from a high-wage country with a unionized labor market to a low-wage country.
There are only a few contributions addressing the effect of offshoring on aggregate unem-
ployment.
68The terms “ex ante wage bargaining” and “ex post wage bargaining” can be used for the time structure
in Skaksen (2004) and Koskela and Stenbacka (2009), respectively.
69In a closely related paper, Koskela and Stenbacka (2010) study the effects of offshore outsourcing and wage
solidarity on the labor demand for high- and low-skilled workers, the skill premium, and aggregate unemploy-
ment. They consider a monopoly union and find that offshore outsourcing reduces domestic unemployment
if the fraction of high-skilled workers is sufficiently low. Two other related papers are by Koskela and Ko¨nig
(2008) and Koskela and Scho¨b (2010). Koskela and Ko¨nig (2008) add flexible and committed profit sharing
to a model that examines the relationship between wage bargaining, offshore outsourcing, and aggregate un-
employment. In contrast, Koskela and Scho¨b (2010) analyze the impact of alternative labor tax reforms on
domestic employment in the presence of offshore outsourcing and a unionized domestic labor market.
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In Section 7.5, we presented models analyzing the labor market effects of offshoring in the
presence of labor market frictions. In these models, unemployment is caused by fair wages,
search frictions, or union wage setting. This section illustrates that research on offshoring
and aggregate unemployment is growing but still limited. We observe that all models on
offshoring to a low-wage country consider small open economies and, thus, abstract from
repercussions on domestic employment and the effects on the host country. Due to this
fact, there is a need for further theoretical research on the aggregate employment effect of
offshoring. We revert to this issue in more detail in Section 7.7. First, however, empirical
results on the labor market effects of offshoring are reviewed.
7.6 Empirical evidence on the labor market effects of off-
shoring
The theoretical literature sheds some light on the labor market effects of offshoring, but the
impact of offshoring on aggregate employment and the role of country-specific labor market
characteristics are not yet fully understood. In this section, we present the insights gained
by empirical studies on the labor market effects of offshoring. A comprehensive survey of
the sizeable amount of empirical literature is carried out by Crino` (2009), while Bottini
et al. (2007) provide a more selective survey. Since our focus lies on theoretical work, we
do not discuss the different empirical methodologies and concentrate on the main results
concerning the domestic labor market effects of offshoring.70 In particular, we present
studies on Western European countries with rigid labor markets.71
A widely discussed issue is the impact of material offshoring72 on wage inequality be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers and relative skilled employment. On the one hand, in
most industrialized countries with flexible labor markets both of these variables rose sharply
70For a review on the host country effects of offshoring, see Bottini et al. (2007, pp. 29-31 and 35-36).
The related empirical literature on the labor market effects of trade is also not covered in this section. Two
examples that examine the relationship between trade liberalization and aggregate employment are Dutt et al.
(2009) and Felbermayr et al. (2011). The link between job turnover and trade is, for instance, studied by
Davidson and Matusz (2010, Chapters 7 and 8).
71Our summary draws on the surveys of Bottini et al. (2007) and Crino` (2009) and additionally presents
studies related to our research focus.
72The studies build on different proxies for material offshoring. Mostly used are the shares of imported
intermediates in output, value added, and input purchases. These measures include offshore outsourcing and
vertical FDI but not horizontal FDI.
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during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. In sum, the empirical studies on these
countries show that material offshoring substantially contributed to the rising skill-biased
inequality. For instance, Hijzen et al. (2005) and Hijzen (2007) conduct studies on the UK,
Head and Ries (2002) on Japan, and Feenstra and Hanson (1996b) on the US. A summary
of empirical studies on the US, Japan, Mexico, and Hongkong is provided in the survey of
Feenstra and Hanson (2001).73 On the other hand, in European countries with lower wage
flexibility the increase in wage inequality was less dramatic, but relative skilled employment
and unemployment of the unskilled rose considerably. In countries like Germany, Austria,
and Italy material offshoring to the CEECs has increased rapidly since 1990 (cf. Crino`,
2009). The question whether offshoring to the CEECs contributed to the rise in the relative
skilled labor demand in these highly unionized countries is examined in several industry-level
studies. For Austria, Egger and Egger (2003, 2005) find that offshoring to the CEECs signif-
icantly increased relative skilled labor demand and that the consideration of inter-industry
spillovers magnifies this labor market effect. For Italy, the results of Helg and Tajoli (2005)
indicate that material offshoring towards the CEECs had a considerable impact on the rise
in relative skilled labor demand. However, for Germany, they do not find a significant effect
with their broad measure of offshoring. In contrast, Geishecker (2006) shows that material
offshoring to the CEECs significantly contributed to the rising relative skilled labor demand
in Germany.74 To sum up, these studies on the skill-biased inequality suggest that material
offshoring tends to harm the domestic low-skilled workers relative to the high-skilled.
Depending on the labor market characteristics of the home country, offshoring primarily
lowers their relative wage or their relative labor demand. One difficulty encountered by
these empirical studies is to isolate the effect of offshoring, since a similar effect arises from
skill-biased technological change, which is another important determinant of rising inequality.
Moreover, material offshoring “seems to make employment more volatile, by raising
the elasticity of labor demand and the risk of job losses” (Crino`, 2009, p. 197). Senses (2010)
analyzes the effect of material offshoring on the elasticity of labor demand (see also Section
7.3). Testing her theoretical prediction with plant-level data for the US manufacturing
sector, she finds that an increase in offshoring is associated with an increase in labor demand
73See Bottini et al. (2007, pp. 31-35) and Crino` (2009, pp. 202-10) for more information on these studies.
74Additionally, Geishecker and Go¨rg (2008) study the real wage effect of offshoring for Germany and find
that material offshoring exerted a negative effect only on low-skilled workers. In contrast to Geishecker (2006),
Becker et al. (2009) analyze the effect of world-wide production relocation within MNEs on relative skilled
labor demand and detect a much smaller impact.
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elasticities for production workers. The effect of material offshoring on short-run employment
dynamics is addressed, for instance, in a study by Egger et al. (2007) on Austria. They show
that material offshoring lowers the probability to remain employed in the manufacturing
sector and the probability to change into this sector. For Denmark, Munch (2005) finds
that material offshoring raises the individual probability of job displacement only modestly.
For Germany, however, a significant effect is detected by Geishecker (2008).75 The varying
results may stem from, among other things, country-specific labor market institutions. To
clarify the magnitude of the effect on individual employment volatility, further research is
needed.
Union wage setting is not explicitly considered in the majority of empirical studies. One of
the few exceptions is the study by Braun and Scheffel (2007), analyzing the effect of material
offshoring on the union wage premium in German manufacturing industries. The authors
show that more offshoring reduces the union wage premium of low-skilled workers, while
they do not find evidence of a negative wage effect for low-skilled workers not covered by
collective bargaining agreements. For low-skilled workers, the study supports the hypothesis
that offshoring lowers the bargaining power of labor unions and the negotiated wage (see,
e.g., Gaston, 2002).76 In a study on five Western European countries, Dumont et al. (2006)
also provide empirical evidence that offshoring lowers union bargaining power.77 The analysis
of these effects is essential in order to better understand the wage and employment effects of
offshoring.
Since we are most interested in the effect on the aggregate employment level, we continue
by presenting studies that shed some light on this issue. First of all, we want to clarify that
the contribution of offshoring on unemployment is very difficult to identify empirically. As
most of the studies work with firm-level data, their statements concerning the aggregate
employment level are only vague indications. The reason is that there may be adverse effects
of production relocation beyond the boundary of the offshoring firms. Thus, firm-level
75In a related paper, Bachmann and Braun (2008) study the effect of offshoring on overall job stability in
the manufacturing and the service sector. They show that the effects differ significantly across age and skill
groups. In addition, Becker and Muendler (2008) find that the probability of job displacement is lower in
German MNEs that offshore production than in local German firms. Buch and Lipponer (2010) also do not
find evidence for higher employment volatility in German MNEs.
76In footnote 74 we mentioned the finding of Geishecker and Go¨rg (2008), namely material offshoring lowers
the real wages of low-skilled workers in Germany. The Braun and Scheffel (2007) result suggests that this
effect works via the change in the union wage premium.
77In Section 8.5, we cover this study in more detail.
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studies may markedly underestimate the impact on economy-wide employment. With
aggregate data, however, the effect of offshoring is very difficult to isolate. In addition, data
scarcity and methodological problems complicate the empirical analysis of this issue (cf.
Neureiter and Nunnenkamp, 2010). Although the firm-level studies do not consider all direct
and indirect effects on economy-wide employment, they illuminate some effects on domestic
employment.
Concerning service offshoring, the literature suggests that it has at most a small negative im-
pact on the aggregate level of employment.78 The effect of service offshoring is predominantly
studied for the US and the UK. For instance, Amiti and Wei (2005a,b) find no support for a
substantial negative effect of service offshoring on aggregate industry employment in the US
and the UK, but service offshoring tends to change the sectoral composition of jobs.79
After a brief look at service offshoring, we now present the main contributions concerning the
employment effects of production relocation within MNEs. The following studies use MNE
data including both vertical and horizontal FDI.80 They analyze how world-wide activity
of MNEs affects employment at the parent firm81 and contrast the effects for affiliates in
low- and high-wage countries. Horizontal, market-seeking FDI is generally associated with
affiliates in other high-wage countries, while vertical, cost-saving FDI is mainly linked with
low-wage countries. Crino` (2009, p. 234) summarizes the results of different country studies
as follows: “MNEs tend to substitute domestic and foreign labor in response to changes in
relative wages across countries. Substitutability is weak, however, and mainly driven by hori-
zontal, market-seeking FDI”. Exemplary studies that support this statement are Braconier
and Ekholm (2000) on Sweden, Harrison and McMillan (2006) on the US, and Konings and
Murphy (2006) on 12 European countries.82 After this rather general summary, we narrow
the focus and present studies on Western European countries that examine the labor market
effects of production relocation to low-wage countries, in particular to the CEECs. Konings
78See Bottini et al. (2007, p. 26) and Crino` (2009, p. 220) for more information.
79Furthermore, Crino` (2008, 2010) obtains the following result by analyzing the US and nine Western
European countries: service offshoring tends to shift relative employment in favor of high-skilled white-collar
workers.
80The proxies of the above mentioned studies on material offshoring include the relocation of input pro-
duction via offshore outsouring and FDI. Only the latter of the two is included in the MNE data, which
additionally comprises horizontal FDI.
81Concerning the employment effect at the parent firm, a basic argument is that an MNE shifts production
abroad via FDI and, thus, employs less domestic labor. But as the relationship is more complex, the employ-
ment effects predicted by theory are ambiguous. One important aspect is whether domestic and foreign labor
are substitutes or complements in the MNE’s production function (cf. Crino`, 2009).
82Blomstro¨m et al. (1997) conduct an early study on Sweden and the US, which analyzes the effect of
multinational activity on domestic employment.
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and Murphy (2006) find no evidence of substitution between Western European MNEs and
their affiliates in the CEECs. This result is supported by Barba Navaretti et al. (2010), who
state that offshoring production to low-wage countries by Italian and French multinationals
does not exert a negative effect on their domestic employment. In contrast, Cuyvers et al.
(2005) conclude that affiliate production in the CEECs negatively affects employment in
the EU manufacturing sectors. In most cases, the authors find this negative effect both at
the investing firm and sectoral level. Since the employment repercussions in neighboring
countries of the CEECs may differ from average results on the EU, we take a closer look at
Germany and Austria. Becker et al. (2005) find evidence that lower wages in the CEECs
tend to reduce domestic employment in German MNEs, but the substitutability relationship
is stronger for affiliates in other Western European countries. These findings are confirmed
by a recent study from Muendler and Becker (2010) analyzing the employment effects at the
extensive and intensive margin.83 Using survey data on Austrian and German firms, Marin
(2004) detects that FDI in the CEECs is associated with surprisingly low job losses in the
parent firms of the two countries. She argues that low-wage jobs of affiliates in the CEECs
help the Austrian and German MNEs to stay competitive. Temouri and Driffield (2009)
use a data set on German MNEs, in which a large portion of FDI in low-wage countries is
FDI in the CEECs. Their results suggest that FDI in low-wage countries does not lead to
lower employment or lower average wages in the parent firms of both the service and the
manufacturing sector. To sum up, the reported results regarding the employment effects of
FDI in the CEECs are inconclusive. The bulk of firm-level studies suggest a rather limited
effect on domestic employment. One may expect that there is a substitutability relationship
for the neighboring countries of the CEECs, but only some studies support this expectation.
As already mentioned above, one shortcoming of these firm-level studies is that they may
markedly underestimate the impact on economy-wide employment. Moreover, these studies
consider both horizontal and vertical FDI in the CEECs, which may have opposing effects
on the employment level. To get a clearer and more complete picture of the employment
repercussions, further research is needed.
On the one hand, jobs created abroad may destroy jobs at home. On the other hand, the
offshoring of jobs may exert a positive effect on productivity in the home country, and this
83For production relocation to the CEECs, their study suggests that the employment adjustment happens
mainly at the extensive margin, i.e., when MNEs enter the foreign market.
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productivity effect may in turn lead to job creation (cf. Bottini et al., 2007). In the following,
we briefly list studies that emphasize the relationship between offshoring and productivity.
For the case of service offshoring, Amiti and Wei (2005b) report a significant positive impact
on productivity in the US. Sethupathy (2009) tests his theoretical model (see Section 7.5.1)
with firm-level data on US multinationals and offshoring to Mexico. He finds that wages
at the offshoring firms are higher than at non-offshoring firms and rationalizes the higher
wages by a productivity and rent-sharing effect.84 For Germany, Ja¨ckle and Wamser (2010)
identify a positive productivity effect for firms that turn multinational. Marin (2004) also
emphasizes the productivity gain for Austrian and German MNEs associated with FDI in
the CEECs. Analyzing the productivity effect for Irish manufacturing firms, Go¨rg et al.
(2008) detect a positive effect for exporters and MNEs. In general, this productivity effect
may also lead to domestic firm selection processes. Due to this fact, the net impact of
offshoring on economy-wide employment is difficult to identify, and country-specific labor
market characteristics have to be taken into account.
In this brief and necessarily selective overview, we stated some broad conclusions one
may draw from the empirical literature. When interpreting the results, the above mentioned
difficulties associated with empirical research in this field should be kept in mind. The
findings suggest that material offshoring harms low-skilled workers and makes employment
more volatile. Concerning the effect of offshoring on the level of employment, the results
are inconclusive. Most existing studies suggest that offshoring has only a limited effect
on domestic employment, but the topic remains controversial. Nevertheless, the studies
illuminate direct and indirect effects on employment. The heterogeneous results may
stem from measurement problems concerning offshoring, different data sources, varying
methodologies, limited data availability, or country-specific labor market characteristics.
The findings also depend on the modes of offshoring covered in the studies. For instance,
Neureiter and Nunnenkamp (2010) consider both modes of offshoring, i.e., offshore out-
sourcing and FDI, and finds that cost-saving motives are associated with more job losses
than market-seeking motives.85 Opposing results are obtained by the majority of the above
mentioned FDI studies. Moreover, firm-level studies provide an incomplete picture of the
effects on economy-wide employment and may underestimate the overall effect. There is a
84Concerning employment, he finds no evidence of higher employment losses in offshoring firms relative to
non-offshoring firms.
85They use a recent Eurostat firm-level survey for a sample of ten European countries.
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need for further empirical research, which clarifies these issues and examines the channels
highlighted in recent theoretical models. Given our research focus, we want to emphasize
one question that should be addressed: how do country-specific labor market institutions
influence the magnitude of the employment effect? Other avenues for further empirical
research are pointed out by Crino` (2009, p. 235) and Pflu¨ger et al. (2010, pp. 19-23).86
7.7 Conclusion
This comprehensive literature survey covered existing theoretical work on trade and
offshoring as well as on the labor market effects of these economic activities. Since the main
aspects have already been summarized in each section of the survey, we will simply point
out several important issues in this conclusion. Concerning the phenomenon of offshoring,
the analyzed scenarios and the modeling approaches differ considerably between the various
contributions. A close look at the differences and similarities of the models enhances our
understanding of the heterogeneous results. To illustrate the wide array of models, we
mention a few key differences: skill-specific versus economy-wide (or industry-specific)
offshoring, two-way offshoring between identical countries versus production relocation
from North to South, and cost-saving versus market-seeking offshoring. Moreover, some
studies focus on the determinants of offshoring in general or of different organizational
forms, while others analyze the effects of offshoring on domestic wages, the skill-bias,
trade flows, employment, welfare, and many other aspects. There is a sizeable amount of
literature on offshoring, but there is not much theoretical work on the effect of offshoring
on aggregate employment. Existing studies either use North-North models or North-South
models with the industrialized North being a small open economy. In the latter case, the
models abstract from repercussions on the domestic labor market and host country effects.
The studies provide some insights on the employment effects of offshoring, but the results
vary considerably depending on the modeling details. It is still not fully understood how
various factors including different labor market characteristics determine the nature and the
magnitude of the employment effect. Besides the theoretical literature, we briefly reviewed
the main results of empirical work on the labor market effects. The majority of empirical
studies suggest that the effects of offshoring on domestic employment are rather limited.
86Among other things, they mention empirical research concerning task trade, the productivity effect of
offshoring, within-group wage and employment inequalities, spatial aspects, and the extensive margin.
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There is, however, considerable controversy, and the existing studies have many limitations.
As some avenues for future theoretical and empirical research have already been indicated
in the respective sections of the survey, we only highlight selected topics where further
theoretical research is needed. First, the labor market implications of the complex sourcing
strategies covered in Section 7.2.2 have not yet been addressed. Second, the effects of
cost-saving offshoring on the host country are merely analyzed. Third, there is a need
for further research on the aggregate employment effects of offshoring in the presence of
labor market frictions. Future models should consider the general equilibrium effects that
arise in a trade framework with two large open economies and offshoring. The detailed
review of the different models in Sections 7.1 to 7.5 illustrates possible starting points
for future work. It is important to improve our understanding of the aggregate employ-
ment effects of offshoring, as policy makers and the public are very concerned about this issue.
The analysis presented in the next chapter is motivated by the case of highly unionized
Western European countries that offshore production to low-wage countries. Therefore, we
use a standard North-South trade model enriched with offshoring and union wage setting in
the North which allows to analyze the effects of offshoring on the production cost in both
countries and unemployment in the North. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
address the employment effects of offshoring in such a setup. The numerous contributions
related to our model have been covered in detail in this survey. Additionally, Section 8.1
provides a short overview of the most important related models in order to emphasize the
main issues.
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Chapter 8
A North-South trade model with
offshoring and unemployment
This chapter is based on joint work with Lutz Arnold. It presents an extended version of
Arnold and Trepl (2011).
8.1 Introduction
Emerging economies export goods to high-wage countries because of lower production cost due
to lower wages. Offshoring production to emerging markets costs jobs in high-wage countries
if wages do not edge down. So offshoring does not benefit all agents in the high-wage country.
While most non-economists regard these statements as self-evident, many, if not most,
economists disagree. There are two possible explanations for this “apparent disconnect be-
tween the public and academic views of the impact of trade on labor market outcomes”
(Davidson and Matusz, 2010, p. 2; see also Amiti and Wei, 2005a, and Mankiw and Swagel,
2006). One possible explanation is that the public is badly informed about what is actu-
ally going on in the global economy and/or gets the driving forces wrong. In fact, when
the debate about offshoring, wages, and jobs resurfaced in the mid-1990s, economists (e.g.,
Freeman, 1995, and Krugman, 1995) pointed out that the public tends to overestimate the
extent and, therefore, the significance of trade with low-wage countries and offshoring and
that unemployment is largely determined by labor market institutions, rather than interna-
tional trade. The alternative explanation for the divergence between the public and academic
views of the employment effects of offshoring is that the optimistic academic view is based on
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inadequate models of low-wage competition, offshoring, and unemployment. Some prominent
economists, notably Blinder (2006) and Krugman (2008) (with a “guilty conscience”, as he
said famously when he presented his paper at the Brookings institution), conceded that we
should not discard this second possibility prematurely.
We present a model in which an emerging economy exports goods to a high-wage country be-
cause of lower production cost due to lower wages, and offshoring production to the emerging
market costs jobs in the high-wage country, since wages do not edge down. As a result,
offshoring does not benefit all agents in the high-wage country and may even make them all
worse-off. The model is Krugman’s (1979a) North-South trade model augmented to include
offshoring and union wage setting (the standard explanation for persistent unemployment
in European high-wage countries, cf. Nickell et al., 2005).1 Our main finding is that a de-
crease in the cost of offshoring usually has a negative effect on employment, thus supporting
skeptical opinions on the labor market effects of globalization. The employment effects of
further offshoring can be positive when there is little offshoring initially. This finding is con-
sistent with concerns about the employment effects of offshoring that have been growing as
the globalization process intensifies.
The model yields further interesting results. First, a welfare analysis shows that if additional
offshoring raises employment, then it constitutes a Pareto improvement: workers in the North
and in the South as well as firm owners gain. Otherwise, offshoring benefits workers in the
South, but hurts their Northern counterparts. The impact on firm owners’ real income de-
pends on the effect on the scale of their firms. If this effect is negative, all agents in the
North lose. An extension of the model with two factors of production gives rise to a similarly
pessimistic assessment of the employment and welfare effects of offshoring. Second, the model
provides an equilibrium explanation for shrinking union power: Northern workers have an in-
centive to appoint a “pragmatic union leader”, with low bargaining power or with preferences
biased toward higher employment. This is because they face a commitment problem: given
that offshoring production is a longer-term decision than wage setting, workers have to look
for a way to make the announcement that they will not fight for high wages once firms have
decided to keep production at home credible. We construct a general equilibrium at which the
commitment problem vanishes when a sufficiently large portion of industry unions appoint a
pragmatic union leader. Third, we show that the extension of the model with heterogeneous
firms (following Melitz, 2003) yields the possibility of multiple equilibria: if Northern unions
1See also Chapter 5, where further information on this issue is provided.
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anticipate a low real wage in the South, they set a high real wage, and offshoring activity
is intensive; conversely, if they anticipate a high real wage in the South, they set a lower
real wage, and there is little offshoring. So coordinated shifts in the unions’ wage policy
have an impact on offshoring and employment. The model with firm heterogeneity justifies
a more optimistic assessment of the labor market effects of offshoring than the model with
homogeneous firms: the marginal impact of the wage rate set in the North on firms’ decision
to offshore production moderates unions’ wage claims, thereby fostering employment.2
The distinguishing feature of our model is that offshoring and unemployment are investigated
in a setup in which the labor cost in both the high-wage country and the low-wage country is
endogenously determined. In particular, offshoring (motivated by factor price differentials)
feeds back on factor prices in both countries and on unemployment in the North. The
model thus encompasses (in a static environment) the experience of export-oriented emerging
economies, which struggle with a dwindling cost advantage in the course of their development
process. China is a noteworthy current example:
“ ‘China has become a victim of its own success,’ sighs Peter Tan, president and
managing director of Flextronics in Asia. He finds it especially hard to hire
and retain technical staff, ranging from finance directors to managers versed in
international production techniques such as ‘six sigma’ and ‘lean manufacturing’.
There are not enough qualified workers to go around, causing rampant poaching
and extremely fast wage inflation. ‘China is definitely not the cheapest place to
produce any more,’ he says” (The Economist, 2007).
This is reminiscent of Japan in the 1990s and the maturing of other emerging economies.
The cost advantage of several CEECs, which are currently a favorite target for offshoring of
Western European firms, will also dwindle in the future.
Our model is related to several voluminous strands of the international economics literature,
which have been covered in detail in Chapter 7. In the following, we summarize the most
important related papers, thereby highlighting the aspects of interest for our analysis. One
class of papers analyzes the impact of offshoring on wage setting, trade flows, and the organ-
ization of firms without simultaneously considering aggregate unemployment. Zhao (1998)
shows how firms can make use of FDI in order to improve their position in wage bargaining
2An increase in the mass of goods producible in the South without a fixed cost has similar effects on
employment and welfare as a decrease in the cost of offshoring (see footnotes 16 and 18). A setup without
costly offshoring would not be suited to analyze the case for a pragmatic union leader or multiplicity of
equilibria in the presence of productivity uncertainty, however.
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in a two-country North-North model. By contrast, offshoring makes the demand curve for
domestic labor less elastic, thereby raising the unions’ wage claims and decreasing industry
employment in Skaksen and Sørensen (2001). Helpman et al. (2004) show that the most
productive firms, and only these firms, use FDI rather than exports to serve foreign markets
in a general equilibrium North-North trade model based on Melitz (2003). Going one step
further, Antra`s and Helpman (2004) consider a North-South model with incomplete contracts,
in which firms decide whether to produce in-house or outsource and, in either case, in which
country. They show how, depending on firm characteristics, firms sort into the four different
possible organizational forms. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) show how trade in tasks
raises aggregate productivity when different tasks in the value chain can be offshored at
different cost. A second class of international trade models incorporates unemployment but
not offshoring. Recent contributions include Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) and Felbermayr
et al. (2011). The former authors show that differences in search frictions in the labor market
act as a source of comparative advantage when countries are identical in other respects. The
latter authors introduce search frictions in the labor market to the Melitz (2003) model.
Trade liberalization can raise productivity to such an extent that both employment and real
wages go up. Finally, there are models which encompass both offshoring and unemployment.
Like our model, these papers focus on the effect of (changes in the cost of) offshoring on
equilibrium employment. Skaksen (2004) considers a unionized small open economy, in which
wage setting precedes the offshoring decision. A decrease in the cost of offshoring pos-
sibly reduces unemployment, as the non-realized threat of offshoring moderates unions’ wage
claims. Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) show that an increase in international fragmentation
raises unemployment among low-skilled workers caused by efficiency wages in a small open
economy if unskilled labor is sufficiently abundant relative to skilled labor. Koskela and
Stenbacka (2009) consider a small open economy similar to Skaksen’s (2004), in which the
offshoring decision precedes wage bargaining, however. Additional offshoring raises the elasti-
city of labor demand, thereby reducing the domestic wage and unemployment if the unions’
bargaining power is sufficiently high. Eckel and Egger (2009) analyze a North-North trade
model with heterogeneous firms, two-way FDI, and wage bargaining. Unemployment tends
to be lower with FDI than in autarky, as FDI strengthens firms’ bargaining position. Kohler
and Wrona (2010) argue that in a small open economy with search unemployment and trade
in tasks the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) productivity effect can be strong enough
so that on net offshoring decreases unemployment in spite of job destruction in the offshored
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tasks. In Ranjan’s (2010) search model, a reduction in the cost of offshoring possibly reduces
equilibrium unemployment by moderating workers’ claims in the wage bargain with firms.
In a related model with a positive productivity effect of offshoring, Mitra and Ranjan (2010)
show that offshoring may lead to a higher wage and lower economy-wide unemployment.
As already mentioned in Chapter 7, the papers on offshoring and unemployment consider
either North-North models with factor price equalization or small open economies. In the
former case, offshoring is driven by factors other than exploiting lower production cost. In the
latter case, somewhat paradoxically, the industrialized North is the small economy relative to
the emerging South, whose production cost is exogenously given. The main contribution of
our model is to address the issues raised by Skaksen (2004), Koskela and Stenbacka (2009),
and others in Krugman’s (1979a) North-South setup, in which factor prices everywhere and,
therefore, the cost differential that drives offshoring are determined endogenously.3
The remainder of Chapter 8 is organized as follows. Section 8.2 introduces the model with
one factor of production and without firm heterogeneity. In Section 8.3, we prove existence
of a free trade equilibrium. Section 8.4 characterizes the employment and welfare effects of
changes in the cost of offshoring, while Section 8.5 makes the case for a pragmatic union
leader. In Section 8.6, a second factor of production is introduced. Sections 8.7 and 8.8 deal
with firm heterogeneity. In Section 8.9, we sum up our main findings and suggest an avenue
for future research.
8.2 Model setup
This section describes the model. It is understood that each endogenous variable is an
element of R+. We will make some additional assumptions about the magnitudes of the
model parameters below.
The world economy is made up of two countries, North and South. There are a continuum of
measure L¯N (> 0) of workers in the North and a continuum of measure L¯S (> 0) of workers
3In addition to the models cited above, there are North-South endogenous growth models based on Gross-
man and Helpman (1991a,b) and Helpman (1993), which study offshoring or unemployment. Lai (1998) shows
that stronger IPR protection raises growth if relocation of production is due to FDI, whereas the contrary
holds true for imitation. Glass and Saggi (2001) demonstrate that a decrease in the labor requirement for
offshoring boosts both offshoring activity and growth. Other North-South endogenous growth models focus on
the impact of labor market imperfections on innovation and growth. Arnold (2002) shows that the more rigid
the labor market, the more negative the impact of imitation on unemployment in the North. Imitation also has
a negative effect on growth in Mondal and Gupta’s (2008b) model with efficiency wages and unemployment
in the South and in Grieben and S¸ener’s (2009) model with collective bargaining in the North.
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in the South. Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor. In addition, there are firm
owners, who do not supply labor, in the North. In the baseline model, labor is the only factor
of production. Later on, we introduce a second factor, skilled labor, in the North.
There is a continuum of measure one of industries i, indexed along the unit interval. Each
industry produces varieties j of a differentiated good indexed along the interval [0, n]. The
mass of varieties per industry n (> 0) is given, i.e., there is no product innovation. Each
agent’s preferences are described by the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) utility function
[∫ 1
0
∫ n
0
x(i, j)αdj di
] β
α
, (8.1)
where x(i, j) is consumption of variety j of the good produced in industry i (0 < α < 1 and
β > 0). Any two varieties are equally good substitutes for each other, irrespective of whether
they are produced in the same industry or in different industries.4 Agents are either risk-
averse (β < 1) or risk-neutral (β = 1). The virtue of having “a large number” of industries,
rather than a single industry, is that this allows us to consider industry unions which are
“large in the small but small in the large” (Neary, 2003): their wage setting does not affect
aggregate income and the aggregate price level. Since the industries are all alike, we suppress
the industry index i in what follows.5
For each variety j of each good i, there is a single producer in the North. This producer is
able to produce “his” variety using aN (> 0) units of labor per unit of output. For a subset of
measure nS of the n varieties producible in the North, there are also competitive producers in
the South with the ability to produce the varieties with input coefficient aS (0 ≤ nS < n and
aS > 0). In order to express that the South is less productive than the North, one can assume
aS > aN , but this is inessential to the analysis. In addition, the production of the remaining
n−nS varieties can be moved to the South within MNEs.6 To do so, the Northern producer
of a variety has to incur a fixed cost.7 We assume that the fixed cost consists of fM (> 0)
units of labor in the South. One may think (informally) of the cost of setting up a plant,
establishing a network of suppliers, training workers, etc. The assumption that (for now)
4We can focus on one representative industry, since all industries are identical. Variables referring to
quantities in this industry equal economy-wide aggregates.
5Up to Section 8.4 the model can alternatively be interpreted as one with a single industry and wage
bargaining at the firm level. The equations which describe an equilibrium are the same.
6That is, offshorers move all their production to the South. This way of modeling offshoring is a special
case of Glass and Saggi (2001), where firms can offshore an exogenous fraction of the labor services required
to produce varieties of a differentiated good. The analysis can be generalized in the obvious way at the cost
of additional complexity of the algebra.
7Northern and Southern labor are perfect substitutes, once the fixed cost of offshoring has been paid.
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the organization of offshoring production does not involve labor input in the North appears
acceptable on the grounds that, in practice, the number of production workers affected by
the offshoring decision is much larger and, therefore, decisive for the general equilibrium
effects of offshoring. This is confirmed by the model with skilled labor in Section 8.6, in
which offshoring also requires a fixed amount of skilled labor in the North.8 We make two
alternative assumptions about the input coefficients in Southern plants of MNEs. We start
with the simple case of no uncertainty: the input coefficient aS is the same for each firm
that spends the fixed offshoring cost. Later on, following the new new trade theory with
heterogeneous firms originating from Melitz (2003), we assume that the productivities are
random. This is meant to capture the fact that even established companies face substantial
uncertainty when they move production to emerging economies. Up to Section 8.4 we confine
attention to symmetric equilibria, with the same level of offshoring activity and the same wage
rate in each industry. Let nM denote the measure of varieties offshored to the South for any
i. Let wN and wS denote the wage rates in the North and in the South, respectively. Suppose
the South has a cost advantage, in that wNaN > wSaS . Then in each industry n− nS − nM
varieties are supplied by a monopolist producing in the North, nS varieties are produced
under perfect competition in the South, and nM varieties are supplied monopolistically by
an MNE producing in the South.9 We argue below (at the end of Section 8.3) that the model
can also be interpreted as one of offshore outsourcing.
In each industry i, there is a single union, which represents L¯N workers. The industry union
bargains over the wage rate with the firms in this sector producing in the North. Firms have
the RTM; they choose employment after the wage rate is set. In the version of the model
without uncertainty about the input coefficient in Southern plants considered up to Section
8.6, wage bargaining takes place after the offshoring decision (see Figure 8.1). This ordering
of events is meant to capture the fact that offshoring production is a longer-term decision than
wage setting.10 If employment LN falls short of L¯N in sector i, each worker faces the same
8The assumption is also implicit in the small open economy models of Skaksen (2004) and Koskela and
Stenbacka (2009), in which the cost function for offshoring is independent of the price of domestic labor.
Introducing Northern labor as an input in the offshoring process in the one-factor model would raise subtle
questions with regard to the wage setting process (cf. footnote 20).
9There is no trade cost, no trade in intermediate inputs, and no distinction between services and manufac-
turers. The motive for offshoring is saving production cost rather than serving foreign markets.
10Concerning collective wage bargaining, there are different modeling options. First, both the RTM approach
and the efficient bargaining approach are used in the context of offshoring (see footnotes 48 and 57 in Chapter
7; for the controversy, see Skaksen, 2004, and Ranjan, 2010). We decide to use the RTM approach, since it
seems to be a more appropriate description of reality. Second, wages may be bargained at the firm level or
at the industry level. In order to be able to analyze the commitment problem and the case of heterogeneous
firms, we choose industry-level bargaining (see footnote 5 for a firm-level interpretation). Third, there are
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Figure 8.1: Timing of events with homogeneous firms.
probability LN/L¯N of employment.11 Unemployed workers have zero income and reservation
utility b (> 0). So expected utility is the sum of LN/L¯N times the maximized value of (8.1)
and (1 − LN/L¯N )b.12 Firms which have decided to offshore production are not party to
the wage bargain, so the threat point of the firms involved in the bargain is zero. Wages
and employment maximize the Nash product subject to the constraint that employment is
determined by the labor demand of the local firms. The firms’ weight in the Nash bargain
is denoted γ (0 ≤ γ < 1). γ = 0 is the monopoly union special case. The distribution of
productivities and the timing of events in the version of the model with uncertainty about
the input coefficient in Southern plants are explained in detail in Section 8.7.
8.3 Equilibrium with homogeneous firms
In this section, we show that, under suitable parameter assumptions, the model without un-
certainty about the input coefficient for production in the South possesses a unique symmetric
equilibrium with a cost advantage for the South and unemployment.
Let p(i, j) denote the price of variety j of good i. p(i, j), x(i, j) (i ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ [0, n]), wN ,
wS , and nM are a symmetric equilibrium with a cost advantage for the South and unem-
different options concerning the ordering of events which in general depends on the flexibility of offshoring. In
our model, offshoring within MNEs is associated with a long-term investment, i.e., a fixed cost that has to be
incurred before wage setting. The sequence of wage bargaining and the offshoring decision of firms which have
incurred the fixed cost differs between the baseline model and the extension with productivity uncertainty.
While offshoring is irreversible in the baseline model, paying the fixed cost gives firms the option to offshore
in the extension with productivity uncertainty (see Sections 8.7 and 8.8).
11In labor economics, it is common to assume that workers who do not get a job in one unionized sector
face a positive probability of getting a job in another unionized sector. Our assumption that “[E]ach worker
is typically tied to one industry” (Parlour and Walden, 2011, p. 394) is also employed in the literature on
hedging uncertain labor income. We believe that it is appropriate in our context, with the threat of job losses
due to offshoring.
12In the presence of unemployment benefits tied to wages, the reservation utility depends on the wage level.
Similarly, the value of being unemployed depends on economy-wide unemployment (i.e., the probability of
finding a job) and on the wage earned once back in work in a dynamic matching setup (such as Felbermayr
et al., 2011, Mitra and Ranjan, 2010, and Ranjan, 2010). If there is a competitive sector that absorbs the
workers who do not get jobs in the unionized sector, the competitive wage in this sector determines the
reservation utility (as in Zhao, 1998). These effects are absent in our model. For details, see Layard et al.
(2005, Section 2.2).
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ployment (or equilibrium for short) if the following conditions are satisfied: operating cost is
higher in the North than in the South (wNaN > wSaS); Northern producers without South-
ern competitors (i.e., firms producing in the North and MNEs) maximize monopoly profit;
Southern producers supply varieties at price equal to unit cost; the measure of MNEs is nM
in each industry; it does not pay to move the production of further varieties abroad, i.e.,
either nM > 0 and the fixed cost of setting up an MNE is equal to the difference between
an MNE’s operating profit and a Northern producer’s operating profit, or nM = 0 and the
fixed cost is no less than the operating profit differential; for each employed worker and firm
owner, consumption of the varieties of the differentiated goods maximizes utility subject to
the budget constraint; demand equals supply for each variety of each good; the wage rate
and employment maximize the Nash product subject to the constraint that employment is
determined via firms’ labor demand; there is excess supply of labor in the North; the labor
market in the South clears.13
Let P = [
∫ 1
0
∫ n
0 p(i, j)
1−εdj di]1/(1−ε) (where ε = 1/(1−α)) and I denote the price index and
world income, respectively. From (8.1), the world-wide demand for variety j of good i is
x(i, j) =
[
p(i, j)
P
]−ε I
P
. (8.2)
Firms producing in the North set p(i, j) = wNaN/α, MNEs set p(i, j) = wSaS/α, and the
price of goods produced by Southern producers is wSaS . From (8.2),
xN =
(
wNaN
wSaS
)−ε
xM , xS = α−εxM , (8.3)
where xN , xM , and xS are the outputs of monopolists producing in the North, MNEs, and
Southern firms, respectively.
From the definition of the price index and the pricing rules,
(
wNaN
P
)ε−1
= αε−1
(
n− nS − nM)+ (nS + αε−1nM)(wNaN
wSaS
)ε−1
. (8.4)
The operating profit differential is (wSaSxM − wNaNxN )/(ε − 1). The fixed cost of setting
up a subsidiary is wSfM . Using (8.3), the condition that it does not pay to move further
13Our model considers union wage setting in the North and a frictionless labor market in the South. As
we have referred to the case of highly unionized Western European countries and offshoring to the CEECs
in Chapter 5, this simplifying assumption can be motivated by the fact that collective bargaining coverage is
notably lower in the CEECs (see footnotes 5 and 7 in Chapter 5).
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varieties abroad becomes
(ε− 1)fM ≥
[
1−
(
wNaN
wSaS
)1−ε](
wNaN
wSaS
)ε
aSxN , nM ≥ 0, (8.5)
with at most one strict inequality.
Consider the wage bargain between the industry union and the producers of varieties in an
industry with n−nS−nM > 0. From (8.2) and the markup pricing rule, the demand for labor
per firm Ld : {R+\{0}}×R+ → R+ is given by Ld(wN/P, I/P ) = aN [(wNaN )/(αP )]−εI/P .
This can be used to rewrite a firm’s real profit (i.e., firm profit deflated by the price
index P ) as (wN/P )Ld(wN/P, I/P )/(ε− 1). The Nash product is
(n− n
S − nM )Ld
(
wN
P ,
I
P
)
L¯N
[(
wN
P
)β
− b
]
1−γ  wNP Ld
(
wN
P ,
I
P
)
ε− 1
γ .
An employed Northern worker’s indirect utility is (wN/P )β (from (8.2)). So the term in
braces is a worker’s expected utility gain compared to his reservation utility b (i.e., his threat
point). Firms which bargain in the North have not incurred the fixed cost of offshoring, so
their threat point is zero, and the final term in square brackets is a representative firm’s
real profit. The wage rate wN and employment LN maximize the Nash product subject to
(n− nS − nM )Ld(wN/P, I/P ) ≤ L¯N . We focus on an equilibrium in which the constraint is
not binding, i.e., unemployment prevails. We will spell out the parameter condition necessary
for this case to arise below. Then,
wN
P
=
{[
1− β(1− γ)
ε− γ
]−1
b
} 1
β
=
ωN
aN
. (8.6)
We call the real wage rate in (8.6) the RTM wage. Given constant wage elasticity, shift
parameters of the labor demand function do not affect the RTM wage (cf. Cahuc and Zyl-
berberg, 2004, p. 395). In particular, this means that the wage rate does not go down when
the amount of offshoring (i.e., nM ) rises. Firms which have sunk the offshoring cost have no
incentive to adopt the RTM wage and produce in the North, since production is cheaper in
the South. This lends support to the assumption that they are not party to the wage bargain
in the first place. ωN measures the Northern real wage wN/P relative to its labor produc-
tivity 1/aN . Labor market clearing in the South requires L¯S = aS(nSxS + nMxM ) + nMfM
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or, using (8.3),
L¯S =
(
α−εnS + nM
)(wNaN
wSaS
)ε
aSxN + nMfM . (8.7)
The price setting equation (8.4), the arbitrage condition (8.5), the wage setting rule for the
North (8.6), and the labor market clearing condition for the South (8.7) jointly determine
the real wage rate in the North wN/P , the measure of varieties produced in MNEs nM , the
relative production cost (wNaN )/(wSaS), and the output of firms producing in the North
xN .14 From (8.4) and (8.6),
wNaN
wSaS
=
[
(ωN )ε−1 − αε−1(n− nS − nM )
nS + αε−1nM
] 1
ε−1
= f(nM ), (8.8)
where f : [0, n− nS ]→ R+ if nS > 0 and f : (0, n− nS ]→ R+ if nS = 0. Letting f(0) =∞
if nS = 0, it is understood that f(0) > a holds for all a ∈ R and f(0) < a is violated for all
a ∈ R. We assume that
(ωN )ε−1 − αε−1(n− nS)− nS > 0, (8.9)
so that f(0) > 1. Equation (8.8) combines price and wage setting. From (8.6), the Northern
real wage is constant. From (8.4), for given (wNaN )/(wSaS) > 1, an increase in nM raises the
real wage in the North wN/P , as the production of varieties moves to the relatively cheaper
location. So the relative production cost (wNaN )/(wSaS) has to fall in order to restore the
original real wage rate. Hence, f(nM ) is monotonically decreasing.
Suppose fM < (αεL¯S)/[(ε− 1)nS ]. Then, from (8.5) and (8.7),
wNaN
wSaS
≤
1− (ε− 1)α−εnS + nM
L¯S
fM
− nM
 11−ε = g(nM , fM ), nM ≥ 0, (8.10)
with at most one strict inequality. g maps {(nM , fM ) ∈ R2+| nM < [L¯S/fM−(ε−1)α−εnS ]/ε}
(i.e., those (nM , fM ) for which the term in square brackets in (8.10) is positive) on R+.
Equation (8.10) combines the condition that further offshoring is not profitable and labor
market clearing in the South. Suppose nM > 0. From (8.7), an increase in the measure of
MNEs nM requires a decrease in the scale of each MNE xM (= [(wNaN )/(wSaS)]εxN ). From
(8.5), the relative production cost (wNaN )/(wSaS) has to rise in order to compensate for the
ensuing decrease in the operating profit differential. Therefore, g(nM , fM ) is monotonically
14The North does not possess an autarky equilibrium. For nS = nM = 0, (8.4) becomes wNaN/P =
αn1/(ε−1). There is in general no joint solution to this equation and (8.6); the unions’ wage setting behavior
and the firms’ price setting behavior are incompatible with each other.
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Figure 8.2: Equilibrium with homogeneous firms.
increasing in nM . For fM ≥ (αεL¯S)/[(ε− 1)nS ], from (8.5) and (8.7), the fixed cost of entry
exceeds the operating profit differential for all nM ≥ 0, so nM = 0.
wN/P is given by (8.6). Once nM and (wNaN )/(wSaS) are determined via (8.8) and (8.10),
wS/P is given by (wS/wN )(wN/P ), goods prices p(i, j)/P are given by the markup pricing
rules for monopolistically supplied goods and average cost for goods sold competitively, and
outputs x(i, j) are pinned down by (8.3) and (8.7) (i ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ [0, n]) (of course, absolute
prices are indeterminate). So in order to find an equilibrium, it suffices to find nM and
(wNaN )/(wSaS) which satisfy (8.8) and (8.10). This is illustrated in Figure 8.2. f(nM )
falls from f(0) > 1 to unity as nM grows large. g(nM , fM ) rises from g(0, fM ) = [1 − (ε −
1)α−εnS/(L¯S/fM )]1/(1−ε) > 1 to infinity as nM rises towards [L¯S/fM − (ε− 1)α−εnS ]/ε. If
f(0) ≥ g(0, fM ), there is a unique nM∗ ≥ 0 such that f(nM∗) = g(nM∗, fM ). From (8.8) and
(8.10), f(0) ≥ g(0, fM ) if, and only if,
fM ≤ α
εL¯S
(ε− 1)nS
[
1− n
S
(ωN )ε−1 − αε−1(n− nS)
]
= f¯M (8.11)
(f¯M > 0 due to (8.9) and f¯M =∞ for nS = 0), and nM∗ is then determined by
fM
L¯S − nM∗fM =
1
ε− 1
1
α−εnS + nM∗
(ωN )ε−1 − αε−1(n− nS)− nS
(ωN )ε−1 − αε−1(n− nS − nM∗) . (8.12)
For nS > 0 and fM > f¯M , the equilibrium is characterized by nM = 0 (= nM∗) and
(wNaN )/(wSaS) = f(0) < g(0). For nS = 0, nM∗ converges to zero as fM grows large.
We have to make sure that there is unemployment and that nM∗ does not exceed either
L¯S/fM or n− nS . Using LN = (n− nS − nM )aNxN , (8.3), (8.7), and (8.8), employment in
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the North can be rewritten as
LN = (n− nS − nM )aN L¯
S − nMfM
aS(α−εnS + nM )
[
nS + αε−1nM
(ωN )ε−1 − αε−1(n− nS − nM )
] 1
α
= Ψ(nM , fM ). (8.13)
Ψ maps {(nM , fM ) ∈ R2+| nM ≤ min{n − nS , L¯S/fM}, nM > 0 if nS = 0} on R+. Unem-
ployment prevails if L¯N is sufficiently large so that Ψ(nM∗, fM ) < L¯N . From the definition
of g,
nM∗ <
1
ε
[
L¯S
fM
− (ε− 1)α−εnS
]
<
L¯S
fM
.
(cf. Figure 8.2), so the condition nM∗ < L¯S/fM is automatically satisfied. To check the
condition nM∗ ≤ n− nS , set nM∗ = n− nS in (8.12). The right-hand side is positive, finite,
and independent of fM , and the left-hand side increases continuously from zero to infinity as
fM rises from zero to L¯S/(n−nS). Hence, there is fM such that nM∗ = n−nS for fM = fM .
Differentiating (8.12) totally gives
dnM∗
dfM
= − L¯
S
fM
(
L¯S − nM∗fM)
[
fM
L¯S − nM∗fM
+
1
α−εnS + nM∗
+
αε−1
(ωN )ε−1 − αε−1(n− nS − nM∗)
]−1
< 0 (8.14)
(cf. Figure 8.2). So nM∗ < n− nS for fM > fM . This proves:
Proposition 8.1: Suppose (8.9) holds, fM ≥ fM , and Ψ(nM∗, fM ) < L¯N . Then a unique
symmetric equilibrium with a cost advantage for the South and unemployment exists.
The model has an alternative interpretation as one of offshore outsourcing. Consider an equi-
librium with nM∗ > 0, in which the operating profit differential (wSaSxM−wNaNxN )/(ε−1)
is equal to the fixed cost of setting up a subsidiary wSfM . Suppose offshore outsourcing re-
quires the same fixed amount of Southern labor fM as offshoring within an MNE. Suppose
further the monopolist for a given variety and a Southern producer can write a contract that
ensures the delivery of xM units of the variety at price wSaS and prohibits the sale of output
to any other party (alternatively, one can think of an intermediate input that is transformed
one-to-one into final output by the Northern monopolist). Prices and quantities are the same
as with offshoring within an MNE.15
15This reinterpretation of the model abstracts from the differences between different organizational forms of
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8.4 Employment and welfare effects of offshoring
This section investigates the employment and welfare effects of changes in the labor require-
ment for offshoring fM . A decrease in fM tends to reduce employment. An exception to this
rule prevails if there is little international economic activity initially: if the mass of goods
producible in the South without a fixed cost nS is small, then employment rises as fM falls
below the level f¯M at which offshoring becomes profitable. Similar results are obtained by
Skaksen (2004) and Ranjan (2010). If employment rises, the reduction in fM yields a Pareto
improvement: Northern workers’ expected utility, Southern workers’ utility, and firm owners’
real profits rise. However, when employment falls, a decrease in the offshoring cost benefits
Southern workers at the expense of their Northern counterparts. Firm owners’ utility and
utilitarian world-wide social welfare possibly fall.
Consider an increase in fM . As shown in (8.14) and illustrated in Figure 8.2, the mass of
goods produced in MNEs in the South nM∗ falls, which is conducive to employment. At
the same time relative production cost (wNaN )/(wSaS) rises (see (8.8) and Figure 8.2), and
this effect tends to reduce the scale xN of each active firm (see (8.5)). So the effect of an
increase in fM on employment is ambiguous. From the analysis in the preceding section,
the relationship between the equilibrium measure of MNEs nM∗ and the cost of offshoring in
terms of Southern labor fM is described by a continuous function Φ : [fM ,∞)→ R+, which
satisfies Φ(fM ) < L¯S/fM and is monotonically decreasing for fM < f¯M . For nS > 0, f¯M is
finite and nM∗ = 0 is constant for fM > f¯M .
Consider the composite function Γ(fM ) = Ψ(Φ(fM ), fM ) : [fM ,∞) → R+. Γ relates equi-
librium employment to the labor requirement for offshoring (see Figure 8.3). We assume
that L¯N is large enough so that there is unemployment (i.e., Γ(fM ) < L¯N ) for all admissible
fM . From Ψ(n − nS , fM ) = 0 and Φ(fM ) = n − nS , it follows that Γ(fM ) = 0. That is,
employment in the North is zero when all firms move production to the South. Γ(fM ) > 0
for fM > fM . The interesting question is whether Γ(fM ) increases monotonically with fM
or possibly has a downward-sloping segment. The answer is provided by the following result:
production, which is at the heart of Antra`s and Helpman’s (2004) incomplete contracts model. They assume
that an MNE entails a higher fixed cost than an offshore outsouring agreement but is advantageous in that
it gives the Northern firm a stronger bargaining position, since it avoids being threatened with not being
delivered outsourced essential specialized inputs (see also Helpman, 2006). As our model is not a model of the
boundary of the firm, it is open to two alternative interpretations.
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Figure 8.3: Employment effects of offshoring.
Proposition 8.2: Let nS > 0. Suppose Γ(fM ) < L¯N for fM ∈ [fM ,∞). Then Γ′(fM ) < 0
for fM sufficiently close to f¯M if, and only if,
nS <
n
1 + εα2−ε
(8.15)
and
α2εnS
[
1 +
(1 + α2ε)α−εnS
n− nS − εα2−εnS
]
< (ωN )ε−1 − αε−1(n− nS)− nS . (8.16)
Proof: Log-differentiating Γ, using (8.13), gives
d ln Γ(fM )
dfM
= − n
M∗
L¯S − nM∗fM + Φ
′(fM )
[
− 1
n− nS − nM∗ −
fM
L¯S − nM∗fM
− 1
α−εnS + nM∗
+
αε−2
nS + αε−1nM∗
− α
ε−2
(ωN )ε−1 − αε−1(n− nS − nM∗)
]
,
(8.17)
where nM∗ = Φ(fM ). Evaluating this derivative at f¯M (interpreting Φ′(f¯M ) as the left-hand
derivative), using Φ(f¯M ) = 0 and (8.11), we have
d ln Γ(f¯M )
dfM
= Φ′(f¯M )
{
− 1
n− nS −
αε
(ε− 1)nS +
αε
(ε− 1) [(ωN )ε−1 − αε−1(n− nS)]
−α
ε
nS
+
αε−2
nS
− α
ε−2
(ωN )ε−1 − αε−1(n− nS)
}
.
The term in braces is positive if, and only if, the conditions of the proposition are satisfied.
Given Φ′(f¯M ) < 0, this proves the proposition. ||
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In the case nS = 0, Γ′(fM ) < 0 holds provided that fM is large enough. This follows from the
observation that, from (8.13), LN → 0 as nM → 0. Thus, when there is very little offshoring
initially, an increase in the offshoring activity possibly comes along with rising employment.
However, as the labor requirement for offshoring falls and further production goes abroad, the
employment effect certainly turns negative and, given that there is no positive lower bound on
employment, significantly so (see Figure 8.3). The conditions for positive employment effects
of further offshoring in the proposition are quite strong. For instance, for α = 0.8, (8.15) is
violated unless the fraction of goods Southern firms are able to produce nS/n falls short of
9.3%. Moreover, numerical experimentation shows that if (8.15) and (8.16) are satisfied, the
range of fM -values for which Γ′(fM ) < 0 tends to be small. So positive employment effects
of reductions in the fixed cost of offshoring appear to be the exception rather than the rule.16
Next, consider the impact of offshoring on agents’ welfare. The indirect utility Northern
workers obtain from spending the RTM wage in (8.6) is independent of fM and exceeds
the reservation utility. So their equilibrium expected utility is a function of employment
alone, and the derivative with respect to fM has the same sign as Γ′(fM ). The real wage
in the South wS/P = (wS/wN )(wN/P ) is a decreasing function of the relative production
cost (wNaN )/(wSaS) alone. Since the equilibrium value of (wNaN )/(wSaS) is an increasing
function of fM , a decrease in fM unambiguously raises Southern workers’ utility for fM <
f¯M . From markup pricing and LN = (n− nS − nM )aNxN , real profit of a firm producing in
the North is [1/(ε−1)](wN/P )LN/(n−nS−nM ). Since the real wage is fixed, equilibrium real
profit is determined by scale alone. Let h(fM ) = Γ(fM )/[n− nS −Φ(fM )] : [fM ,∞)→ R+.
h gives the equilibrium value of LN/(n− nS − nM ). The derivative of equilibrium real profit
with respect to fM has the same sign as
d lnh(fM )
dfM
=
d ln Γ(fM )
dfM
+
Φ′(fM )
n− nS − Φ(fM ) . (8.18)
The same holds true for an MNE’s profit, for the non-profitability of further offshoring implies
that they make the same profit as Northern producers if plants in the South are set up in
the first place.17
16The employment effects of an increase in nS (i.e., the mass of goods producible in the South without a
fixed cost) are similar to the effects of a decrease in fM (i.e., the fixed cost of producing further goods in the
South). Ignoring costly offshoring, employment in the North is Ψ(0, 0). Employment is small for nS close to
zero (recall that an equilibrium does not exist for nS = 0) and for nS = n and positive in between. So the
impact of an increase in nS on employment is positive if there is little international trade initially, but turns
negative at a higher level of nS .
17Since Southern firms make zero profit, we do not have to analyze the effect of fM on their profit.
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Proposition 8.3: A marginal change in fM causes a Pareto improvement if, and only if,
dfM < 0 and Γ′(fM ) < 0.
Proof: Since Southern workers’ utility is a decreasing function of fM , only a decrease in
the offshoring cost dfM < 0 can bring about a Pareto improvement. A decrease in fM raises
Northern workers’ expected utility exactly if Γ′(fM ) < 0. From (8.18) and Φ′(fM ) < 0,
Γ′(fM ) < 0 implies h′(fM ) < 0, so the decrease in fM also raises firms’ real profit. ||
Southern workers benefit because the technology transfer within MNEs raises the purchasing
power of the wages they earn, Northern workers gain because their probability of getting a
job rises, and firm profits soar because both the increase in employment in the North and the
increase in the measure of MNEs raise the scale of each firm that stays in the North. From
Proposition 8.2, this situation arises when fM falls below the level at which Northern firms
start to operate plants in the South and nS is sufficiently small.
Whenever Γ′(fM ) > 0, a decrease in fM benefits Southern workers but harms their Northern
counterparts. The firm owners’ interests can coincide with either side. To see this, we
first consider a case in which their interests are aligned with those of Southern workers.
Substituting from (8.12) into (8.17) and then into (8.18) yields
h′(fM ) = − n
M∗
L¯S − nM∗fM + Φ
′(fM )
[
− 1
ε− 1
1
α−εnS + nM∗
(ωN )ε−1 − αε−1(n− nS)− nS
(ωN )ε−1 − αε−1(n− nS − nM∗)
− 1
α−εnS + nM∗
+
αε−2
nS + αε−1nM∗
− α
ε−2
(ωN )ε−1 − αε−1(n− nS − nM∗)
]
. (8.19)
The term in square brackets is positive if, and only if,
α2εnS
(
1 +
αε−1nM∗
nS
)2
< (ωN )ε−1 − αε−1(n− nS)− nS . (8.20)
Proposition 8.4: Suppose Γ′(fM ) > 0 and (8.20) holds for nM∗ = n−nS. Then a marginal
decrease in fM raises firm owners’ real profit.
Proof: If (8.20) holds for nM∗ = n − nS , then it holds for all nM∗ ≤ n − nS . From (8.19),
h′(fM ) < 0 for all fM < f¯M . ||
The condition of the proposition ensures that the net effect of lower employment and more
offshoring on the scale of producers staying in the North is positive. As a consequence,
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Southern workers and Northern firms gain from easier access to Southern production plants,
at the expense of Northern workers.
Finally, we consider a case in which easier offshoring is detrimental to both workers and firm
owners in the North:
Proposition 8.5: Suppose (8.20) is violated for nM∗ = 0. Then for fM sufficiently close to
f¯M , a marginal decrease in fM reduces workers’ expected utility and firm owners’ real profit
in the North.
Proof: The fact that (8.20) is violated for nM∗ = 0 implies that (8.16) is also violated, so
Γ′(f¯M ) > 0. For fM close to f¯M , nM∗ and, hence, the first term in the sum on the right-
hand side of (8.19) are close to zero. If (8.20) is violated, the term in square brackets on the
right-hand side of (8.19) is negative, so h′(fM ) > 0. ||
Unemployment soars, and this reduces the scale and profit of Northern firms. So there are
losers but no winners from additional offshoring in the North.18
Turning to world-wide social welfare, suppose agents are risk-neutral (i.e., let β = 1), and
define social welfare as the sum of all agents’ individual (indirect expected) utilities. β = 1
implies that each agent’s indirect utility can be set equal to his real income (i.e., income
deflated by the price index P ). Hence, social welfare is I/P . Using (8.2), markup pricing,
(8.6), and LN = (n− nS − nM )aNxN , this can be written as
I
P
=
(
ωN
α
)ε
LN
n− nS − nM ,
and the derivative of social welfare with respect to fM has the same sign as h′(fM ). From
the analysis above we immediately obtain:
Proposition 8.6: Let β = 1. Consider dfM < 0. Social welfare rises if Γ′(fM ) < 0. Social
welfare rises if Γ′(fM ) > 0 and (8.20) holds for nM∗ = n− nS. For fM sufficiently close to
f¯M , social welfare falls if (8.20) is violated for nM∗ = 0.
18Again, the effects of an increase in the mass of goods producible in the South without a fixed cost nS
are similar, when costly offshoring is ignored (cf. footnote 16). The derivative of Northern workers’ expected
utility with respect to nS has the same sign as the derivative of LN = Ψ(0, 0) with respect to nS . The same
holds true for firms’ aggregate real profit (wN/P )LN/(ε−1). Finally, an increase in nS raises (wSaS)/(wNaN ),
so that Southern workers’ real wage (wS/wN )(wN/P ) rises. Hence, an increase in nS constitutes a Pareto
improvement if LN rises, while both Northern workers and firm owners lose if employment falls.
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The final part of the proposition strengthens the message of Proposition 8.5 further: not only
does everyone in the North lose from additional offshoring, but the losses are so large that
the aggregate world-wide social welfare (ignoring distributional considerations) goes down
despite rising worker utility in the South.
8.5 The case for a pragmatic union leader
Offshoring is often cited as a prime cause of shrinking union power (and, therefore, lower
wages, especially for low-skilled workers). Dumont et al. (2006) present direct empirical
evidence corroborating this claim. They explain (estimates of) union bargaining power in
12 industries in five high-income EU countries using several measures of internationalization.
They find that the number of employees in foreign affiliates in the CEECs relative to the
domestic industry has a significant negative effect on union bargaining power. The present
section derives an equilibrium explanation for shrinking union power from our model.19
The starting point is the observation that Northern unions face a serious commitment problem
in an equilibrium with positive offshoring activity (i.e., with nM∗ > 0). Suppose a single
industry union could commit to agree to a wage rate ωN/aN + dwN/P marginally below the
RTM wage ωN/aN (dwN/P < 0). This would cause a negligible loss in the indirect utility
of an employed worker. At the same time, it would render the operating profit differential
between an MNE and a Northern producer in that industry strictly smaller than the fixed
cost of offshoring, so that all firms in the industry would leave production at home, and the
demand for labor would surge from (n−nS−nM∗)Ld(ωN/aN , I/P ) to (n−nS)Ld(ωN/aN +
dwN/P, I/P ). If there were a way to make such a commitment, unions would strive to use
it. In parallel to Rogoff’s (1985) case for a “conservative central banker”, unions may appoint
a “pragmatic union leader” (PUL) in order to commit to wage restraint. In the following,
we show that an equilibrium might exist in which some unions set the RTM wage and others
employ a PUL in order to commit to a lower real wage rate. That is, union bargaining power
decreases endogenously in some industries.
Suppose each industry union can appoint a non-combative union leader, who commits credibly
to accept a wage rate in his industry w˜N/P equal to a given fraction δ of the RTM wage
19The effect of offshoring on union bargaining power is also addressed, for instance, by Rodrik (1997) and
Gaston (2002).
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Figure 8.4: Employment with or without commitment.
in (8.6):
w˜N
P
= δ
ωN
aN
, (8.21)
where [1 − β(1 − γ)/(ε − γ)]1/β ≤ δ ≤ 1 (the former inequality ensures that the wage is no
less than the reservation wage b1/β). One interpretation is that the union appoints a weak
union leader, with bargaining power 1 − γ˜ ∈ [0, 1 − γ]. For each δ, there is γ˜ such that
w˜N/P = {b/[1 − β(1 − γ˜)/(ε − γ˜)]}1/β satisfies (8.21). A different possible interpretation
(analogous to a central banker with stronger inflation aversion than the public) is that the
PUL maximizes union members’ expected utility, but uses a lower reservation utility for the
unemployed b˜ in doing so (where [1− β(1− γ)/(ε− γ)]b ≤ b˜ ≤ b). Letting δ = (b˜/b)1/β, the
validity of (8.21) then follows from (8.6). As in Rogoff (1985), the commitment entails no
physical cost. However, the lower δ, the greater the degree of wage restraint implied by the
commitment solution.
Let x˜N denote the output of a firm in an industry with commitment. From (8.2) and (8.21),
x˜N/xN = δ−ε. Employment in the industry is L˜N = (n − nS)aN x˜N . We assume that
L˜N < L¯N (see Figure 8.4). The necessary parameter condition is derived later on. Using
LN = (n− nS − nM )aNxN , it follows that
L˜N
LN
=
n− nS
n− nS − nM δ
−ε. (8.22)
Let µ denote the (endogenous) proportion of industries with a PUL. The definition of an
equilibrium with PULs is similar as in Section 8.3: µ is included in the list of variables that
constitute an equilibrium, and, as an additional condition, expected utility with commitment
8.5 The case for a pragmatic union leader 135
(L˜N/L¯N )(w˜N/P )β + (1 − L˜N/L¯N )b is greater than expected utility without commitment
(LN/L¯N )(wN/P )β + (1 − LN/L¯N )b and µ = 1, or else the expected utilities are the same
and µ ∈ (0, 1). Using (8.22), this additional condition can be written as
nM
n− nS ≥ 1− δ
−ε
[
1− ε− γ
β(1− γ)
(
1− δβ
)]
, µ ≤ 1, (8.23)
with at most one strict inequality. There is δ˜ in the interval ([1−β(1−γ)/(ε−γ)]1/β, 1) such
that the right-hand side of the first inequality in (8.23) is positive for [1−β(1−γ)/(ε−γ)]1/β ≤
δ < δ˜ and non-positive for δ˜ ≤ δ ≤ 1.
For δ˜ ≤ δ ≤ 1, the first inequality in (8.23) is strict for all nM ≥ 0. That is, the cost
of commitment is low enough so that it pays to appoint a PUL irrespective of the amount
of offshoring. Each industry union makes use of the commitment device. The analysis in
Section 8.3 goes through, except that the real wage in (8.6) is lower by factor δ. (If nM∗ > 0,
the commitment problem is still present, however: the appointment of a slightly more PUL
would mean that the measure of firms which go abroad jumps to zero at the cost of a small
loss in wages.)
Let δ < δ˜, so that the right-hand side of the first inequality in (8.23) is positive. As in
Section 8.3, let nM∗ be the equilibrium measure of MNEs in the absence of the possibility of
commitment. If nM = nM∗ violates the first inequality in (8.23) or satisfies it with equality,
then the job losses due to offshoring are small enough so that it does not pay to commit to
wage moderation, and the analysis in Section 8.3 goes through without modification. The
interesting case is that in which the first inequality in (8.23) is strict for nM = nM∗. In
this case, there possibly exists an equilibrium with RTM wages in some sectors and PULs
in others:
Proposition 8.7: Suppose the conditions of Proposition 8.1 are satisfied, and the first in-
equality in (8.23) is strict for nM = nM∗. Suppose further δ < δ˜ and
fM >
αεL¯S
(ε− 1)nS
[
1− n
S
(ωN )ε−1 − (αδ )ε−1 (n− nS)
]
. (8.24)
Then for L¯N large enough, there is an equilibrium with µ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: See Appendix 8.10.1. ||
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Proposition 8.7 provides an equilibrium explanation for shrinking union power; a subset of
the unions endogenously chooses to cut down its union power as a way to commit to wage
restraint. The unions’ commitment problem is solved, in that no union has an incentive
to decrease its bargaining power further (as there is no offshoring in the industries with a
PUL). Since in the standard RTM model (for a closed economy with perfectly competitive
goods markets) a decrease in their bargaining power harms unions, it is the interaction of
wage setting with offshoring that creates scope for shrinking union power as an equilibrium
phenomenon.
8.6 Headquarter services
In the model considered so far the fixed cost of offshoring consists of labor input in the South
(for setting up a plant, establishing a network of suppliers, training workers, etc.) only. This
ignores that a large part of the planning process for setting up a foreign subsidiary is carried
out in the headquarter. Furthermore, the success or failure of offshoring in practice is often
determined by issues that relate to the cooperation between parent and subsidiary (e.g.,
bridging cultural gaps, ensuring stability of production chains, quality controls, etc.) and,
therefore, require inputs both in the headquarter and in the subsidiary. So, as a robustness
check, the present section assumes that the fixed cost of offshoring consists of labor inputs
both in the North and in the South. The analysis confirms the pessimistic assessment of
the employment and welfare effects of offshoring based on the one-factor model without
headquarter services.
Suppose, in addition to the L¯N (unskilled) workers, there are H¯N (> 0) skilled workers in
the North, each supplying one unit of skilled labor (while unskilled labor is the only factor
of production in the South). Setting up a subsidiary in the South requires the input of fN
(≥ 0) units of skilled labor in the North and fM (≥ 0) units of labor in the South (fN > 0
if fM = 0). We assume that
n− nS < L¯
S
fM
<
H¯N
fN
. (8.25)
That is, there are enough labor in the South and enough skilled labor in the North to pay the
fixed cost of offshoring all varieties. The production function for varieties of differentiated
goods in the North is x(i, j) = Ah(i, j)ζ l(i, j)1−ζ (0 < ζ < 1, A = {[ζ/(1 − ζ)]1−ζ + [(1 −
ζ)/ζ]ζ}), where h(i, j) and l(i, j) are the inputs of skilled and unskilled labor, respectively.
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The wage rate for skilled labor is denoted vN . The definition of an equilibrium is the same
as in Section 8.3 except that vN is included in the list of variables and the market clearing
condition for skilled labor in the North is included in the set of conditions.20
The price of each variety produced in the North (vN )ζ(wN )1−ζ/α is the usual markup on
unit cost. The price setting equation becomes(
wN
P
)ε−1
= αε−1
(
n− nS − nM)(wN
vN
)ζ(ε−1)
+
(
nS + αε−1nM
)( wN
wSaS
)ε−1
(8.26)
(cf. (8.4)). The condition that it does not pay to move further varieties abroad is
(ε− 1)
(
fM +
wN
wSaS
aSfN
)
≥
[
1−
(
wN
wSaS
)1−ε(
vN
wN
)ζ(1−ε)](
wNaN
wSaS
)ε
aSxN , nM ≥ 0,
(8.27)
with at most one strict inequality (cf. (8.5)). The Nash product for the wage bargain in
industry i is
 (n− n
S − nM )Lˆd
(
wN
P ,
vN
P ,
I
P
)
L¯N
[(
wN
P
)β
− b
]
1−γ [
A
ε− 1
(
ζ
1− ζ
)ζ
wN
P
Lˆd
(
wN
P
,
vN
P
,
I
P
)]γ
,
where
Lˆd
(
wN
P
,
vN
P
,
I
P
)
=
1
A
(
1− ζ
ζ
vN
wN
)ζ [ (vN )ζ(wN )1−ζ
αP
]−ε
I
P
is the demand for unskilled labor per Northern firm (for the sake of convenience, here and in
what follows, we do not specify domain and range of functions). The constant wage elasticity
of labor demand is ε − ζ(ε − 1). The union and the employers in each industry take the
economy-wide wage rate for skilled labor vN as given. Maximization of the Nash product
subject to the labor demand equation yields
wN
P
=
 b
1− β(1−γ)ε−γ−ζ(ε−1)
 1β = ωˆN (8.28)
if there is unemployment (cf. (8.6)). Market clearing for skilled labor implies
H¯N = (n− nS − nM )B(aN )ε
(
vN
wN
)−1−ζ(ε−1)
xN + nMfN , (8.29)
where B = (1/A)[ζ/(1− ζ)]1−ζ .
20The assumption that manufacturing is the only use of unskilled labor (as headquarter services in the North
are provided by a different factor, whose price is determined via perfect competition) allows us to sidestep
the question of how union wage setting in manufacturing interacts with the wage for, and the employment
probability of, unskilled labor in different tasks.
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The labor market clearing condition for the South (8.7), the price setting equation (8.26), the
arbitrage condition (8.27), the wage setting rule for unskilled labor in the North (8.28), and
the labor market clearing condition for skilled labor in the North (8.29) jointly determine the
equilibrium values of wN/P , vN/wN , nM , wN/(wSaS), and xN .
From (8.26) and (8.28),
vN
wN
=
(ωˆN )ε−1 − (nS + αε−1nM )
(
wN
wSaS
)ε−1
αε−1(n− nS − nM )

1
ζ(1−ε)
. (8.30)
From (8.7), (8.29), and (8.30),
H¯N − nMfN
L¯S − nMfM =
B
aS
(n− nS − nM )− 1ζ(ε−1)
α−εnS + nM
(
wN
wSaS
)−ε
·
(ωˆN )ε−1 − (nS + αε−1nM )
(
wN
wSaS
)ε−1
αε−1

1+ζ(ε−1)
ζ(1−ε)
. (8.31)
From (8.7), (8.27), and (8.30),
αε−1(n− nS) + nS − (ωˆN )ε−1
(
wN
wSaS
)1−ε
≤ (ε− 1)f
M + w
N
wSaS
aSfN
L¯S − nMfM
·αε−1(n− nS − nM )(α−εnS + nM ),
nM ≥ 0, (8.32)
with at most one strict inequality. From (8.30), the South has a cost advantage (i.e., wSaS <
(vN )ζ(wN )1−ζ) exactly if
wN
wSaS
>
ωˆN
[nS + αε−1(n− nS)] 1ε−1
= νˆN . (8.33)
The following inequality ensures that this condition is satisfied in equilibrium:
B
aS
(n− nS)− 1ζ(ε−1)
α−εnS
(νˆN )−ε
[
(ωˆN )ε−1 − nS(νˆN )ε−1
αε−1
] 1+ζ(ε−1)
ζ(ε−1)
>
H¯N
L¯S
. (8.34)
For ζ = 0, (8.34) boils down to the corresponding condition (8.9) in Section 8.3. An equilib-
rium exists if, given fM and fN , there exists (nM , (wN/(wSaS)) with 0 ≤ nM < n− nS and
wN/(wSaS) > νˆN that satisfies (8.31) and (8.32).
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Figure 8.5: Equilibrium with headquarter services.
Proposition 8.8: Suppose (8.25) and (8.34) hold and L¯N is sufficiently large. Then a
symmetric equilibrium with a cost advantage for the South and unemployment exists.
Proof: See Appendix 8.10.2. ||
The determination of the equilibrium values of wN/(wSaS) and nM via (8.31) and (8.32) is
illustrated in Figure 8.5. Equation (8.31) has a unique solution wN/(wSaS) = fˆ(nM , fM , fN ).
fˆ(nM , fM , fN ) starts at fˆ(0, fM , fN ) > νˆN and goes to νˆN with infinite slope as nM →
n − nS . A solution to equation (8.32) holding with equality may or may not exist. If so,
solutions come in pairs, and the smaller solution gˆ(nM , fM , fN ) satisfies gˆ(nM , fM , fN ) > νˆN
for all nM . In the main text, we assume that gˆ(nM , fM , fN ) exists for all nM and that fˆ
and gˆ intersect at some positive nM , with ∂fˆ/∂nM < ∂gˆ/∂nM at the point of intersection.
For L¯N sufficiently large, the intersection represents a symmetric equilibrium with a cost
advantage for the South, unemployment, and offshoring.
Having established existence of equilibrium, we address the comparative statics effects of
changes in the labor requirement for offshoring on the amount of offshoring, employment,
and the wages of skilled and unskilled workers in the North. Broadly speaking, the results
reinforce the pessimistic conclusions drawn from the one-factor model: a decrease in the cost
of offshoring raises Southern workers’ utility, but this gain comes at the expense of unskilled
Northern workers’ expected utility and possibly skilled workers’ expected utility as well.
While general analytical results are hard to come by, the model is tractable enough so that
we can substantiate these claims analytically for the case of low offshoring cost. Since changes
in fM are easier to deal with than changes in fN , we focus on the former. Throughout, it is
understood that variables refer to equilibrium values.
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Proposition 8.9: Suppose nM > 0 and ∂fˆ/∂nM < ∂gˆ/∂nM . Then dnM/dfM < 0 and
d(wN/(wSaS))/dfM > 0.
Proof: See Appendix 8.10.2. ||
An increase in fM shifts fˆ to the left and gˆ to the right. For gˆ downward-sloping at the
equilibrium point, the comparative statics effects are obvious from the right panel of Figure
8.5. For the opposite case, the proof requires some tedious algebra.
Numerical analysis shows that generally dLN/dfM > 0. That is, employment falls when
the labor requirement for offshoring in the South fM falls. This is easy to see for a small
offshoring cost:
Proposition 8.10: dLN/dfM > 0 for fM and fN small enough.
Proof: See Appendix 8.10.2. ||
Starting from a low level of offshoring, the welfare effects of a decrease in the labor requirement
for offshoring in the South are similar as in the one-factor model. The fact that the relative
wage wN/(wSaS) and employment fall implies that Southern workers’ utility wS/P goes up,
but Northern unskilled workers’ expected utility goes down, and the same holds true for the
skilled workers:
Proposition 8.11: For fM and fN small enough, a decrease in fM raises Southern workers’
utility but reduces both unskilled Northern workers’ expected utility and skilled workers’ utility.
Proof: See Appendix 8.10.2. ||
Evidently, the commitment problem analyzed in Section 8.5 remains present in the two-factor
model: each industry union would commit to agree to a wage rate ωˆN +dwN/P (dwN/P < 0)
marginally below the RTM wage ωˆN in (8.28) if it could, since this would completely eliminate
the incentive to offshore at the cost of a negligible loss in the indirect utility of an employed
worker.
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8.7 Heterogeneous firms
So far we have neglected the uncertainties surrounding the establishment of a plant in an
emerging economy. Productivity uncertainty appears particularly relevant with regard to
offshoring to low-wage emerging markets. The recent experience of German manufacturers
provides a good example (see Kinkel and Maloca, 2009). German firms were especially active
in offshoring since the mid-1990s: in each of the two-year periods between 1995 and 2005,
about 15-25% of the German manufacturing firms relocated (further) production abroad. The
main target region was Central and Eastern Europe, the dominant motive cost reduction, and
the preferred mode offshoring within MNEs (rather than offshore outsourcing). In 2007-09,
this proportion fell to 9% (though it was still 45% for firms with 1,000 or more employees
and 24% for the medium-sized manufacturers with 250 to below 1,000 employees). At the
same time, 3% of all manufacturing firms re-relocated production to Germany. That is, there
was one firm moving production back to Germany per three offshorers. The main motive for
moving production back home was disappointment with the quality of production processes
and the scope for handling them.
Following the new new trade theory initiated by Melitz (2003), the present section introduces
uncertainty about the input coefficient in the South to the model of Section 8.2. A novel
feature of the model is that uncertainty concerns only production abroad, while productivity
in the North is certain (whereas the new new trade theory assumes that productivities are
identical at different locations). Given that the typical product cycle involves offshoring
of mature products (Vernon, 1966), this seems to be an appropriate representation of the
firms’ offshoring decision. The central result in this section is that the interaction of firms’
risky offshoring decision and unions’ wage setting behavior provides a natural explanation for
multiple equilibria. The implications of the model for aggregate employment are the object
of the subsequent section.
We return to the assumption that labor is the only factor of production and offshoring requires
labor input in the South only, and we focus on the monopoly union special case of RTM wage
setting. Firms which pay the fixed cost of offshoring wSfM acquire the ability to produce in
the South. The productivity of Southern subsidiaries is uncertain when the fixed cost is paid.
Following Helpman et al. (2004) and Baldwin and Forslid (2010), each firm independently
draws a productivity level in the South from the Pareto distribution, i.e., the probability of
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Figure 8.6: Timing of events with heterogeneous firms.
drawing an input coeffici nt a′ ≤ a is H(a) = aλ for 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 (where λ > ε − 1).21 After
firms have spent the fixed cost of offshoring, the monopoly unions set wages. The realizations
of the input coefficients are still not known, so each union sets a uniform wage rate for its
industry (firm-level wages cannot be made contingent on the firms’ productivity in Southern
subsidiaries realized later). After wages are determined, firms which have incurred the fixed
cost observe productivity in their Southern subsidiary and decide whether to offshore or
not, and all firms decide on their labor demand. Thus, in contrast to ex ante (relative to
offshoring) wage setting as in Skaksen (2004) and ex post wage setting as in Koskela and
Stenbacka (2009) (and in the model with homogeneous firms in Sections 8.3 and 8.4), wages
are set in between the firms’ decisions to set up capacity in the South and to utilize it (see
Figure 8.6).22 Bergin et al.’s (2009) observation that variation in the number of existing
subsidiaries that actually operate explains a sizeable portion of output volatility in MNEs
provides neat evidence for the practical relevance of this timing structure. We comment on
the impact of the difference in the timing of events compared to the model with homogeneous
firms at the beginning of Section 8.8.
Let nM denote the mass of firms in industry i which incur the fixed cost of offshoring (which
possibly exceeds the mass of firms which actually offshore production). Equilibrium is defined
similarly as in the model with homogeneous firms, with the following modifications: either
nM > 0 and the fixed cost of setting up an MNE is equal to the expected difference between
an MNE’s operating profit and a Northern producer’s operating profit, or nM = 0 and the
fixed cost is no less than the expected operating profit differential; firms which have incurred
the fixed cost of offshoring relocate production to the South if, and only if, operating cost is
lower there; if a firm has incurred the fixed cost but does not offshore, its profit in the North
is no less than the fixed cost of offshoring.23
21The productivity level in the South (1/a) is Pareto distributed, i.e., the probability of drawing a produc-
tivity level (1/a′) ≤ (1/a) is G(1/a) = 1 − aλ for 1 ≤ (1/a) < ∞. It follows that the input coefficients are
distributed as spelt out above.
22As in the baseline model, setting up capacity in the South is a longer-term decision than wage setting,
i.e., the fixed cost of offshoring has to be incurred before wage setting (cf. footnote 10).
23If we dropped the final condition, we would have to allow for bankruptcy or introduce an insurance
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An MNE with input coefficient a in the South sets the markup price wNaN/α or wSa/α,
depending on whether it produces in the North or in the South, respectively. From (8.2),
its operating profit if it produces in the South is wSa[(wSa)/(wNaN )]−εxN/(ε − 1). An
MNE offshores production if, and only if, this is greater than operating profit in the North
wNaNxN/(ε− 1), i.e.,
a <
wNaN
wS
. (8.35)
The main novelty that is due to firm heterogeneity is that the union’s objective function
becomes non-concave, which implies that the optimum wage wN/P is a discontinuous and
non-monotonic function of the prevailing wage rate in the South wS/P . The monopoly
union maximizes workers’ expected utility gain compared to the reservation utility b sub-
ject to the industry labor demand curve. Using (8.35), the mass of firms that produce in
the North is n − nS − max{(wNaN )/wS)λ, 1}nM . Labor demand per firm is given by the
function Ld(wN/P, I/P ) defined in Section 8.3. Substituting Ld and omitting the factor
(aN )1−εαε(I/P )/L¯N , which it takes as given, the union’s objective function becomes
[
n− nS −max
{(
wNaN
wS
)λ
, 1
}
nM
][(
wN
P
)β
− b
](
wN
P
)−ε
. (8.36)
An increase in wN/P has a twofold negative effect on employment. For one thing, it reduces
labor demand per firm in the North (the intensive margin). For another, for wN/P <
(wS/P )/aN (i.e., wNaN < wS), it decreases the mass of firms operating in the North (the
extensive margin). Consistent with the Rodrik (1997) hypothesis, offshoring thus increases
the wage elasticity of labor demand. The function in (8.36) is depicted in Figure 8.7 for given
nM . The max term equals one for wN/P ≥ (wS/P )/aN . For wS/P ≤ aNb1/β, this condition
is satisfied for all wN/P ≥ b1/β. From Section 8.3, we know that the monopoly union sets
wN/P = ωN/aN then, where ωN is defined by (8.6) with γ = 0. For wS/P > aNb1/β, we
have wNaN/wS < 1 for wN/P in the interval (b1/β, (wS/P )/aN ). For wS/P close enough
to aNb1/β, ωN/aN is still the optimum wage rate. On the other hand, for wS/P = ωN
(> aNb1/β), the left-hand derivative of the function in (8.36) is negative at wN/P = ωN/aN ,
so it attains a local maximum at some wN/P < ωN/aN . It follows that there is a real wage
rate in the South wS/P = ω˘S(nM ) such that (8.36) has two maxima (with the same level
mechanism that redistributes income from “lucky” firms that draw a low input coefficient to “unlucky” high-a
firms (we must not assume that firm owners also have wage income, since the wage setting process assumes
that the workers involved have no income if they do not work).
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Figure 8.7: Wage setting with heterogeneous firms.
of expected utility), one at a wage rate wN/P < ω˘S(nM )/aN (so that wNaN/wS < 1) and
the other one at a wage rate wN/P > ω˘S(nM )/aN (so that wNaN/wS > 1). The monopoly
wage is ωN/aN for wS/P up to ω˘S(nM ) and is implicitly determined by
wN
P
=
1− βλnM
(n−nS)
(
wNaN
wS
)−λ−nM + ε

− 1
β
b
1
β =
ω˘N
(
wNaN
wSaS
, nM
)
aN
(8.37)
for wS/P > ω˘S(nM ). ω˘N ((wNaN )/(wSaS), nM ) is decreasing in its first argument, so if a
solution wN/P exists, then it is unique. Moreover, since ω˘N ((wNaN )/(wSaS), nM ) rises when
wS/P rises, the optimum wage wN/P is an increasing function of wS/P for wS/P > ω˘S(nM ).
This relation between the union wage in the North and labor cost in the South is similar as
in Skaksen (2004).
Proposition 8.12: There are functions ω˘N ((wNaN )/(wSaS), nM ) (< ωN and decreasing
in both arguments), ν(nM ), and ν¯(nM ) (with ν(nM ) = ν¯(nM ) = 1/aS for nM = 0 and
ν(nM ) < 1/aS < ν¯(nM ) for nM > 0) such that
wN
P
=

ω˘N
(
wNaN
wSaS
, nM
)
aN
, w
NaN
wSaS
≤ ν(nM )
ωN
aN
, w
NaN
wSaS
≥ ν¯(nM )
. (8.38)
Proof: See Appendix 8.10.3. ||
8.7 Heterogeneous firms 145
Low levels of relative production cost (wNaN )/(wSaS) (≤ ν(nM )) go along with a real wage
that falls short of the monopoly wage ωN/aN defined in Section 8.3. Relative production cost
(wNaN )/(wSaS) in the interval (ν(nM ), ν¯(nM )) is incompatible with the unions’ wage setting
behavior. What will prove crucial to multiplicity of equilibria is the non-monotonicity of the
dependence of the Northern real wage on relative production cost: wN/P is non-increasing
in (wNaN )/(wSaS) both for (wNaN )/(wSaS) ≤ ν(nM ) and for (wNaN )/(wSaS) ≥ ν¯(nM );
but as (wNaN )/(wSaS) jumps upward from ν(nM ) to ν¯(nM ), wN/P jumps upward.
The remainder of the equilibrium analysis is straightforward. From the definition of the price
index and the markup pricing rules,
(
wNaN
P
)ε−1
=

[
n− nS −
(
wNaN
wS
)λ
nM
]
αε−1
+nM λα
ε−1
λ+1−ε
(
wNaN
wS
)λ
+ nS
(
wNaN
wSaS
)ε−1
, w
NaN
wSaS
≤ 1
aS
(n− nS − nM )αε−1
+nM λα
ε−1
λ+1−ε
(
wNaN
wS
)ε−1
+ nS
(
wNaN
wSaS
)ε−1
, w
NaN
wSaS
≥ 1
aS
. (8.39)
The condition that further offshoring is not profitable reads:
1
ε− 1w
NaNxN ≥ H
(
wNaN
wS
)
E
[
1
ε− 1w
Sa
(
wSa
wNaN
)−ε
xN
∣∣∣∣∣ a ≤ wNaNwS
]
+
[
1−H
(
wNaN
wS
)]
1
ε− 1w
NaNxN − wSfM , nM ≥ 0,
with at most one strict inequality. Simplifying terms yields
fM ≥

xN
λ+1−ε
(
wNaN
wS
)λ+1
, w
NaN
wSaS
≤ 1
aS
xN
λ+1−ε
λ
(
wNaN
wS
)ε
−(λ+1−ε)wNaN
wS
ε−1 ,
wNaN
wSaS
≥ 1
aS
, nM ≥ 0, (8.40)
with at most one strict inequality. The condition that firm profit in the North wNaNxN/(ε−1)
is sufficient to cover the fixed cost wSfM for firms that do not offshore is
(
wNaN
wS
)λ
≤ λ
ε− 1 − 1
if nM > 0 and wNaN/wS < 1. The labor market clearing condition for the South becomes
L¯S =
 n
M λ
λ+1−ε
(
wNaN
wS
)λ+1
xN + nSaSα−ε
(
wNaN
wSaS
)ε
xN + nMfM , w
NaN
wSaS
≤ 1
aS
nM λλ+1−ε
(
wNaN
wS
)ε
xN + nSaSα−ε
(
wNaN
wSaS
)ε
xN + nMfM , w
NaN
wSaS
≥ 1
aS
.
(8.41)
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Equations (8.38)-(8.41) jointly determine wN/P , nM , (wNaN )/(wSaS), and xN . From (8.38)
and (8.39),
wNaN
wSaS
=

 ω˘
N
(
wNaN
wSaS
, nM
)ε−1
−αε−1
[
n−nS+ ε−1
λ+1−ε
(
wNaN
wS
)λ
nM
]
nS

1
ε−1
, w
NaN
wSaS
≤ ν(nM )
[
(ωN )ε−1−αε−1(n−nS−nM )
nS+ λ
λ+1−ε (a
S)ε−1αε−1nM
] 1
ε−1
, w
NaN
wSaS
≥ ν¯(nM )
.
(8.42)
Let f˘(nM ) denote the mapping that assigns solutions (wNaN )/(wSaS) to this equality to
nM . For (wNaN )/(wSaS) ≥ ν¯(nM ), this is simply the right-hand side of the equation. A
crucial property of the mapping f˘ is that, as we will see below, it is possibly multi-valued for
a certain range of nM -values. From (8.40) and (8.41),
wNaN
wSaS
≤

[
(λ+1−ε)(aS)−λα−εnS
L¯S
fM
−(1+λ)nM
] 1
λ+1−ε
, w
NaN
wSaS
≤ 1
aS[
λ
λ+1−ε(a
S)ε−1 − (ε− 1)α
−εnS+ λ
λ+1−ε (a
S)ε−1nM
L¯S
fM
−nM
] 1
1−ε
, w
NaN
wSaS
≥ 1
aS
= g˘(nM , fM ), nM ≥ 0, (8.43)
with at most one strict inequality. The function g˘ is increasing in nM , increasing in fM , and
continuous. For (wNaN )/(wSaS) ≥ ν¯(nM ), the only difference between the functions f˘ and
g˘ and their counterparts f and g defined in (8.8) and (8.10), respectively, is the presence of
the term [λ/(λ+ 1− ε)](aS)ε−1.24
If the curves representing f˘ and g˘ do not intersect either at (wNaN )/(wSaS) ≤ ν(nM ) or
at (wNaN )/(wSaS) ≥ ν¯(nM ), a symmetric equilibrium does not exist. If there is a unique
intersection with (wNaN )/(wSaS) ≤ ν(nM ) or (wNaN )/(wSaS) ≥ ν¯(nM ), there is a unique
equilibrium. The main result in this section is that multiple equilibria can occur, and that this
is not a theoretical curiosity that depends on the curvature of the functions which determine
equilibrium, but a natural consequence of the unions’ wage setting behavior.
Proposition 8.13: There are parameters such that two symmetric equilibria with a cost
advantage for the South and unemployment exist.
24As λ→∞, this term goes to unity, and at the same time E(a) = λ/(λ+ 1)→ 1 and σ2a = λ/[(λ+ 1)2(λ+
2)]→ 0. Accordingly, for (wNaN )/(wSaS) ≥ ν¯(nM ), the model “converges” to the model with certainty and
input coefficient aS = 1 as λ→∞.
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Figure 8.8: Multiple equilibria.
Proof: Let L¯N = 30, L¯S = 40, α = 0.5, aN = 0.3, aS = 0.7143, n = 5, nS = 0.1,
fM = 8, b = 2.5, β = 0.5, and λ = 2.5. f˘ and g˘ intersect twice, at ((wNaN )/(wSaS), nM ) =
(1.2797, 1.1539) (so that 1 < (wNaN )/(wSaS) < ν(nM ) = 1.3279) and at ((wNaN )/(wSaS),
nM ) = (1.6754, 1.4394) (so that (wNaN )/(wSaS) > ν¯(nM ) = 1.5679). In the former equilib-
rium, the real wage in the South is wS/P = 3.1565. The two local maxima of the union’s ob-
jective function occur at wN/P = 9.6174 and wN/P = ωN/aN = 11.1111 with values 0.0259
and 0.0253, respectively. That is, the global maximum is at wN/P = 9.6174. A proportion
((wNaN/wS)λ =) 0.7988 of the firms which have spent the fixed cost of offshoring go abroad.
The condition that the owners of those firms that incur the fixed cost of offshoring but do not
go abroad have non-negative income is satisfied: (wNaN/wS)λ = 0.7988 ≤ 1.5 = λ/(ε−1)−1.
In the latter equilibrium, the real wage in the South is wS/P = 2.7854. The two local max-
ima of the union’s objective function occur at wN/P = 9.0570 and wN/P = ωN = 11.1111
with values 0.0220 and 0.0234, respectively. The global maximum is at wN/P = 11.1111.
Aggregate employment is 19.6160 in the former equilibrium and 6.9781 in the latter. ||
The example in the proof is constructed such that there is a range of nM -values in which f˘
assigns two values of (wNaN )/(wSaS) to each nM and g˘ intersects f˘ twice (see Figure 8.8).
The reason why f˘ is possibly multi-valued is that the relation between (wNaN )/(wSaS) and
the wage rate wN/P is non-monotonic. The function f˘ is derived from the wage setting
equation (8.38) and the price setting equation (8.39). According to the price setting equation
(8.39), for given nM , an increase in the relative production cost in the North (wNaN )/(wSaS)
causes an increase in the Northern real wage. If the wage setting process gave rise to a non-
increasing relation between (wNaN )/(wSaS) and wN/P (as in the model with homogeneous
firms), there could not be multiple values of (wNaN )/(wSaS) consistent with firms’ price
setting and unions’ wage setting behavior for given nM . But as noted above, wN/P jumps
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upward as (wNaN )/(wSaS) jumps upward from ν(nM ) to ν¯(nM ) (see Figure 8.9). That
is why both a low level and a high level of relative production cost (wNaN )/(wSaS) are
compatible with agents’ price and wage setting behavior. For the low value of (wNaN )/(wSaS)
(< ν(nM )), the real wage in the South (wS/P > ω˘S(nM )) is high, so unions in the North
have an incentive to set wages low enough such that not all firms that have paid the fixed cost
of offshoring go abroad. They take the negative impact of a marginal decrease in wN/P on
offshoring intensity into account and set wN/P < ωN/aN . For (wNaN )/(wSaS) (> ν¯(nM ))
high, the real wage rate in the South wS/P (< ω˘S(nM )) is so low that keeping firms that
have paid the fixed cost of offshoring at home requires a degree of wage moderation which is
unattractive from the unions’ point of view, so they set wN/P = ωN/aN .
If two equilibria exist, the equilibrium with higher offshoring activity is characterized by the
lower real wage in the South. Since there is full employment in the South and profits made
by Southern subsidiaries of MNEs accrue to firm owners in the North, Southern agents prefer
the equilibrium with less offshoring, in which the South exports a narrower range of goods.
So the model should not be taken as an explanation for divergent economic performance of
developing countries with different levels of industrialization (see, e.g., Murphy et al., 1989).
Rather, it points to the role of wage policy in equilibrium selection: unions in the North have
to accept a low real wage in order to keep jobs at home.
The commitment problem discussed in Section 8.5 remains present with firm heterogeneity.
In a symmetric equilibrium with offshoring, the expected operating profit differential be-
tween an MNE and a Northern producer is equal to the fixed cost of offshoring. If a
union could commit to set the wage rate wN/P slightly below the equilibrium level (i.e.,
ω˘N ((wNaN )/(wSaS), nM )/aN if (wNaN )/(wSaS) < ν(nM ) and ωN/aN if (wNaN )/(wSaS) >
ν¯(nM )), then no firm in the industry would pay the fixed cost of offshoring, so employment
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and expected utility would surge. So each single union has an incentive to appoint a PUL,
who has lower bargaining power or attaches a lower reservation utility to being unemployed.
8.8 Employment with heterogeneous firms
This section deals with equilibrium employment in the model introduced in the previous
section. The upshot of the analysis is that the model justifies a more optimistic assessment
of the labor market effects of offshoring than the model with homogeneous firms analyzed in
Sections 8.3 and 8.4. The reason is that, as in Skaksen (2004), the presence of potential, but
non-realized, offshoring has a moderating effect on the unions’ wage claims, since the wage
has an impact on firms’ decision to offshore.
The model with heterogeneous firms differs from the model with homogeneous firms in two
respects. For one thing, productivity in Southern subsidiaries is uncertain. For another, firms
which have paid the fixed cost of offshoring decide whether to move production abroad only
after unions have set the wage rate; i.e., paying the fixed cost in the first stage gives firms the
option to offshore, whereas offshoring is irreversible in the model with homogeneous firms.
Different labor market outcomes can in principle be due to either of these two differences.
However, in Proposition 8.A.1 in Appendix 8.10.4, we rule out the option to offshore per se
as an explanation for differences in equilibrium employment: in the model with homogeneous
firms and the option to offshore, if an equilibrium exists (which is not implied by existence
of equilibrium with irreversible offshoring), it displays the same level of employment as the
equilibrium of the model with irreversible offshoring. Thus, it is the assumption of firm
heterogeneity which raises the possibility that the firms’ option to offshore feeds back on
unions’ wage setting behavior.25
Consider the model with heterogeneous firms. Let ( ˘(wNaN )/(wSaS)), n˘M , and L˘N denote
the equilibrium values of relative production cost, the mass of producers which incur the fixed
cost of offshoring, and aggregate employment in the North. For the sake of comparability,
set aS = E(a) = λ/(λ+ 1), so that the expected input coefficient coincides with the certain
input coefficient in the model with irreversible offshoring. For simplicity, set nS = 0. A
change in the wage rate unions set has a marginal impact on offshoring intensity if, and only
25Together with Proposition 8.1, this rules out multiplicity of equilibria in the model with homogeneous
firms and the option to offshore. So the possible multiplicity of equilibria stated in Proposition 8.13 is also a
consequence of firm heterogeneity.
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if, (wNaN )/(wSaS) < ν(nM ). Our main result in this section is that employment is higher
than with homogeneous firms and irreversible offshoring in this case under fairly general
conditions:
Proposition 8.14: Let nS = 0. Suppose the model with homogeneous firms and aS =
λ/(1 + λ) has an equilibrium with nM∗ > 0, and the model with heterogeneous firms has an
equilibrium with ( ˘(wNaN )/(wSaS)) < ν(n˘M ) and n˘M > 0. Then L˘N > LN∗ if n˘M ≤ nM∗.
If n˘M ≤ n/2 and ( ˘(wNaN )/(wSaS)) ≤ ((wNaN )/(wSaS))∗, then L˘N > LN∗ also holds for
n˘M > nM∗.
Proof: See Appendix 8.10.5.26 ||
Given that offshoring is an all-or-nothing decision (so that nM > n/2 would mean that firms
incur the fixed cost necessary to offshore more than half of the domestic products) and that
an equilibrium in which offshoring responds to wage policy is located to the left of ν(nM )
in Figure 8.8 (so that the relative production cost tends to be low), the conditions of the
proposition imposed in the case n˘M > nM∗ appear rather weak. The proposition states
that productivity uncertainty is conducive to high employment, since, as in Skaksen (2004),
it means that unions have to take into account the impact of wage increases on realized
offshoring.
Proposition 8.14 compares employment in equilibria with or without uncertainty for a given
labor requirement for offshoring fM . Another question (addressed in Section 8.4 for the
case of homogeneous firms) is how equilibrium employment responds to changes in fM in
the model with uncertainty. Generally, employment can increase or decrease (locally) when
fM rises and can be higher or lower than the employment level that arises when fM is large
enough so that there is no offshoring in equilibrium. In the example in the proof of Proposition
26We also illustrate Proposition 8.14 by means of examples. First, consider the case n˘M ≤ nM∗. Let
L¯N = 30, L¯S = 35, α = 0.5, aN = 0.3, aS = 0.6364, n = 5, nS = 0, fM = 8, b = 2.5, β = 0.5, and λ = 1.75.
The model with homogeneous firms has an equilibrium with nM∗ = 1.5066, ((wNaN )/(wSaS))∗ = 2.1063,
and LN∗ = 5.6544. For the model with heterogeneous firms, the following equilibrium values are obtained:
n˘M = 1.5909 (and a proportion 0.5052 of the firms which have spent the fixed cost of offshoring go abroad),
( ˘(wNaN )/(wSaS)) = 1.0638 < ν(n˘M ) = 1.5772, and L˘N = 22.0834. Hence, L˘N is larger than LN∗. Second,
consider the case n˘M > nM∗, n˘M ≤ n/2, and ( ˘(wNaN )/(wSaS)) ≤ ((wNaN )/(wSaS))∗. Let L¯N = 30,
L¯S = 40, α = 0.5, aN = 0.95, aS = 0.8333, n = 5, nS = 0, fM = 3, b = 1.4, β = 0.5, and λ = 5.
The model with homogeneous firms has an equilibrium with nM∗ = 3.3021, ((wNaN )/(wSaS))∗ = 1.4907,
and LN∗ = 7.9377. The equilibrium of the model with heterogeneous firms is: n˘M = 2.2222 ≤ n/2 (and a
proportion 0.4313 of these firms actually offshore production), ( ˘(wNaN )/(wSaS)) = 1.0142 < ν(n˘M ) = 1.1954
(and ≤ ((wNaN )/(wSaS))∗ = 1.4907), and L˘N = 126.3848 > LN∗. (In both examples, the condition that the
owners of those firms which incur the fixed cost but do not offshore have non-negative income is satisfied.)
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8.13, nM falls to zero for fM = 108. Employment, at 2.6442, is then lower than in either
of the two equilibria which exist for fM = 8. Numerical experimentation suggests that, as
one would expect, employment is generally higher than without offshoring in equilibria with
( ˘(wNaN )/(wSaS)) < ν(n˘M ).
8.9 Conclusion
Popular concerns about adverse employment effects of offshoring production to low-wage
countries are not hard to reconcile with standard economic theory. Incorporating an off-
shoring decision and standard RTM union wage setting into the standard Krugman (1979a)
North-South trade model yields a model in which negative effects of decreases in the cost of
offshoring are the rule rather than the exception. The popular concerns cannot be discarded
on the grounds that they are incompatible with basic principles of economics. The model
casts doubt on the presence of gains from trade with low-wage countries for countries with
a strongly unionized labor market27 and explains shrinking union power as an equilibrium
phenomenon.
A more optimistic view of the employment effects of offshoring can be justified by a model
with heterogeneous firms, in which unions can prevent the relocation of production to a
foreign subsidiary by moderating their wage claims. This model possibly gives rise to multiple
equilibria, which differ in terms of wage policies and employment levels.
Our baseline one-factor model is flexible enough to incorporate the possibility of commitment
to a PUL, a second factor of production, or firm heterogeneity. So there is probably scope
for other extensions and modifications. The most promising direction for future research
seems to be the integration of a value chain with different tasks and trade in tasks as in
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). In such a setup one could investigate the impact of
the joint distribution of the offshoring cost and reductions in the production cost across the
stages of the value chain on wage setting and employment.
In this chapter, our analysis considering union wage setting and offshoring to low-
wage countries illustrated the factors which determine the decision to relocate production
abroad via FDI as well as the impact of offshoring on domestic employment and production
cost in both countries. In the variant of the model with heterogeneous firms, we showed how
27This result contrasts with the statement of Greg Mankiw mentioned in Chapter 5.
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productivity uncertainty influences the results. Part III of this dissertation was devoted to
this second application of the economics of investment in the presence of risk and market
frictions. Chapter 9 provides some concluding remarks on this dissertation.
8.10 Appendix
8.10.1 Proof of Proposition 8.7
Proof: The condition for non-profitability of further offshoring in industries with the RTM
wage (8.6) is unchanged. The fact that the wage is lower implies that there is no offshoring in
industries with a PUL. The price setting equation and the condition for labor market clearing
in the South become
(
wNaN
P
)ε−1
= (1− µ)
[
αε−1
(
n− nS − nM)+ (nS + αε−1nM)(wNaN
wSaS
)ε−1]
+µ
[(α
δ
)ε−1 (
n− nS)+ nS (wNaN
wSaS
)ε−1]
(8.44)
and
L¯S =
[
α−εnS + (1− µ)nM](wNaN
wSaS
)ε
aSxN + (1− µ)nMfM , (8.45)
respectively. Equations (8.5), (8.6), (8.23), (8.44), and (8.45) determine wN/P , nM ,
(wNaN )/(wSaS), xN , and µ. Equation (8.21) then pins down w˜N/P . From (8.6) and (8.44),
wNaN
wSaS
=
[
(ωN )ε−1 − αε−1 (1− µ+ µ
δε−1
)
(n− nS) + (1− µ)αε−1nM
nS + (1− µ)αε−1nM
] 1
ε−1
= f˜(nM , µ),
(8.46)
where f˜ : [0, n− nS ]× [0, 1]→ R. From (8.5) and (8.45),
wNaN
wSaS
≤
1− (ε− 1)α−εnS + (1− µ)nM
L¯S
fM
− (1− µ)nM
 11−ε = g˜(nM , fM , µ), nM ≥ 0, (8.47)
with at most one strict inequality, where g˜ maps {(nM , fM , µ) ∈ R2+ × [0, 1] | (1 − µ)nM <
[L¯S/fM − (ε − 1)α−εnS ]/ε} on R+. Let the measure of firms which offshore in industries
with the RTM wage n˜M∗ be determined by (8.23) holding with equality. The assumption
that nM∗ satisfies the first inequality in (8.23) implies nM∗ > 0 and 0 < n˜M∗ < nM∗. The
question is: does there exist µ˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that f˜(n˜M∗, µ˜) = g˜(n˜M∗, fM , µ˜)?
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Figure 8.10: Equilibrium with µ˜ ∈ (0, 1).
The fact that nM∗ > 0 implies f˜(0, 0) = f(0) > g(0, fM ) = g˜(0, fM , 0). From (8.24), (8.46),
and (8.47), we have f˜(0, 1) < g˜(0, fM , 1). So f˜(0, µ′) = g˜(0, fM , µ′) for some µ′ ∈ (0, 1). For
given fM , let ϕ : [0, µ′] → R+ be defined by f˜(ϕ(µ), µ) = g˜(ϕ(µ), fM , µ). ϕ is a continuous
real-valued function. By construction, ϕ(0) = nM∗ and ϕ(µ′) = 0. Hence, there is µ˜ ∈ (0, µ′)
such that ϕ(µ˜) = n˜M∗, i.e., f˜(n˜M∗, µ˜) = g˜(n˜M∗, fM , µ˜) (cf. Figure 8.10).
The fact that nM∗ > 0 implies fM < f¯M . This does not contradict (8.24), since the right-
hand side of (8.24) is less than f¯M . n˜M∗ < nM∗ implies the validity of (1−µ)n˜M∗ < L¯S/fM
and n˜M∗ < n− nS . The condition for unemployment in industries with a PUL is:
(n− nS)δ−εaN L¯
S − (1− µ′)n˜M∗fM
aS [α−εnS + (1− µ′)n˜M∗]
 nS + αε−1n˜M∗
(ωN )ε−1 −
(
1− µ′ + µ′
δε−1
)
(n− nS)
 < L¯N .
Since n˜M∗ and µ′ are independent of L¯N , the condition is satisfied for L¯N large enough.
Employment is lower in industries with RTM wages, so unemployment prevails there too. ||
8.10.2 Proofs of Propositions 8.8 to 8.11
Proof of Proposition 8.8: Rewrite (8.31) as
0 =
B(n− nS − nM )− 1ζ(ε−1)
aS(α−εnS + nM )
(
wN
wSaS
)−ε (ωˆN )ε−1 − (nS + αε−1nM )
(
wN
wSaS
)ε−1
αε−1

1+ζ(ε−1)
ζ(ε−1)
−H¯
N − nMfN
L¯S − nMfM
= Fˆ
(
nM ,
wN
wSaS
, fN , fM
)
. (8.48)
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Rewrite (8.32) as
0 ≥ αε−1(n− nS) + nS − (ωˆN )ε−1
(
wN
wSaS
)1−ε
−(ε− 1)f
M + w
N
wSaS
aSfN
L¯S − nMfM α
ε−1(n− nS − nM )(α−εnS + nM )
= Gˆ
(
nM ,
wN
wSaS
, fN , fM
)
, nM ≥ 0, (8.49)
with at most one strict inequality.
Here and in what follows, we do not specify domain and range of functions, omit arguments
when convenient, and do not label equilibrium values explicitly. We use subscripts n and w
to indicate partial derivatives with respect to nM and wN/(wSaS), respectively. Denote the
function in the first line of (8.48) as Fˇ . Fˇw < 0 for wN/(wSaS) < ωˆN/(nS +αε−1nM )1/(ε−1).
From (8.25), H¯N − nMfN > 0 and L¯S − nMfM > 0 for nM ∈ [0, n − nS). So there is a
unique wN/(wSaS) < ωˆN/(nS +αε−1nM )1/(ε−1) that solves Fˆ (nM , wN/(wSaS), fN , fM ) = 0
for nM ∈ [0, n − nS) (see the left panel of Figure 8.11).28 Define fˆ(nM , fM , fN ) as this
wN/(wSaS). From (8.34), Fˇ (0, νˆN , fN , fM ) > H¯N/L¯S and, therefore, fˆ(0, fM , fN ) > νˆN .
From (8.48), fˆ(n− nS , fM , fN ) = νˆN . Differentiating Fˆ partially yields
Fˆn = −Fˇ
[
− 1
ζ(ε− 1)
1
n− nS − nM +
1
α−εnS + nM
+
1 + ζ(ε− 1)
ζ(ε− 1)
αε−1
(ωˆN )ε−1
(
wN
wSaS
)1−ε − (nS + αε−1nM )
]
−f
MH¯N − fN L¯S
(L¯S − nMfM )2 (8.50)
and
Fˆw = −Fˇ
(
wN
wSaS
)−1 ε+ 1 + ζ(ε− 1)
ζ
nS + αε−1nM
(ωˆN )ε−1
(
wN
wSaS
)1−ε − (nS + αε−1nM )
 .
So fˆn(n − nS , fM , fN ) = −Fˆn(n − nS , νˆN , fN , fM )/Fˆw(n − nS , νˆN , fN , fM ) = ∞. In sum,
fˆ(nM , fM , fN ) starts at fˆ(0, fM , fN ) > νˆN and goes to νˆN with infinite slope as nM → n−nS
(see Figure 8.5 in the main text).
28According to (8.30), wN/(wSaS) has to be smaller than ωˆN/(nS +αε−1nM )1/(ε−1) in an equilibrium. For
the sake of completeness, we add that for wN/(wSaS) > ωˆN/(nS +αε−1nM )1/(ε−1), Fˆ may rise or fall. In the
left panel of Figure 8.11, we only draw the first case which corresponds to (ζ(ε − 1) + 1)/ζ(ε − 1) being an
even number.
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Figure 8.11: Determination of fˆ , gˆ, and gˇ.
Define the function following the minus sign in the second line of (8.49) as Gˇ. As illustrated in
the right panel of Figure 8.11, solutions wN/(wSaS) to (8.49) come in pairs. For (nM , fM , fN )
such that a solution exists, define gˆ(nM , fM , fN ) as the smaller solution and gˇ(nM , fM , fN ) as
the larger solution. As can be seen from Figure 8.11, gˆ(nM , fM , fN ) > νˆN for all nM < n−nS .
From (8.49), Gˇ(n−nS , wN/(wSaS), fM , fN ) = 0, so gˆ(n−nS , fM , fN ) = νˆN . Differentiating
Gˆ partially yields
Gˆn = Gˇ
(
1
n− nS − nM −
1
α−εnS + nM
− f
M
L¯S − nMfM
)
(8.51)
and
Gˆw = (ε− 1)(ωˆN )ε−1
(
wN
wSaS
)−ε
− Gˇ a
SfN
fM + wN
wSaS
aSfN
.
Since Gˇ > 0, Gˆn > 0 for nM close enough to n−nS . Since Gˇ(n−nS , wN/(wSaS), fM , fN ) =
0, Gˆw > 0 for nM close enough to n − nS . Hence, gˆn(n − nS , fM , fN ) = −Gˆn(n − nS ,
νˆN , fN , fM )/Gˆw(n− nS , νˆN , fN , fM ) < 0.
For given nM , if gˆ(nM , fM , fN ) exists, then (8.49) holds exactly if wN/(wSaS) ≤ gˆ(nM , fM ,
fN ). If gˆ does not exist, then (8.49) holds. If fˆ(nM , fM , fN ) = gˆ(nM , fM , fN ) or fˆ(nM , fM ,
fN ) = gˇ(nM , fM , fN ) for some nM > 0, then nM and wN/(wSaS) = fˆ(nM , fM , fN ) consti-
tute an equilibrium with offshoring. The fact that gˇ(nM , fM , fN ) ≥ gˆ(nM , fM , fN ) > νˆN im-
plies that condition (8.33) is satisfied. If gˆ(0, fM , fN ) exists and fˆ(0, fM , fN ) < gˆ(0, fM , fN )
or if gˆ(0, fM , fN ) does not exist, then nM = 0 and wN/(wSaS) = fˆ(0, fM , fN ) constitute an
equilibrium without offshoring. fˆ(0, fM , fN ) > νˆN implies that (8.33) is satisfied.
Suppose gˆ(0, fM , fN ) exists and fˆ(0, fM , fN ) > gˆ(0, fM , fN ). If gˆ exists for all nM , then fˆ
and gˆ intersect for some nM > 0 and an equilibrium with offshoring exists (see Figure 8.5
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in the main text). If gˆ does not exist for all nM , then gˆ and gˇ converge for some nM > 0
(corresponding to a tangency point in the right panel of Figure 8.11), so fˆ intersects either gˆ
or gˇ and an equilibrium with nM > 0 exists (see the left panel of Figure 8.12). If gˆ(0, fM , fN )
exists and fˆ(0, fM , fN ) ≤ gˆ(0, fM , fN ) or gˆ(0, fM , fN ) does not exist, then an equilibrium
with nM = 0 exists (see the right panel of Figure 8.12).
From cost minimization, employment in the North is LN = [(1−ζ)/ζ](vN/wN )(H¯N−nMfN ).
Using (8.30), this can be rewritten as
LN =
1− ζ
ζ
(ωˆN )ε−1 − (nS + αε−1nM )
(
wN
wSaS
)ε−1
αε−1(n− nS − nM )

1
ζ(1−ε)
(H¯N − nMfN ). (8.52)
Since the equilibrium values of nM and wN/(wSaS) are independent of L¯N , there is unem-
ployment for L¯N sufficiently large. ||
Proof of Proposition 8.9: From (8.48) and (8.49),
Fˆf = −n
M (H¯N − nMfN )
(L¯S − nMfM )2 (8.53)
and
Gˆf = −Gˇ
(
1
fM + wN
wSaS
aSfN
+
nM
L¯S − nMfM
)
, (8.54)
where subscript f denotes partial differentiation with respect to fM . So
Fˆw < 0, Fˆn < 0, Fˆf < 0, Gˆw > 0, Gˆf < 0,
Fˆn
Fˆw
>
Gˆn
Gˆw
(8.55)
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in equilibrium. The final inequality states that fˆn < gˆn. From (8.48) and (8.49),
dnM
dfM
=
FˆwGˆf − Fˆf Gˆw
FˆnGˆw − FˆwGˆn
,
d
(
wN
wSaS
)
dfM
=
Fˆf Gˆn − FˆnGˆf
FˆnGˆw − FˆwGˆn
.
From (8.55), an increase in the labor requirement for offshoring in the South reduces the
equilibrium amount of offshoring: dnM/dfM < 0.
The wage gap between North and South for unskilled labor increases (i.e., d(wN/(wSaS))/dfM
> 0) if, and only if,
Fˆf Gˆn < FˆnGˆf .
From (8.55), this condition is satisfied if Gˆn ≥ 0. In the opposite case, inserting (8.50), (8.51),
(8.53), and (8.54), dividing by Gˇ (> 0), using Fˇ = (H¯N−nMfM )/(L¯S−nMfM ), multiplying
by (L¯S − nMfM )2/(H¯N − nMfM ) (> 0), and simplifying terms yields
− n
M [L¯S − (n− nS)fM ]
(n− nS − nM )(L¯S − nMfM ) <
(
L¯S − nMfM
fM + wN
wSaS
aSfN
+ nM
)
·
{
1
ζ(ε− 1)
[
− 1
n− nS − nM
+
αε−1
(ωˆN )ε−1
(
wN
wSaS
)1−ε − (nS + αε−1nM )

+
αε−1
(ωˆN )ε−1
(
wN
wSaS
)1−ε − (nS + αε−1nM )
+fMfN
H¯N
fN
− L¯S
fM
(H¯N − nMfN )(L¯S − nMfM )

+
L¯S − nMfM
fM + wN
wSaS
aSfN
1
α−εnS + nM
.
The fact that wN/(wSaS) > νˆN implies that the term in square brackets in the second and
third lines is positive. So the validity of the inequality follows from condition (8.25). ||
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Proof of Proposition 8.10: Log-differentiate (8.52) to obtain
d lnLN
dfM
=
[
− f
N
H¯N − nMfN −
1
ζ(ε− 1)
1
n− nS − nM
+
1
ζ(ε− 1)
αε−1
(ωˆN )ε−1
(
wN
wSaS
)1−ε − (nS + αε−1nM )
 dnM
dfM
+
1
ζ
(nS + αε−1nM )
(
wN
wSaS
)−1
(ωˆN )ε−1
(
wN
wSaS
)1−ε − (nS + αε−1nM )
d
(
wN
wSaS
)
dfM
. (8.56)
From (8.56), dLN/dfM > 0 exactly if
0 <
{
−
[
ζ(ε− 1)fN
H¯N − nMfN +
1
n− nS − nM
]
·
[
(ωˆN )ε−1
(
wN
wSaS
)1−ε
− (nS + αε−1nM )
]
+ αε−1
}
dnM
dfM
+(ε− 1)(nS + αε−1nM )
(
wN
wSaS
)−1 d( wN
wSaS
)
dfM
. (8.57)
From (8.49),
αε−1 −
(ωˆN )ε−1
(
wN
wSaS
)1−ε − (nS + αε−1nM )
n− nS − nM ≤ (ε− 1)
fM + w
N
wSaS
aSfN
L¯S − nMfN (α
−1nS + αε−1nM ).
So for fM → 0 and fN → 0, the (potentially negative) term in braces in (8.57) goes to zero,
and the assertion follows from d(wN/(wSaS))/dfM > 0 (cf. Proposition 8.9). ||
Proof of Proposition 8.11: Southern workers’ utility is wS/P = (wS/wN )(wN/P ). The
real wage for unskilled labor in the North wN/P is fixed via (8.28). From Proposition 8.9,
d(wN/(wSaS))/dfM > 0. So wS/P rises as fM falls.
As their real wage is fixed, unskilled Northern workers’ expected utility falls whenever em-
ployment falls. From Proposition 8.10, this happens for fM and fN small enough.
The real wage of skilled workers in the North vN/P = (vN/wN )(wN/P ) falls whenever
vN/wN falls. From (8.30), vN/wN is given by the power term in (8.52), so
d ln
(
vN
wN
)
dfM
=
d lnLN
dfM
+
fN
H¯N − nMfN .
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The fact that LN decreases as fM falls for fM and fN small enough implies that vN/wN
and, hence, vN/P also fall for fM and fN small enough. ||
8.10.3 Proof of Proposition 8.12
Proof: The upper right panel of Figure 8.13 depicts the dependence of the monopoly union
wage in the North on the real wage in the South. The upper left panel of Figure 8.13 illustrates
the dependence of (wNaN )/(wSaS) on wS/P . For wS/P < ω˘S(nM ), wN/P is constant, so
(wNaN )/(wSaS) falls as wS/P rises. At wS/P = ω˘S(nM ), (wNaN )/(wSaS) jumps downward,
from above 1/aS to below 1/aS . For wS/P > ω˘S(nM ), from (8.37), (wNaN )/(wSaS) and
wN/P are inversely related. Since wN/P is an increasing function of wS/P , (wNaN )/(wSaS)
is a decreasing function of wS/P .
Consider the inverse of the mapping of wS/P on (wNaN )/(wSaS) depicted in the upper left
panel of Figure 8.13. Let ν(nM ) be implicitly determined by
ν(nM ) =
ω˘N (ν(nM ), nM )
ω˘S(nM )aS
,
and
ν¯(nM ) =
ωN
ω˘S(nM )aS
.
Notice that ν(nM ) ≤ 1/aS ≤ ν¯(nM ). For (wNaN )/(wSaS) ≤ ν(nM ), there is wS/P
which induces the monopoly union to set wN/P = ω˘N ((wNaN )/(wSaS), nM )/aN . For
(wNaN )/(wSaS) ≥ ν¯(nM ), there is wS/P such that wN/P = ωN/aN . For (wNaN )/(wSaS) ∈
(ν(nM ), ν¯(nM )), there is no pair (wS/P, wN/P ) consistent with the monopoly union’s max-
imizing decision. For (wNaN )/(wSaS) < ν(nM ), when (wNaN )/(wSaS) increases, wS/P and,
hence, wN/P fall (and wN/P = ω˘N (0, nM )/aN = ωN/aN for (wNaN )/(wSaS) = 0). So the
wage rate wN/P set by the monopoly union is a non-increasing function of (wNaN )/(wSaS) in
each of the intervals (0, ν(nM )) and (ν¯(nM ), ∞); but as (wNaN )/(wSaS) jumps upward from
ν(nM ) to ν¯(nM ), the monopoly real wage jumps upward from ω˘N (ν(nM ), nM ) to ωN/aN .
An increase in nM reduces the value of the union’s objective function (8.36) for all wN/P >
b1/β. From the envelope theorem, the derivative of the maximum value of the union’s ob-
jective function with respect to nM is proportional to max{(wNaN/wS)λ, 1}. Starting from
a situation such that wS/P = ω˘S(nM ) (so that (8.36) has two maxima), let nM rise. Since
the value of the maximum with wN/P > (wS/P )/aN (i.e., max{(wNaN/wS)λ, 1} = 1) reacts
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Figure 8.13: Admissible ((wNaN )/(wSaS), nM ) pairs.
stronger to the increase in nM , the maximum with wN/P < (wS/P )/aN now has a higher
value. Since the objective function decreases when wS/P falls for wN/P < (wS/P )/aN and
is independent of wS/P for wN/P > (wS/P )/aN , wS/P has to fall in order to restore two
maxima again, i.e., ω˘S(nM ) is a decreasing function. ω˘N ((wNaN )/(wSaS), nM ) is decreasing
in its second argument. So for any wS/P > ω˘S(nM ), the optimum wage rate wN/P and,
consequently, (wNaN )/(wSaS) fall as nM rises (i.e., the relevant portions of the graphs in
the upper panels of Figure 8.13 shift to the left). For the inverse of the mapping from
wS/P to (wNaN )/(wSaS), this means that the bounds of the interval of non-admissible
(wNaN )/(wSaS)-values (ν(nM ), ν¯(nM )) change (the upper bound rises, the lower bound
may rise or fall).29 For nM and, hence, max{(wNaN/wS)λ, 1}nM close to zero, the difference
between the two optimum wages wN/P for wS/P = ω˘S(nM ) is small, so ν(nM ) and ν¯(nM )
are close to 1/aS (see the bottom panel of Figure 8.13). ||
29An increase in nM leads to a rise in ν¯(nM ) = ωN/ω˘S(nM )aS , since ω˘S(nM ) is a decreasing function of nM
and ωN is independent of nM . ν(nM ), which is implicitly determined by ν(nM ) = ω˘N (ν(nM ), nM )/ω˘S(nM )aS ,
may rise or fall due to opposing effects.
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8.10.4 Proposition 8.A.1
Proposition 8.A.1: Suppose productivity in Southern plants of MNEs is certain and firms
have the option to offshore. Then an equilibrium with nM > 0 coincides with the equilibrium
of the (identically parameterized) model with irreversible offshoring. The set of parameters
for which equilibrium exists is smaller than in the model with irreversible offshoring.
Proof: Firms which have spent the fixed cost of offshoring move production to the South
exactly if production is more expensive in the North, i.e., if wNaN > wSaS . So the unions’
objective function is (omitting variables taken as given by the monopoly union)
(
n− nS − 1wNaN
wSaS
>1
nM
)[(
wN
P
)β
− b
](
wN
P
)−ε
, (8.58)
where 1 is the indicator function. Unions set wN/P = ωN/aN or wN/P = (wSaS)/(aNP )
(so that wNaN = wSaS and the potential offshorers stay at home), depending on which real
wage yields the higher value of the objective function. But wNaN > wSaS in an equilibrium
with nM > 0, since no firm would spend the fixed cost of offshoring if the operating profit
differential between producing in a Southern subsidiary and in the North were non-positive.
So there cannot be an equilibrium with nM > 0 and wN/P 6= ωN/aN . As a consequence, the
same conditions as in the model with irreversible offshoring determine equilibrium prices and
quantities. An additional condition for existence is that the objective function (8.58) takes
on a higher value at ωN/aN than at (wSaS)/(aNP ). ||
8.10.5 Proof of Proposition 8.14
Proof: In the model with homogeneous firms, if (8.5) holds, equilibrium employment in the
North satisfies
LN = (n− nM )a
N
aS
(ε− 1)fM
wNaN
wSaS
[(
wNaN
wSaS
)ε−1 − 1] . (8.59)
With firm heterogeneity, employment satisfies LN = [n− (wNaN/wS)λnM ]aNxN . If (8.40)
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holds and wNaN/wS < 1, then
LN =
[
n−
(
wNaN
wS
)λ
nM
]
aN
(λ+ 1− ε)fM(
wNaN
wS
)1+λ
> (n− nM )aN (λ+ 1− ε)f
M(
wNaN
wS
)1+λ . (8.60)
As in the model with homogeneous firms, employment is proportional to the mass of firms
active in the North and to the scale of each firm, and firm scale is a monotonically decreasing
function of relative production cost (wNaN )/(wSaS) alone. Given nS = 0, (8.43) alone
determines the mass of firms which incur the fixed cost of offshoring if ˘(wNaN )/(wSaS) ≤
ν(n˘M ):
n˘M =
1
1 + λ
L¯S
fM
. (8.61)
Let
ν˘ =
(
λ
λ+ 1− ε
) 1
ε−1
.
Further, let
LN
′
= (n− n˘M )a
N
aS
(λ+ 1− ε)fM
ν˘
denote the value of (8.59) evaluated at ( ˘(wNaN )/(wSaS), nM ) = (ν˘, n˘M ). The first assertion
of the proposition follows from the fact that L˘N > LN ′ and LN ′ > LN∗ if n˘M ≤ nM∗. From
(8.60) and ( ˘wNaN/wS) < 1,
L˘N > (n− n˘M )aN (λ+ 1− ε)fM .
The validity of L˘N > LN ′ follows from the fact that
aS ν˘ =
λ
1 + λ
(
λ
λ+ 1− ε
) 1
ε−1
> 1
for λ > ε− 1 (the expression on the left-hand side is decreasing in λ and converges to unity
as λ→∞). From (8.10), g(n˘M , fM ) = ν˘. From n˘M ≤ nM∗ and the fact that g is increasing
in nM , it follows that ((wNaN )/(wSaS))∗ ≥ ν˘ (cf. Figure 8.14). Since the right-hand side
of (8.59) is a decreasing function of both (wNaN )/(wSaS) and nM (whenever g is positive-
valued), it follows that LN ′ > LN∗.30
30Analogously, from the fact that g˘ is an increasing function of nM and (8.60), it follows that if two equilibria
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Figure 8.14: Employment with and without uncertainty.
Turning to the case n˘M < n/2, ˘(wNaN )/(wSaS) < ((wNaN )/(wSaS))∗, and n˘M > nM∗, from
(8.8), (8.59), and ω˘N ( ˘(wNaN )/(wSaS), n˘M ) < ωN , equilibrium employment in the model
with homogeneous firms satisfies
LN∗ < (n− nM∗)a
N
aS
(ε− 1)fM(
wNaN
wSaS
)∗ ω˘N( ˘(wNaNwSaS ), n˘M)ε−1−αε−1n
αε−1nM∗
.
Given nS = 0, for (wNaN )/(wSaS) ≤ ν(nM ), (8.42) becomes
ε− 1
λ+ 1− ε
(
wNaN
wS
)λ
=
ω˘N
(
wNaN
wSaS
, nM
)
− αε−1n
αε−1nM
.
Hence,
LN∗ < (n− nM∗)aN (λ+ 1− ε)f
M(
wNaN
wS
)∗ ˘(wNaN
wS
)λ nM∗n˘M .
From (8.60), L˘N > LN∗ is implied by
(n− n˘M )n˘M
˘(wNaN
wS
) > (n− nM∗)nM∗(
wNaN
wS
)∗ .
nM∗ < n˘M ≤ n/2 implies that the numerator on the left-hand side is greater than the numer-
ator on the right-hand side. So the validity of the inequality follows from ( ˘(wNaN )/(wSaS)) ≤
((wNaN )/(wSaS))∗. ||
with nM > 0 exist in the model with firm heterogeneity, employment is higher in the equilibrium with little
offshoring (nM low) and a low wage differential ((wNaN )/(wSaS) low).
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Part IV
Conclusion
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Chapter 9
Summary and future research
This dissertation presents two applications of the economics of investment in the presence of
risk and market frictions. The first application addresses the role of aggregate risk in credit
markets with asymmetric information, while the second analyzes the employment effects of
offshoring in a model with union wage setting. We were motivated to study these topics due
to their relevance and insufficient consideration in economic theory so far. In the following,
we summarize our main results and outline some future research directions.
In Part II, we introduced non-diversifiable risk in the seminal Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
adverse selection model. Portfolio risk rises if the average riskiness of the projects financed
increases, and lenders have to bear this risk. This opens up the possibility of a credit
rationing equilibrium. In contrast, a rationing equilibrium cannot arise in the original
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model, as shown independently by Coco (1997) and Arnold and
Riley (2009). In our model, lenders’ degree of risk aversion plays a crucial role. In order
to conduct comparative statics analysis with respect to this parameter, we generalized the
model by using a non-expected utility framework that separates risk aversion from the
preference for intertemporal consumption smoothing. It is shown that there is a switch from
a two-price equilibrium to a pure rationing equilibrium when the degree of risk aversion
grows sufficiently large. Comparing the two types of equilibrium from a welfare point of
view, the two-price equilibrium is more inefficient. The imposition of a usury law may thus
raise welfare if it rules out the higher interest rate of a two-price equilibrium. Additionally,
we derived optimal investment in a first-best and a second-best solution. Relative to
both optima, the credit market equilibrium may be characterized by underinvestment or
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overinvestment. Hence, credit rationing does not necessarily imply too little investment.
Overinvestment can arise if collateral is high and firm owners get little consumption in the
optimum. This contrasts with the standard underinvestment result for the original Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) model.
In sum, the introduction of non-diversifiable risk has profound effects on equilibrium and
welfare. We modified a standard theoretical model in order to illustrate the fact that the
common assumption of independent project payoffs not only reduces complexity in credit
market models with asymmetric information but also significantly influences the equilibrium
outcome and the welfare implications.
This aspect points to an avenue for future research. Although the information-based models
considerably improved our understanding of equilibrium credit rationing, they have the
shortcoming that they abstract from portfolio risk. As non-diversifiable risk plays a major
role in financial markets, it would be desirable that this kind of risk is also considered in
credit market models. We suggest further development of the theory in this direction, and
our analysis demonstrates a possibility of integrating portfolio risk in existing credit market
models with asymmetric information. More generally, correlations and non-diversifiable
risk matter in many areas, but they have not always received sufficient attention in the
theoretical literature.1 Therefore, other fields of financial economics should as well put more
emphasis on these aspects.
In Part III, we first provided a comprehensive literature survey on offshoring and its
labor market effects, bringing together the different strands of literature. Concerning the
phenomenon of offshoring, the analyzed scenarios differ considerably between the numerous
contributions. Some main differences are: skill-specific versus economy-wide (or industry-
specific) offshoring, two-way offshoring between identical countries versus production
relocation from North to South, and cost-saving versus market-seeking offshoring. While
several studies focus on the determinants of offshoring and organizational choice, others
consider the impact of offshoring on wages, the skill-bias, trade flows, employment, welfare,
and many other aspects. As most papers use full employment models, the literature on the
aggregate employment effect of offshoring is still limited. To incorporate unemployment, the
models consider search frictions, fair wages, and union wage setting. Up to now, it is not
1Of course, there are exceptions which also analyze the role of correlations. Katzur and Lensink (2010),
for example, consider correlated project payoffs in the context of group lending in microfinance.
169
fully understood which factors determine the nature and the magnitude of the employment
effect. In particular, the impact of different labor market characteristics on the employment
effect has not been sufficiently analyzed. The empirical literature does not resolve these
issues either, since the findings are inconclusive and the studies have serious limitations.
Concerning the employment effect of offshoring to low-wage countries, existing models
assume that the North is a small open economy relative to the emerging South, i.e., the
production cost in the South is exogenously given. This assumption simplifies the analysis
but is somewhat paradoxical. Due to this fact, we analyzed a model with two large economies
that also takes into account the effect of offshoring on the South and its repercussions
on employment in the North. The model is Krugman’s (1979a) North-South trade model
extended to include offshoring and union wage setting in the North. Our baseline model
supports popular concerns about negative employment effects of offshoring. A reduction in
the cost of offshoring usually lowers employment; it may only have a positive effect when
there is little offshoring initially. Concerning the welfare effects of additional offshoring,
we find that Southern workers always gain from offshoring, but Northern workers and firm
owners may gain or lose. If both employment and the scale of Northern firms fall, all agents
in the North lose. Thus, a high-wage country with a highly unionized labor market does
not necessarily benefit from offshoring to a low-wage country. This pessimistic assessment
of the employment and welfare effects is corroborated by the extension of the model with
two factors of production. In addition, our model explains shrinking union power as an
equilibrium phenomenon. As labor unions face a commitment problem, they may appoint
a “pragmatic union leader”, who will not fight for high wages after firms have decided to
produce in the North. We also analyzed a variant of the model with heterogeneous firms, in
which unions may prevent firms from offshoring by lowering their wage claims. First, this
model possibly displays multiple equilibria implying different wage policies and employment
levels. Second, it justifies a more optimistic assessment of the employment effect, since
potential, but non-realized, offshoring has a moderating effect on unions’ wage claims.
Building on a standard North-South trade model, we illustrated the complex relationship
between offshoring to a low-wage country and domestic employment. Due to our focus on
Western European countries with unionized labor markets, we incorporated union wage
setting as a source of labor market frictions in our model.
In general, it can be expected to see much more work in this lively area of research
concerning offshoring and its labor market effects. International integration intensifies, and
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the widespread business practice of offshoring has profound effects on the involved economies,
which should be addressed in theoretical models. As the fear of low-wage competition is
present in many industrialized countries, there is a need for further research to improve
the understanding of the employment effects of offshoring. We suggest studying various
offshoring scenarios in general equilibrium models with two large economies. Moreover,
dynamic aspects and the impact of different labor market characteristics should be further
considered. Due to the fact that for quite a long time the theory of trade and offshoring has
predominantly used full employment models, there are many questions left to study in the
context of offshoring and labor market frictions.
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